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Abstract 
 
This dissertation assesses the potential impacts of corporate governance codes and legislation on 
Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance. Corporate failures lead to numerous losses for 
stakeholders especially shareholders. Worldwide including in South Africa, this has resulted in an 
increase in legal liability claims against directors and thus insurers.  Often these failures are ascribed to 
corporate governance breaches giving rise initially to corporate governance codes and more recently 
many countries are legislating certain aspects of corporate governance; this includes a codification of 
director‟s duties. South Africa, in-line with the United Kingdom, Australia and to an extent the United 
States has followed suit with the Companies Bill of 2008. This dissertation seeks to assess the possible 
effects of the codes of practice and new Companies Act on Directors‟ and Officers‟ Liability insurance. 
This will be done by ascertaining what impact the new Act will have on directors‟ liability using inter 
alia the Delphi Technique.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, directors and officers liability insurance, 
Companies Bill.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this research is to assess the effects which codes of practice and 
forthcoming company legislation will have on Director‟s and Officer‟s (D&O) 
Liability Insurance. Specifically the research will assess the possible outcomes of the 
proposed Companies Act (due to be passed by parliament in 2010) on D&O 
insurance. 
 
In the past two decades or so there has been an increase in the incidence of directors 
being sued resulting in increasing insurance premiums. Recently in discussing the 
decline of Lloyd‟s profits, Lord Levine, Lloyd‟s chairman singled out the adverse 
performance of the D&O class as one of the causes for the decline.
1
  By February this 
year over 100 civil actions had been launched in the US arising out of the subprime 
crisis, totally in excess of $3.6 – billion.2 Since the early 1990s there have been an 
increasing number of events, and scandals, in which directors and officers of 
companies have been accused of causing losses to company stakeholders, which 
forms the basis of the increasing claims against directors and officers and thus their 
insurers. 
 
This dissertation will first assess whether or not director liability has indeed increased 
and then discuss what mitigating steps have been taken to contain claims against 
directors. An opinion will be formed as to whether or not the mitigating steps have 
been successful. Finally this will be tested by performing a Delphi Technique study in 
order to assess the opinions of the dissertation. In order to make certain that the study 
is robust separate interviews will be conducted with industry experts, which should 
confirm the findings.  
 
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the board of directors 
and assesses whether or not director liability has increased as a result of the doctrinal 
issues. Chapter 2 will inspect whether director liability has increased as a result of the 
complexity issues; this will mostly look at corporate failures which have occurred. 
                                                 
1
 „Lloyd‟s posts its first profit fall in two years‟ Business Report September 9, 2008.  
2
 Paul Tower „A parting of the ways‟, Risk Specialist August 2008 
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Chapter 3 looks at the first mitigating step which is codes of corporate governance. 
An opinion will be formed as to whether the codes of practice have been successful in 
containing directors‟ liability. Chapter 4 will analyse the second mitigating step of 
legislation. The focus will be on the new South African Companies Act which is due 
to be passed in 2010. By inspecting the various sections of the Bill which affect 
directors, one will form an opinion as to whether this new legislation will succeed in 
containing director liability. Chapter 5 explicates D&O liability insurance by looking 
at its history, cycles, the policy, as well as D&O literature. Chapter 6 will contain a 
Delphi Technique study with industry experts in order to assess the views of the 
dissertation. In order to make the study more robust, interviews will be conducted 
separately with some of the industry experts and the opinions will be summarised. 
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1 DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY – DOCTRINAL ISSUES 
 
The objective of the first chapter is to introduce the concept of the board of directors 
and to analyse the doctrinal issues related to the legal liability of a director. The 
doctrinal issues refer to whether or not courts and society have become more willing 
to hold directors liable for their actions, carried out as a result of their duty towards 
the company. In order to do this it is necessary to discuss directors‟ liability, which 
can arise out of four different sources; contract, delict, statute and sui generis. These 
aspects of the law will be discussed in order to assess whether or not directors‟ 
liability has increased and expanded over the years. Further, directors‟ common law 
duties will be looked at with the aim of discovering if these duties have become more 
onerous leading to increasing liability exposures and whether or not courts and society 
have become more willing to hold directors accountable for losses. One must 
differentiate between sources of liability (contract, delict, statute and sui generis), and 
common law duties. A breach of common law duties will lead to liability under two 
(delict and sui generis) of the four sources mentioned.  
 
The first section will introduce the concept of a director by providing definitions and 
explanations according to statute, common law and corporate governance codes. 
Subsequently the board of directors will be looked at as well as its functions and 
committees. The office of the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and the company 
secretary will be examined. The section ends off with a brief description of the 
relationship between the board of directors and management. The second and third 
sections look at director‟s liability and directors‟ common law duties respectively.  
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1.1 Describing the board of directors  
 
Definitions of „director‟ and „officer‟  
 
In South Africa and internationally the board of directors is regarded as the “directing 
mind and will”3 of the company. This is due to the fact that the company is an 
artificial legal entity or juristic person. Therefore the company operates through its 
board of directors.
4
 This section looks at the definitions, as well as the duties and 
liabilities of company directors.  
 
The Companies Act defines a director as “any person occupying the position of 
director or alternate director of a company, by whatever name he may be 
designated.”5 An officer is defined as “any managing director, manager or secretary 
thereof.”6  
 
Another South African statutory definition may be found in Section 332 (10) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act: “any person who controls or governs that corporate body or 
who is a member of a body or group of persons who controls or governs that 
corporate body or where there is no such body or group, who is a member of that 
corporate body.”    
 
Categories of directors 
 
Company directors may be split into two classes: executive and non-executive. 
Corporate governance codes such as the King Codes have made a distinction since the 
early part of the 1990s. It is unfortunate that the Companies Bill
7
 has not defined the 
                                                 
3
 Lennard‟s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL) 713; Canada and Dock 
Co v The Queen 1985 SCR 662; AL Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd (not 
reported).  
4
 R v Kritzinger 1971 (2) SA 57 (A)  
5
 Companies Act 1973 S 1 
6
 Companies Act 1973 S 1 
7
 B 61D – 2008 – referred to throughout the Dissertation. 
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two separate positions. However this is in-line with the Corporations Act 2001
8
 of 
Australia and the British Companies Act 2006.  
 
A distinction between the two categories of directors may be found in King II:  
 
- Executive directors: a director who is engaged in the day-to-day management 
of the company or is salaried as full time. This includes directors of any 
subsidiaries of a company.  
- Non-Executive directors: a director who is not engaged in the day-to-day 
management of the company and is not under full time salary. This includes 
directors of any subsidiaries of a company. A person who is employed full-
time by the holding company or its subsidiaries may be considered as a non-
executive director, unless his/her actions could be interpreted as being 
involved in directing the day-to-day business of the company.  
 
Non-executive directors may also be independent. According to King 2 an 
independent director is a non-executive director who: 
 
- is not an agent of a shareholder who can influence management 
- has not been employed by the company for the preceding three financial years 
- is not a related to any individual that has been employed by the company in 
the preceding three financial years  
- is not a professional adviser to the company 
- is not a customer or supplier of the company  
- has no contractual relationship with the company, and 
- is not involved in any business or relationship of a nature which could 
interfere with his/her independence.  
 
The board of directors  
 
It is necessary to first comprehend the environment in which a director operates prior 
to understanding the office of a director as well as the duties and liabilities attached 
                                                 
8
 Corporations Act No. 50 of 2001 
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therein. This subsection looks at the definition of the „board‟, some of the board‟s 
functions and duties, as well as the relationship between the board of directors and 
management. However it is initially essential to explain the scope and categorisation 
of the company according to the Companies Bill.  
 
Company classification 
 
According to clause (c) l8 of the Companies Bill there are two types of companies 
which may be formed and incorporated under the Act (in the event that it is passed); 
namely profit companies and non-profit companies. According to c8 (2) a profit 
company is:  
 
a) a state-owned enterprise; or 
b) a private company if –  
i. it is not a state-owned enterprise; and 
ii. its Memorandum of Incorporation –  
 prohibits it from offering any of its securities to the public; 
and 
 restricts the transferability of its securities; 
c)  a personal liability company if –  
i. it meets the criteria for a private company; and  
ii. its Memorandum of Incorporation states that it is a personal liability 
company; or 
d) a public company, in any other case.  
 
According to c8 (3) any association formed after 31st December 1939 which was 
formed with the intention of creating benefits for the association or its members may 
not be a company unless it is registered as a company under the new Act, is created 
according to another law, or was created according to Letters Patent or Royal Charter 
before 31 May 1962. 
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Defining the board of directors  
 
The Companies Bill, in c66 (1) states that the business of a company must be either 
managed by the board of directors, or run under the direction of a board. This section 
also states that the board has the authority to perform all its functions as needed unless 
the Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise. This section applies equally to 
prescribed officers.
9
 
 
C66 (2) provides for the number of directors required for the board of the various 
types of companies:  
 
 a private or personal liability company must have at least one director;  
 a public or non-profit company must have at least three directors.  
 
However the Memorandum of Incorporation may specify a greater number of 
directors if the circumstances of the company so require, according to c66 (3).  
 
C66 (4) provides that a company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation may: allow the 
election and removal of any company director; permit a person to be an ex officio
10
 
director of the company; and permit the appointment of one or more persons as 
alternate directors of the company. The Memorandum of Incorporation must also state 
that the shareholders of a profit company, other than a state-owned enterprise, must 
elect at least 50% of the directors, as well as 50% of the alternate directors.  
 
C66 (5) states that an ex officio director may not serve as a director in the event that 
he is disqualified according to c69 (contemplated later). The ex officio director has all 
the powers of any other director unless the Memorandum of Incorporation restricts 
otherwise. The ex officio director also carries the same liabilities toward the company 
as any other director.  
 
                                                 
9
 Defined by c66 (11) of the Companies Bill.  
10
 The Companies Bill defines an ex officio director as a person who holds office as a director of a 
company only as a consequence of that person holding some other office, title, designation, or similar 
position according to the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation.   
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C66 (6) nullifies the appointment of a director, if at the time of election that director is 
disqualified according to c69.  
 
C66 (7) states that a person becomes a director when he is elected in accordance with 
the provisions of the Bill or when he is allowed to do so as an ex officio director. The 
person must also furnish the company with written consent to being a director of that 
company. 
 
C66 (8) makes it mandatory for at least one director of a company to be resident in the 
Republic of South Africa. 
 
C66 (9) and (10) deal with remuneration of directors. The company may remunerate 
directors unless the Memorandum of Incorporation states otherwise. This 
remuneration may only be carried out by a special resolution of the shareholders 
within the preceding two years.  
 
C66 (11) confers powers on the Minister to create regulations which assign specific 
functions to a prescribed office within the company.  
 
C66 (12) states that in the event that a company does not have the minimum required 
number of directors serving on its board, according to the Bill or the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, the board will not be considered unsound and the decisions taken by 
the board in the said circumstances will still be considered valid.  
 
Functions of the board of directors 
 
It is stated in the King 2 Code that the board of directors is the central position 
regarding the corporate governance practices of a company. This involves 
accountability and responsibility for the functioning and affairs of the organisation. A 
unitary board structure is common practice in South Africa and this is supported by 
the King Code. 
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Some of the key functions of the board of directors according to King 1 and King 2 
are:  
 
- The construction of the company‟s strategy and arrangement.  
- The board must ascertain which businesses the company will partake in.  
- The board must monitor executive management and ensure the execution of 
the company strategy. 
- The board must appoint the company CEO. 
- The board must ensure that a succession plan is in place in the event that the 
position of the CEO is vacant. This is to minimise any disruption.  
- The board must ensure company compliance with applicable laws, regulations 
and codes of business practice. 
- The board must make certain that the company communicates with 
shareholders and relevant stakeholders. 
- The board should ensure that the company has satisfactory systems of internal 
controls. 
- Information must be supplied to all shareowners and relevant stakeholders. 
- It is the board‟s duty to ensure that the company functions in an ethical 
manner. 
- The board must produce a code of corporate conduct for the company which 
focuses on conflicts of interest relating to directors and management. This 
code must be constantly reviewed and updated. 
- Systems must be in place allowing directors to seek independent professional 
advice relating to the company‟s affairs.  
- It is important for the board of directors to deliberate whether its size, diversity 
and demographics render it successful.  
- The board of directors should acknowledge focal risk areas and performance 
indicators of the company. 
- An evaluation must be regularly performed on the company‟s technology and 
operational systems. 
- Identification and monitoring of non-financial aspects of the company. 
- The board of directors must record the reasons for the belief that the company 
will be a going concern. In the event that the company is believed not be a 
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going concern, the reasons must be provided as well as an action plan to 
resolve the situation. 
- All items discussed at the annual general meeting (AGM) must be 
supplemented by a description of the consequences of a proposed decision.  
- The board of directors must promote the attendance of shareholders at the 
AGM. Directors should be present at the AGM as well as the chairpersons of 
the board committees.  
- The company annual report must contain the CV of all directors.  
- The board of directors must create a charter which establishes its 
responsibilities. This must be disclosed in the annual report.   
- The board of directors must perfect a method of conforming to corporate 
governance constraints, whilst still executing their duties in an entrepreneurial 
manner.
11
  
 
C46 of the Companies Bill deals with the fact that distributions must be authorised by 
the board of directors. A company may only make a distribution if it is as a result of a 
legal obligation, a court order, or by a resolution of the board. The company must be 
able to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test after the distribution has been made. It is 
the duty of the board to acknowledge the application of the solvency and liquidity 
test.
12
 Once the board has made this acknowledgment the distribution must be made in 
full as originally contemplated.
13
 
 
If the distribution has not been made 120 days after the board made the 
acknowledgment, the board must reconsider the solvency and liquidity test. A new 
resolution will have to be passed by the board unless the distribution is subject to a 
court order or legal obligation.
14
 If the distribution will lead to an incurrence of debt 
or an obligation by the company, the requirements of this c46 apply after the board 
decides that the company may incur the debt or obligation.
15
 
                                                 
11
 This point is very important when looking at the codification of director‟s duties under the 
Companies Bill. There is an ongoing debate as to whether imposing high standards on director conduct 
and duties will inhibit the entrepreneurial spirit with which companies undertake risky operations in 
order to generate high returns for shareholders. 
12
 C46 (1) 
13
 C46 (2) 
14
 C46 (3) 
15
 C46 (4) 
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If as a result of carrying out the solvency and liquidity test, it is evident that the 
company will not satisfy the requirements of c46 for a court order distribution, the 
company may apply to a court in order to vary the original order. The court may 
change the order if it is just and equitable with respect to the financial circumstances 
of the company, and if the person to whom the company owed money will be repaid 
within a reasonable time period.
16
 A director of a company will be personally liable if 
that director is present at a board meeting, at which a resolution is passed that is 
contrary to this section.
17
 
 
It is evident that the board of directors carries an enormous amount of corporate 
duties. Although the functions are set out in corporate governance codes, existing and 
potential legislation such as the Companies Bill are now holding directors accountable 
to ever increasing standards. Compliance with the King codes is a necessity only for 
current public companies, however only to the extent that conformity is described in 
the annual report as is obligatory in the JSE Listing Requirements. 
 
Board of directors‟ committees  
 
According to c72 (1) of the Companies Bill, the board of directors may arrange any 
number of committees of directors, as well as delegate any authority of the board. 
This is subject to possible restrictions contained in the company‟s Memorandum of 
Incorporation.  
 
C72 (2) states that a committee may contain persons who are not directors of the 
company; however these persons must not be ineligible to be directors according to 
c69. Further, these persons may not actually vote on a matter which is to be decided 
by the committee. The committee may receive advice from any person and possesses 
the authority which is conferred to it by the board of directors.  
 
                                                 
16
 C46 (5) 
17
 C46 (6) 
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It is important to note that according to c72 (3) the creation, delegation of a matter, or 
action taken by a committee does not constitute a satisfaction of a director‟s duty 
toward the company relating to c76 (discussed later).   
 
C73 sets out the requirements and procedures of board meetings. A director when 
authorised by the board, is permitted to call a board meeting. If the board consists of 
at least twelve members then 25% of the directors must necessitate the meeting, 
otherwise only two directors must require the meeting if the board consists of less 
members than specified. However the Memorandum of Incorporation may set out any 
other number of directors who must require a meeting in order for it to take place.  
 
The board meeting may be carried out through electronic communication, or certain 
members may partake via electronic communication unless the Memorandum of 
Incorporation states otherwise. The method of electronic communication is required 
to be clear and concise. The board may determine the means and time in order to give 
notice of meetings; however this must comply with the Memorandum of 
Incorporation. No meeting may be assembled unless all the directors of the company 
have received notice thereof. It is however possible for a meeting to occur even 
though the company did not manage to give the required notice of the meeting. This 
will be allowed if all the directors of the company admit receipt of the notice, are 
present at the meeting, or waive notice of the meeting. This is unless the 
Memorandum of Incorporation states otherwise.  
 
In order for a vote to be carried out at a board meeting, the majority of the directors of 
the company must be present. A majority of votes cast is sufficient to pass a 
resolution and each director only has one vote in the matter. If there are an equal 
number of votes regarding a certain resolution, the Chairman of the company will 
possess the deciding vote; only in the event that the Chairman did not actually 
originally vote on the matter. If the Chairman has already voted and the numbers are 
still tie, the matter is not carried.  
 
The company is required to keep minutes of board meetings and those held by any 
board committees. The minutes must contain any resolutions approved by the board, 
as well as any declaration of a director‟s personal financial interest in any matter. The 
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resolutions adopted by the board must be dated and numbered consecutively in order 
to provide a clear understanding if ever required. The resolutions adopted by the 
board are effective as soon as they are passed, unless otherwise specified. The chair‟s 
signature on the minutes of the board meeting renders the proceedings effectual and 
may be used for evidentiary purposes.  
 
According to King 2, board committees are there to support the board of directors in 
accomplishing their duties. The duration and function of committees must be formally 
determined and committees should ideally be chaired by an independent non-
executive director. Committees must be subjected to reoccurring evaluation and must 
have the ability to seek outside independent professional advice regarding company 
business.  
 
King 2 states that all company boards must contain a minimum of an audit committee 
and a remuneration committee. The following is a list of the more often used board 
committees, as well as their basic roles.  
 
- Audit committee: the committee is meant to help the board regarding the 
safeguarding of assets, maintaining systems and the production of accurate 
financial statements conforming to prescribed accounting standards (King 2). 
This committee is particularly important as it ensures company compliance 
with corporate governance standards.  
- Remuneration committee: the committee is charged with the duty to ensure 
that directors are compensated accordingly for their duties. The approach must 
accommodate for the need to recruit, retain and motivate directors with 
necessary skills. It is necessary to remunerate directors and executive 
managers appropriately in order make certain that their interests mimic those 
of the shareowners. The remuneration committee holds a monumental task as 
conflicts of interest arise easily when rewards are set for the directors 
themselves (Wixley & Everingham, 2005).  
- Actuarial committee: generally found in long-term insurance companies. The 
main purpose of this committee is to assess the technical features of a 
company‟s actuarial policy and to make proposals to the board (Wixley & 
Everingham, 2005).  
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- Chairperson‟s committee: the main objective of this committee is to provide 
the chairperson with a forum for strategic analysis. A chairperson‟s committee 
is most often found in companies with a sizeable board of directors (Wixley & 
Everingham, 2005). 
- Credit committee: the aim of this committee is to evaluate the company‟s 
credit policy; it is mostly found in banks and lending organisations (Wixley & 
Everingham, 2005). 
- Employment equity and skills retention committee: the main aim of this 
committee is to ensure strategically that the company can appeal to and retain 
skilled employees (Wixley & Everingham, 2005). 
- Environmental, health and safety committee: the aim is to develop and 
monitor environmental, health and safety procedures (Wixley & Everingham, 
2005).  
- Executive committee: the purpose of this committee is to support the CEO in 
management tasks.  
- Governance committee: it is essential that the governance committee make 
certain that the board of directors and the organisation as a whole conforms to 
good corporate governance practices. This committee should consist of non-
executive directors (Wixley & Everingham, 2005).  
- Information technology committee: deals with governance and operational 
issues relating to IT. 
- Investment committee: deals with operational and governance issues regarding 
the investment of company capital.  
- Nomination committee: it is the main objective of this committee to make 
certain that the company‟s board contains directors with relevant skills and 
knowledge.  
- Risk management committee: this committee deals with the continuing 
improvement and monitoring of the company‟s risk management system.  
 
Chairman 
 
The chief function of the chairman of a company is to lead the board of directors in a 
sense that one may attain the utmost participation by all members of the board. 
According the King 1 the chairman must head board meetings and ensure compliance 
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with corporate governance standards, as well as to direct company shareholder 
meetings. Other primary functions of the chairman are to oversee the selection of 
board members, supervise the succession plan of executives (Wixley & Everingham, 
2005), provide a link between the board of directors and management, preserving 
contact with the shareholders, introducing new directors to their roles on the board, 
and initiating the elimination of inept directors from the board.  
 
The chairman should be an independent non-executive director and it is recommended 
that one person should not preside over both the roles of chairman and CEO. Due to 
the fact that there is a shortage of skills in South Africa, it is not feasible to expect all 
companies to separate the two roles. However where one person presides over both 
offices, it is a corporate governance requirement that this decision is explained in the 
company‟s annual reports.   
 
Chief executive officer 
 
The CEO is appointed by the board of directors and is thus accountable to them. The 
CEO is charged with the operational performance of the company. Some of the main 
objectives of the CEO according to the King Report are: 
 
- to provide for the monitoring and management of the business of the company 
- to provide a competent management group 
- to be the chief representative of the company 
- to ensure that the corporate culture is one of corporate governance observance 
- to create and progress the strategy and vision of the company, and 
- to supervise the functioning of corporate policies  
 
Company secretary 
 
As in s268 (a) of the Companies Act,
18
 the Companies Bill under c86 (1) renders the 
appointment of a company secretary mandatory for a public company or state-owned 
enterprise. The company secretary must be a permanent resident in the Republic of 
                                                 
18
 Under Section 268 (A) of the Companies Act, the appointment of a company secretary is compulsory 
for public companies.  
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South Africa. C86 (3) states that the first company secretary of a public company or 
state-owned enterprise may be assigned by the incorporators of the company or within 
40 business days of the incorporation by either the directors, or an ordinary resolution 
of the shareholders. The company secretary must be appointed within 60 days 
subsequent to a vacancy on the board of directors, by a person whom the board 
considers to possess the required experience and expertise.  
 
C87 states that a juristic person
19
 or a partnership may be a company secretary; that is 
provided that certain requirements are met by the entity, such as those under c84 (5)
20
 
and c86. An alteration of the membership of the juristic person or partnership does not 
amount to a vacancy in the office of the company secretary so long as the 
requirements are still met. According to c87 (3), the juristic person or partnership, 
which is serving as company secretary must inform the directors in the event that the 
said juristic person or partnership, no longer satisfies the requirements necessary to 
hold the office. The directors are justified in assuming that the company secretary 
satisfies the necessary requirements if it is comprised of a juristic person or 
partnership. The company secretary‟s actions are not considered invalid if the juristic 
person or partnership does not satisfy the necessary requirements to hold the office.   
 
It is mentioned in King 2 that the company secretary bears a fundamental part of the 
corporate governance of a company. It is for this reason that widely held companies 
are compelled to appoint a secretary; corporate governance is much more highlighted 
when dealing with public companies. The public requires more protection when 
dealing in the shares of a company as they have less access to information than the 
shareowners of private companies. King 2 states that the board of directors must 
enable the company secretary to conduct his/her duties in an unproblematic manner. 
Some of the most important functions of the company secretary according to King 2 
are as follows: 
 
- to provide direction to the board and individual directors relating to the 
performance of their duties in the best interests of the company 
                                                 
19
 According to the Companies Bill definition a juristic person includes a foreign company and a trust, 
whether it was formed in South Africa or abroad.  
20
 The requirements refer to those in c69 (8) which is one of the instances where a person may be 
disqualified from being a company director. C69 is discussed later.  
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- to instruct new and inexperienced directors regarding their duties 
- to support the chairman and CEO in the establishment of the annual board 
plan 
- to assist in strategic matters at board level, and 
- to offer guidance to the board of directors regarding issues of corporate 
governance and ethics. 
 
King 2 also recommends that the company secretary must be weighed up by the fit 
and proper test as is the case for new director appointments.  
 
The Companies Bill goes on to state the duties of a secretary under c88 (2) (a-g). The 
list is not however exhaustive:  
 
- providing directors with guidance regarding their duties, responsibilities and 
powers 
- bringing to the attention of directors any law affecting the company and 
making any failure of legal compliance known at shareholders meetings 
- informing the board on whether the company or any director is not complying 
with the proposed legislation 
- making certain that the minutes of shareholder, board and committee meetings 
are recorded correctly 
- certifying in the annual financial statements that the company has filed the 
requisite returns in accordance with the proposed legislation, as well as that 
the returns are true, correct and up to date, and 
- making certain that everyone who is entitled to the company‟s financial 
statements receives a copy 
- carrying out the responsibilities of a person selected in accordance with c33 
(3).
21
  
  
C88 (1) states that the company secretary is accountable to the board of directors.  
 
                                                 
21
 C33 deals with the company‟s annual transparency and accountability report. In terms of c33 (3), the 
company must select a person who is responsible for the company‟s compliance with the requirements 
of this section, in its annual return, which is filed.   
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The relationship between board and management 
 
It is essential to look at the board-management relationship as the board of directors 
may be held accountable when not performing their oversight duties. Executive 
management may also be held accountable to the same standards as the board when 
duties have been delegated or by simple fact that a person in a managerial position 
may be regarded as a company officer.  
 
The relationship between the board of directors and management is a simple one, in 
theory at least. The business which a company undertakes is managed under the 
supervision and direction of the company‟s board. By delegating to the CEO, the 
board delegates the power and responsibility of running the business of the company 
to management. In this manner the board of directors monitor management on behalf 
of the company shareholders (Principles of Corporate Governance, 2002).  
 
The duties of management are beyond the scope of this paper however some of the 
main functions are as follows:  
 
- operating the company‟s day-to-day business 
- suggest strategic plans to the board and implement them if necessary 
- presenting and discussing the financial situation of the company with the 
board 
- setting up a suitable organisational structure, and 
- the identification and management of key company risks.  
 
Although it is the board of directors‟ duty to select, monitor and if necessary dismiss 
management, in actuality the board is often dependent on management for among 
other things, information. Individual directors do not have the time and resources to 
completely comprehend the daily business of an organisation; therefore management 
is often in a commanding position. It is for this reason that one often finds that even 
when an executive manager is dismissed, the severance pay is nevertheless enormous. 
Two examples of this are those of the CEOs of Home Depot, the world‟s largest home 
improvement retailer, and Pfizer, the world‟s largest research-based pharmaceutical 
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company who were dismissed in 2006. The mentioned CEOs were both granted 
$200 000 000 severance packages (Monks and Minow, 2008). 
 
1.2 Director’s liability 
 
Broadly speaking, a director may be liable under four sources of law: delict, contract, 
statute, and sui generis. It is crucial to understand that the above are sources of 
liability. This is contrary to directors‟ common law duties. Should a director not 
uphold a common law duty, he/she will potentially be held liable under either delict or 
sui generis. Breaches of contract or statute are dealt with under the respective titles.  
 
The common law duties of directors towards a company are that of a fiduciary duty as 
well as a duty of care, skill and diligence. In South Africa breaches of fiduciary duties 
have had consequences under sui generis; whilst a breach of the duty of care 
possesses delictual repercussions.  
 
This will however change due to the fact that the Companies Bill has attempted a 
partial codification of the director‟s common law duties under c76 (3). It will be 
interesting to see what will be the effects of this partial codification on directors, and 
more importantly for this dissertation, on director‟s liability and insurance. Before one 
inspects the possible effects of the Companies Bill on director‟s liability insurance, it 
is important to look at director‟s liability in South Africa. Firstly all the potential areas 
of liability will be discussed: delict, contract, sui generis, and statute. Then the 
common law duties of directors will be deliberated.  
 
The two common law duties are discussed in detail in the Dissertation as this is one of 
the main topics of change under the Companies Bill relating to directors. A breach of 
director common law duties will now have consequences in statute (the new 
Companies Act) in addition to delict and sui generis, which was only the case until 
the Bill gets passed.   
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1.2.1 The fields of director liability 
 
This subsection is intended to introduce the four fields of director liability. These are 
delict, contract, statute and, sui generis. A brief description will be provided for each 
of these, as well as an explanation of the manner in which they affect directors. 
 
Delict 
 
The law of delict may be classified under the area of private law, the law of 
obligations (Van der Walt & Midgley, 2005). The notion is that everyone is 
responsible for the wrongs which they cause. There is thus an obligation to 
compensate the party which suffered damage as a result of one‟s wrongful act.  
 
However the simple fact that one has caused damage to another does not entail that 
the wrongdoer is liable in delict (Neethling et al, 2006). There are five requirements 
or elements which must be met in order for delictual liability to attach to a person: act, 
wrongfulness, fault, causation, and harm. If any of the mentioned requirements are not 
present, there is no delictual liability. A delict has therefore been defined as an act of a 
person, which in a wrongful and culpable way, causes harm to another (Van der Walt 
& Midgley, 2005).  
 
The above requirements also apply to the delictual question on part of company 
directors. The fact that a director or officer of a company was acting on behalf of that 
company when a third party suffers damage does not denote that the director is liable 
in delict. In the same manner, being a director of a company is not a defence in stating 
that the company is liable and not the director in question (Ferreira, 2005). The 
delictual elements are relevant no matter what interest is infringed and irrelevant of 
the manner in which the infringement resulted. In South Africa this generalising 
method is used whilst in England and in Roman law, a casuistic style is utilised 
(Neethling et al, 2006). The English law of torts (delict) is made up of a set of 
detached delicts, which contain their own requirements. Therefore one may be liable 
under an English law of torts if the conduct of the wrongdoer fulfils the requirements 
of a specific delict (Neethling et al, 2006).  
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In delict a distinction may be made between patrimonial damage (damnum iniuria 
datum
22
) and injury to personality (iniuria). These two actions create the basis for the 
law of delict: actio legis Aquiliae – action for damages regarding wrongful and 
culpable patrimonial damage, and actio iniuriarum – action for damages regarding the 
wrongful, intentional harm to personality (Neethling et al, 2006). The two actions are 
the very core of the law of delict although the field has been stretched and added to. 
Some other important extensions are that of pure economic loss and the action for 
pain and suffering (Neethling et al, 2006). The five delictual elements will now be 
looked at briefly.  
 
Conduct: 
 
In order for an action in delict to exist, a person must cause damage or harm to 
another by way of an act or conduct. The damage to a person which is actionable in 
delict is caused by conduct. With regards to delict, conduct, may be defined as a 
voluntary human act or omission (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
Conduct may be split up into commissio (positive conduct) and omissio (omission). 
Roman-Dutch law made a distinction between the two types of conduct but only 
positive acts would actually lead to liability. This was also the case in South Africa; 
however omissions slowly started being recognised as legitimate causes for claims 
under delict. At first one would only be held liable for an omission if there was a 
connection between prior conduct – factum praecedens (of the defendant) which led 
to a situation of potential loss (Ferreira, 2005). In this case the liability only attached 
due to the prior conduct not as a result of the omission. Eventually omissions were 
legally recognised in South African law as a form of conduct under delict in Minister 
van Polisie v Ewels.
23
 In this case it was also stated by Rumpff CJ that it is important 
to first ascertain whether wrongfulness exists before looking at conduct. This is due to 
the fact that a person may only be held liable for a loss to another in delict if the 
conduct in question was wrongful. One must also keep in mind that the conduct in 
question must be voluntary for the delictual element to apply.  
                                                 
22
 This was created by a plebiscite named the Lex Aquilia around 287 BC (Van den Heever, 1944).  
23
 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 
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The basic inference here regarding directors is that one may be held liable not only for 
action but also for failing to take action. Due to the fact that it may not be feasible for 
a director or officer to determine whether or not their conduct will lead to delictual 
liability, the scale may then be extremely wide.  
 
Wrongfulness:  
 
In order for a harmful act to lead to delictual liability, a loss must occur in a wrongful 
manner. „Wrongful‟ may be expressed as unreasonable or legally reprehensible 
(Neethling et al, 2006). Wrongfulness may only be established in the event that a 
harmful effect has been produced; that is, a legally accepted interest must be violated. 
Alternatively a duty must not be undertaken on part on the respondent. The next step 
is then to decide, making use of legal norms, whether the wrong was performed in an 
unreasonable or legally reprehensible manner (Neethling et al, 2006). Therefore the 
act or omission must lead to an undesirable consequence, which is evaluated 
regarding the reasonableness of the respondent‟s action or inaction.  
 
A basic test for the element of wrongfulness was created in Minister van Polisie v 
Ewels
24
 named the „legal convictions of the community‟ or „boni mores‟ test. The test 
is an objective one which is based on the reasonable standard. One must inquire into 
whether or not in the eyes of the legal convictions of the community, as well as in 
light of the circumstances of the case, the respondent infringed an interest of the 
plaintiff in an unreasonable manner (Neethling et al, 2006). In Minister van Polisie v 
Ewels the legal convictions of the community found that an omission may be regarded 
as wrongful. It was also stated that wrongfulness may attach to an act or omission as 
well as to the resulting consequences. The test seeks to attain a balance of interests in 
establishing wrongfulness.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24
In Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A), Mr. Ewels was battered by an off-duty 
policeman whilst other on-duty policemen witnessed the event and failed to act. The plaintiff chose to 
sue the Minister of Police due to the „deep pocket‟ concept. The Minister was found vicariously liable 
as a result of the omission on part of the off-duty policemen in not preventing the assault.  
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Fault: 
 
Two main types of fault exist: intention (dolus) and negligence (culpa). Fault 
represents the legal blameworthiness of a person who has acted wrongfully (Neethling 
et al, 2006). It is traditionally said that dolus requires legally reprehensible conduct 
and culpa requires a legally reprehensible attitude (Boberg, 1984). However some 
explain that fault is the blame attached to a person by means of the law (Van der 
Merwe & Olivier, 1989).  
 
Fault is to an extent a subjective element as it deals with a person‟s state of mind; 
however the test for negligence is inherently objective. For actions involving 
patrimonial damage and for pain and suffering, one may attach either dolus or culpa, 
for an infringement of personality, dolus is necessary as culpa is inadequate 
(Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
In order to hold a respondent liable in delict under the element of fault, one must 
establish that the person may be held accountable. In order to do this it must be shown 
that the respondent‟s mental state allows for intent or negligence to attach to him. In 
some instances a person may not be held accountable depending on age, mental 
stability, intoxication, and provocation (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
It is known that in reality claims against directors and officers infrequently involve 
intent; negligence is generally dealt with. The general test which is employed for 
negligence is that of a reasonable man or diligens paterfamilias test.
25
 The test 
proceeds as follows: “would a reasonable man in the same situation as respondent 
foresee a reasonable possibility that his conduct might result in harm to another 
person or his property or cause him patrimonial loss and what steps would a 
reasonable man take to prevent such damage or loss? If the defendant failed to take 
the necessary precautions he is at fault” (Bouberg, 1984: 274).  
 
The „reasonable person‟ is a fabricated concept which serves as an objective norm 
regarding behaviour in society. This reasonable person lies somewhere in between 
                                                 
25
 Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 
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one that possesses qualities of extreme care, highly developed skills and education, 
and one that is uneducated, careless and lacks any useful skills. The fabricated person 
is said to be a legal personification (Neethling et al, 2006) of the qualities which a 
community expects from its members. The following is taken from Weber v Santam 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk in which Joubert JA states (Neethling et al, 2006: 121): 
 
“In my opinion it serves no purpose to ascribe various 
anthropomorphic characteristics to the diligens paterfamilias, 
because we are not dealing with a physical person, but only with the 
name of an abstract, objective criterion. We are furthermore not 
concerned with what the care of a legion of reasonable person types 
would have been, such as a reasonable educated person, a 
reasonable illiterate person, a reasonable skilled labourer,  a 
reasonable unskilled labourer, a reasonable adult or a reasonable 
child. There is only one abstract, objective criterion, and that is the 
Court‟s judgement of what is reasonable, because the Court places 
itself in the position of the diligens paterfamilias.” 
 
This is interesting when the test is applied to directors of companies. As will be seen 
later a person may be tested versus the reasonable person who possesses knowledge 
and skill which is more advanced than that of an ordinary man. This is important 
when a professional person is involved, and this altered test is applied to directors of 
companies. In the event that a person, such as a director, holds advanced knowledge 
or skill, he is expected to implement the affiliated standard of care. The requisite 
standard of care then develops into that of a reasonable person who possesses the 
person‟s expertise and knowledge. Thus the standard is higher. Further discussion on 
this topic will be held under the section of the common law duties of directors; 
specifically the duty of care.  
 
Causation: 
 
„Causation‟ refers to the causal nexus between the act of a respondent and the 
consequent damage which the plaintiff suffers. It is inappropriate to hold someone 
accountable if the person in question did not actually cause the damage. One should 
always look at the facts of each case and decide using the relevant evidence 
(Neethling et al, 2006). Causation can sometimes be easily ascertained, for example 
when an act leads to physical harm. However the situation tends to get complicated in 
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the event that the delict involves an omission, the harm caused is not physical, and a 
time lapse exists between the conduct and the damage. For this reason theorists have 
contemplated this element for a long time and different theories are used in order to 
establish legal causation: conditio sine qua non theory, the direct consequences 
theory, the adequacy theory, the foreseeability theory, as well as the flexible approach 
(Neethling et al, 2006). 
 
One should also distinguish between factual and legal causation. Factual causation is 
concerned with showing that the conduct of the respondent actually, in fact, caused 
the harm. This is done by inquiring into the facts and probabilities of each case in 
question. The test used most often by courts in order to determine a causal nexus is 
that of the conditio sine qua non. This is aimed at determining whether one fact leads 
to another. Legal causation on the other hand is concerned with which consequences 
should be legally attributed to the person whose conduct may have led to the harmful 
event. This is needed due to the fact that factual causation can be endless; one act may 
lead to an infinite number of harmful events and it is legally unjust to hold a 
respondent liable for all possible consequences (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
The above was distinctly pointed out in Minister of Police v Skosana
26
 in which 
Corbett JA stated that only once one has established that the negligent act or omission 
caused the harm to the plaintiff, one may then inquire into whether the said negligent 
act or omission is correlated to the harm directly enough for liability to attach. This 
will be decided as the facts of the case are considered. In the same judgment it was 
stated that the appropriate test to be used in determining causation is that of the 
conditio sine qua non test. The inquiry was said to be as follows: “Would the result 
have set in but for the negligent act or omission of the person concerned?”27  
 
This approach has changed from the earlier one, which first started with the influence 
of English law into South African law: only proximate outcomes which are not 
removed from the act should be considered material. Other approaches were to only 
contemplate direct consequences or those consequences which are „natural and 
probable‟ or „foreseeable‟ outcomes (Ferreira, 2005). Judges have now elongated the 
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 Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 (1) SA 31 (A)  
27
 Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 (1) SA 31 (A) at 44 
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interpretation of factual and legal causation and this has led to the necessity of finding 
a balance between policy considerations and unlimited liability.  
 
Damage:  
 
This is the loss which is consequent to a wrongful act. In order for the law of delict to 
provide compensation to a plaintiff some form of damage must have taken place. 
Damage (damnum) is defined as “the detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or 
personality interest deemed worthy of protection by the law.” (Neethling et al, 2006: 
196). The law of delict has a compensatory function which exists in two forms: the 
first is to compensate for damage monetarily for past and future patrimonial damage. 
The second is called satisfaction, which is monetary payment to a plaintiff in order to 
proportionately compensate for the wrong done to him/her. This is most often as a 
result of violation of personality rights (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
The most concerning threat to directors of companies is that of a pure economic 
(financial) loss. This is a financial loss which is not consequent to damage to 
corporeal property or the person (Boberg, 1984). This type of loss normally occurs as 
a result of a negligent miss-statement, which misleads certain individuals, causing a 
pure financial loss. With due regard, it is important to note that pure financial loss 
may encompass patrimonial loss, which is not consequent upon damage to property or 
injury to personality (Neethling et al, 2006). Pure economic loss may however come 
from damage to property or injury to personality, so long as the said damage or injury 
is not upon the plaintiff (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
South African courts were for a long time apprehensive regarding claims for pure 
economic loss. This was as a result of (Ferreira, 2005): 
 
- liability for pure economic loss did not exist in Roman-Dutch law 
- there was a fear that the floodgates would open to a high amount of claims 
- it was thought feasible to spread losses instead of expecting one defendant to 
carry the burden of liability, and  
- it was thought that the plaintiffs and amounts claimed would be indefinite. 
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In the UK the first successful attempt to extend the law of torts in order to recognise 
pure economic loss was in Dutton v Bognor Regis.
28
 This case involved negligence on 
part of a housing council for not identifying faults in a house foundation. However 
progress had already been made in Hedley Byrne v Heller
29
 in which a bank was sued 
as a result of the information it provided regarding the creditworthiness of a company. 
Another case, Anns v Merton London Borough,
30
 then became the foundation for pure 
economic loss in the UK until all decisions were overturned by the House of Lords in 
Murphy v Brentwood District Council.
31
 This rendered all previous decisions on the 
matter incorrect and pure economic loss was no longer recognised as actionable under 
the general law of torts (Cover, 1992). Each case would now have to be looked at on a 
factual basis, to see if it falls within a known category as opposed to falling within 
some general principle, leading to a pure financial loss.   
 
In South Africa, up until 1977 there were two main cases (although others did exist) 
involving an action in delict, regarding losses other than those to corporeal property or 
to the person: Perlman v Zoutendyk
32
 and Herschell v Mrupe.
33
 It is worth observing 
that in both these cases professionals were held liable for their errors; as may be the 
case of directors and officers (Ferreira, 2005). The concept of pure economic loss as 
an upshot of negligence or miss-statements was formally introduced in South Africa 
in SA Bantoetrust v Ross en Jacobz.
34
 Here the court found that there: “it is no longer 
arguable that such a ground of liability does not exist.” (Translation at 187F-G).  
 
In Ewels, SA Bantoetrust confirmed in Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika 
Bpk
35
 the limits of liability for pure economic loss were said to be established by 
looking at the elements of the Lex Aquilia. It was said that indeterminate liability will 
be avoided if „unlawfulness‟ and „fault‟ are given due regard. It would then be up to 
the court on a case-by-case basis to resolve whether the defendant owes the plaintiff 
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 Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC [1972] 1 QB 373 
29
 Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 
30
 Anns v Merton London Borough [1977] 2 WLR 1024 HL 
31
 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908 HL 
32
 Perlman v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 115 – This case involved a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff as a result 
of incorrect valuations by a sworn appraiser.  
33
 Herschell v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) – This case involved a loss on the plaintiff‟s part due to 
incorrect statements made by an attorney. The decision was overturned on appeal.   
34
  SA Bantoetrust v Ross en Jacobz 1977 (3) SA 184 (T) 
35
 Ewels, SA Bantoetrust and Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 
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the duty not to create a misrepresentation (negligently) in the circumstances provided. 
It would also depend on whether the defendant took reasonable care in order to ensure 
that the representation in question was correct. It was stated that in the event that a 
legal duty does not exist toward the plaintiff, the defendant did not act wrongfully and 
may not be held liable. The element of „causation‟ will also be inquired into so as to 
understand the nature of the misrepresentation.  
 
In Durr v ABSA Bank Ltd
36
 the appellant successfully recovered money for failed 
investments in debentures and preference shares which were purchased on the 
recommendation of ABSA‟s regional manager. It was stated that the required level of 
skill and diligence on part of the manager was that which would be expected of the 
members of the profession which the man was a part of. As it was, the manager had 
not taken advice from colleagues or investigated the credit worthiness of the issuing 
company. The manager was held liable in his personal capacity jointly and severally 
with ABSA.
37
 
 
In McLelland v Hulett and others
38
 the plaintiff was a director and shareholder of a 
company who attempted to hold other directors liable for failing to purchase some 
land. The acquisition would have profitable to the plaintiff director as a shareholder of 
the company. An agreement had been made between all the directors to acquire the 
land however the defendants failed to exercise the option. In this case the court looked 
at a policy founded on reasonableness. One must make a decision based on moral 
standards and the legal convictions of the community: was the act unlawful? Should 
the defendant be liable to the plaintiff for the loss suffered
39
 (or profit not gained)? If 
the defendant could reasonably foresee that his conduct will lead to a loss on part of 
the plaintiff, then the conduct is regarded as unlawful. One must now distinguish 
between the circumstances in McLelland v Hulett and others and those in Ewels, SA 
Bantoetrust and Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk. In the latter case 
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37
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the losses endured by the plaintiff were those of expenditures. However in McLelland 
v Hulett and others the plaintiffs claimed damages in the form of speculative losses.
40
 
 
In McLelland v Hulett
41
 and others the court deliberated the following policy 
considerations:  
 
1. Is the loss to the plaintiff finite?  
2. Is the number of potential plaintiffs foreseeable and determinable? 
3. Regarding the knowledge of the defendant of potential harm to the specific 
plaintiff, does that knowledge isolate that plaintiff from a mass of 
unforeseeable plaintiffs? 
4. Would the acknowledgment of liability indicate a fair assessment of: 
a. the interests of the parties involved and their relationship to one 
another; 
b. the social outcomes of the imposition of liability; 
c. the extent of the duty which would be implicated on other persons who 
find themselves in the same position as the defendant? 
5. Would the imposition of the duty be just, taking into account: 
a. the simplicity with which the loss could have been foreseen; 
b. the probability of risk that a loss would be suffered; 
c. the availability of methods to the defendant which could or would have 
avoided the loss; 
d. the potential that those methods would have been a success; 
e. the ease with which a person in the position of the defendant could 
have taken such measures, as well as the cost to him of doing so. 
6. Does the law actually sanction the conduct of the defendant, or, on the other 
hand, does the defendant‟s conduct actually fall into one of the accepted 
categories of unlawfulness, albeit in relation to a person other than the 
plaintiff?  
 
In the relevant case the court opted to award the plaintiff R28 million. The South 
African law is not at a stage where all financial harm is prima facie wrongful, 
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 A speculative risk is one where the potential gain or loss in unknown in advance.  
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 McLelland v Hulett and others 1992 (1) SA 456 (D) at 464 I-J and 465 A-E 
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therefore a duty to prevent pure economic loss for other persons is non-existent. The 
onus lies with the plaintiff to prove to the court that the conduct (or lack thereof) of 
the defendant is unlawful. The court will then decide, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether or not in light of the relevant circumstances, a legal duty to avoid a pure 
economic loss existed on part of the defendant (Neethling et al, 2006). This should 
theoretically be done by considering the legal convictions of the community and boni 
mores. 
 
Other South African cases in which liability for pure economic loss was determined 
are: EG Electric Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin;
42
 Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v 
NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd;
43
 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika BPK;
44
 
Kern Trust (EDMS) BPK v Hurter;
45
 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan 
Construction Co (Pty) Ltd;
46
 and Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Lillicrap, 
Wassenaar and partners.
47
 
 
This section is important due to the fact that directors that breach their duty of care, 
skill and diligence will be held liable in delict. Further discussion on the actual duty of 
care may be found under the section of director‟s common law duties.  
 
One may get an indication that courts and society are more willing to hold directors 
accountable by the fact that the new Companies Act will place the duty of care in 
legislation. Therefore, eventually it may no longer be necessary to show that all the 
delictual elements are in place in order to hold a director accountable. It is easier to 
pin liability under statute than under delict.  
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Statute  
 
Company directors and officers are held personally liable for the fraudulent conduct 
or reckless trading of business
48
 under the Companies Act 61 of 1973. There are a 
number of provisions in the Act in terms of which directors can be personally liable 
for committing fraud; however a discussion of each of these is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. For a more detailed discussion on the effects of the Act on company 
directors and officers, one may be referred to Ferreira (2005). This section will look at 
the main section of liability for directors (regarding fraud) under the Act, as well as 
some of the case law relevant to the application of the Act. A list of South African 
legislation which affects director liability is provided in Appendix 2.  
 
S424 of the Act is entitled: “Liability of directors and others for fraudulent conduct of 
business”. S424 (1) reads as follows: 
 
“When it appears, whether it be in winding-up, judicial management 
or otherwise, that any business of the company was or is being 
carried on recklessly
49
 or with the intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent 
purpose, the Court may, on the application of the Master, the 
liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor or member or 
contributory of the company, declare that any person who was 
knowingly
50
 a party
51
 to the carrying on of the business
52
 in the 
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 Fraud may be defined as: “Fraud consists in unlawfully making, with intent to defraud, a 
misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.” (PMA 
Hunt in South African Criminal Law and Procedure, 2
nd
 ed., Vol. 2, at 755)  
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manner aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, without any 
limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of 
the company as the Court may direct.” 
 
Some of the prominent cases involving directors‟ and officers‟ personal liability under 
s424 will now be looked at.  
 
In Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd
53
 the general guidelines for the 
application of s424 were stated. It was said in this case that s424 does not replace the 
common law remedies available to those who suffer damage at the hands of directors 
and officers, whilst carrying on the business of the company, be it intentional or 
negligent. Therefore the statutory provision is there to supplement the common law 
by presenting the victim with a supplementary remedy. The s424 resolve is available 
if there is a claim against the company as a result of an intentional act, recklessness or 
breach of contract. In the event that there is no existing claim against the company, 
s424 is inapplicable.  
 
In this manner s424 allows the court to infer liability on the directors and officers who 
carried on the business of the company fraudulently or with the intention to defraud. 
However s424 may also be applied when the original claim is not only against the 
company but also against the wrongdoers themselves (directors and officers). It is 
clear from the wording of s424 that there are four means by which a person may be 
held personally liable, that is if the business of the company was carried on: 
recklessly, or with the intent to defraud creditors of the company, with the intent to 
defraud creditors of others, or for any fraudulent intention (Pretorius et al, 2006). One 
must note that a claim under s424 will not be available in the event that a director or 
officer of a company was reckless or committed fraud outside the scope of the 
company‟s business. In that event only the common law rules apply. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
NNO v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society and others, one may not be liable due to the fact that in 
carrying on the business of a company, one may incidentally enable another company to carry out its 
business in a reckless manner. For example a broker may not be held personally liable for the wrongful 
conduct of a company, due to the fact that the broker enabled business between the wrongful company 
and another. The broker would in this case simply be pursuing his own objectives.  
53
 Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) 
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In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman
54
 a subsidiary of the 
Rentmeester group named Wolnit had been performing at a loss for a number of 
years. The financial statements did not reveal how Wolnit would be kept in operation; 
however the company was kept as a going concern by utilising monetary funds from 
its holding companies. The directors nevertheless continued to project that the 
company would thrive in the future. Despite that, Wolnit was voluntarily liquidated 
1989.  
 
The creditors of Wolnit were seeking to hold the directors accountable under s424 of 
the Act. Two actions were brought: the first was to hold the directors personally liable 
for all the debts of Wolnit incurred after a certain date, and the second (alternatively) 
was to recover debts owed to the creditors at the time of liquidation. The court a quo 
(Transvaal Provincial Division) dismissed the claims as it was found that recklessness 
on part of the directors had not been proved.  
 
However the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the directors knew the correct 
condition of the company and purposely intended for the financial statements to 
portray a misleading depiction. It was stated that no reasonable person in the position 
of the directors would have acted the same if they had no intention to defraud. It was 
held that there was no reasonable prospect for the company to settle its debts in the 
future and that the directors knew that the creditor‟s finances were being risked 
unnecessarily. The directors were therefore knowingly parties to the proved reckless 
trading of Wolnit, on a balance of probabilities.   
 
This case as well as that of Howard v Herrigel
55
 confirms the fact that a director can 
be held personally responsible for the liabilities of a company even though there may 
be no causal link between the conduct and loss incurred by the plaintiff. The onus is 
on the person who is claiming recklessness, on part of the defendant, to prove it. To 
this one must show that the defendant was reckless on a balance of probabilities. The 
case also confirms that the test for recklessness is objective in that the defendant‟s 
actions are measured against those of a reasonable person. However the test is also 
subjective in that the defendant‟s conduct is compared to that of individuals who have 
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the same abilities, skills and knowledge as the defendant actually has. It must also be 
pointed out that „recklessness‟ refers to a minimum of gross negligence. When the 
court attempts to decide whether a director was reckless in the conduct of the 
company‟s business, the following aspects must be taken into account (non 
exhaustive): the capacity of operation of the company, the role, functions and powers 
of the directors, company debts, and the company‟s financial situation.  
 
In Kalinko v Nisbet and others
56
 the plaintiff who was a major shareholder of the 
company in liquidation sought to hold the directors of the company liable under s424 
of the Companies Act for debts owed to the plaintiff by the said company. These 
debts were incurred as a result of a retail agreement entered into by the company and 
a third party, which included a subordination clause, whereby shareholders‟ loans 
would be secondary to claims of the creditors of the company. Other claims against 
the defendants were for an alleged breach of fiduciary duties towards the company 
shareholders.  
 
The important principle which resulted from this case was that of the „timing‟ of the 
wrongful conduct. The defendants claimed that the loan was entered into two years 
prior to the wrongful conduct; therefore they could not be held personally liable to 
debts resulting from that transaction. First it was once again stated that the claimant 
has no duty to prove a causal link between the wrongful conduct of the director and 
the loss to the plaintiff. Secondly it was held that the fact that a debt is incurred prior 
to the wrongful conduct does not absolve the defendant under s424. The debt was 
incurred prior to the wrongful conduct, however it continued throughout the time 
when the conduct in question took place. The question must be one of when the 
wrongful conduct took place, irrespective of when a debt was incurred which may 
influence the wrongful conduct in turn.   
 
S93 (2) of the Companies Bill should operate in the same manner as its predecessor. 
The company must be liable for a debt which the directors and officers may be held 
personally liable for provided that they undertook the business of the company in a 
reckless or fraudulent manner. However the Bill seems to „codify‟ some of the 
                                                 
56
 Kalinko v Nisbet and others 2002 (5) SA 766 (W) 
 43 
principles which have been set-out in case law. Directors and officers may be held 
personally liable for the signing of, consenting to, or publishing of financial 
statements, prospectuses or written statements, if knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the fact that the said documents were false, misleading or untrue.  This is 
an addition to s424 of the Act.  
 
Further, the Bill also holds directors and officers personally liable if they were 
knowingly party to the reckless carrying on of the company‟s business, or for an act 
or omission which intended to defraud a creditor, employee or security holder of the 
company. To add to this „any other fraudulent purpose‟ is also included in c93 (2). It 
is worth noting that the Bill has stipulated that the director or officer will be held 
personally liable for either an act or omission, which is wrongful and results in harm 
to the plaintiff. 
 
Perhaps one must assume that the legislators are reacting to the increasing tendency of 
society and courts to hold directors accountable. Not only is there potential additional 
liability under statute, there is also the fact that the common law duties of directors are 
being codified under the new legislation. Even though the codification is in addition 
to the common law, it is easier to prove liability under statute. In this manner two 
sources of liability (statute and delict) will be running concurrently which will 
probably increase the chances of directors being held liable. This is a clear indication 
that courts and society are increasingly looking to point the finger when a loss occurs 
to a company. The pointing is progressively more in the direction of company 
directors.  
 
Contract 
 
The law of contract in South Africa was originally derived from Roman-Dutch law, 
which itself initially was Roman law. In the Cape Colony in 1826 the Bigge and 
Colebrooke report was produced (Christie, 2006). This report suggested, among other 
things, that the Cape Colony should initiate a replacement of Roman-Dutch law with 
English law. The first Charter of Justice created the Supreme Court in the Cape 
Colony an 1826. The first case regarding the application of rules of contract law was 
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that of Louisa and Protector of Slaves v Van den Berg
57
; it was related to an oral 
gratuitous stipulation alteri
58
. South African law was not willing to enforce an oral 
gratuitous promise and reference was only made to Roman-Dutch law in this case. 
However English law would slowly be introduced at the Cape Colony and eventually 
in the rest of South Africa. The first case to apply English rules of contract was that of 
Jacobson v Norton
59
 in which the English concept of quid pro quo
60
 was in issue 
(Christie, 2006).  
 
One may point out six requirements in order for a contract to be valid: agreement 
(consensus), contractual capacity, certainty, possibility, formalities, and legality 
(Bhana, 2007). In the event that the requirements are met, the contracting parties will 
be legally bound in terms of the contract. The following is a brief summary of the 
requirement for the validity of a contract (Bhana, 2007):   
 
- Agreement: A subjective agreement must be reached between the contracting 
parties regarding the following aspects: who the parties to the contract are, the 
rights and duties which the contract generates, and that the contract itself must 
be legally binding.  
- Contractual capacity: The contracting parties must possess the legal capacity 
to enter into a contract. This entails the capability of comprehending the nature 
and effect of the contract, as well as to act in accord with the awareness. It is 
usually accepted that persons over the age of majority possess the required 
capacity to contract.  
- Certainty: In order for the contract to be valid, the contracting parties must 
understand completely their respective rights and duties in accordance with the 
contract. That is, there must be certainty as to what the contract entails.  
- Possibility: A valid contract requires that at the time of conclusion, it must be 
feasible to perform the duties in respect of the said contract. It may happen 
that performance under a contract may be possible at the time of conclusion; 
however it consequently becomes impossible to perform. The contract will 
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 An exchange of something for a contractual promise in this case.  
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still be valid but certain rules will exist which establish who must execute 
which duties, as well as who carries the risk of impossibility.  
- Formalities: Certain kinds of contracts have statutes which stipulate 
formalities that must be met prior the validation of a contract. The contracting 
parties themselves may sometimes set out formalities for a contract. In the 
event that the formalities are not met, the contract will not be valid.  
- Legality: No terms of a contract may be contrary to the law or public policy. 
The law spoken of may be derived from either statute or common law. The 
court will have to decide whether a contract is contrary to public policy by 
taking into account policy considerations as well as the Constitution of South 
Africa.  
 
Parties to a contract may be held liable as a result of the contractual arrangement. 
Regarding directors‟ and officers‟ liability, the majority of claims arise consequent to 
a disagreement as to whether the director or officer assumed personal liability for the 
obligation under the contract, or whether the director or officer only intended to bind 
the company which he represents. It is possible that a director may be held personally 
liable for the terms of a contract entered into as a representative of the company, even 
if that director only intended binding the said company. This would be the case if, in 
light of the circumstances and terms of the contract, the other party to the contract is 
justified in judging that the director intended being bound in his personal capacity.  
 
There are three other main areas regarding contract which are relevant to directors; 
breach of warranty of authority in conclusion of contract, fraudulent 
misrepresentation of belief relating to a company‟s ability to pay, and procuring a 
company‟s breach of contract or prevention of performance by the company of its 
obligations. These three topics are covered briefly; however one may see Ferreira 
(2005) for a more detailed explanation.  
 
Breach of warranty of authority in conclusion of contract: 
 
A company, being a juristic person, can only act through its human agents or 
representatives, such as the directors and officers. The directors are not granted 
complete freedom to bind the company in any circumstance or manner; certain limits 
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are established. The general rule is that if a director or officer acts outside the limit of 
his binding authority regarding a contract, he will be held personally liable under the 
terms of that contract. That is assuming that the other contracting party lacked the 
knowledge of the director or officer‟s lack of capacity to enter into the contract. 
However one must keep in mind that the company itself may still be bound by the 
contract regardless of the director‟s lack of authority.  
 
In West London Commercial Bank Ltd v Kitson
61
 the directors of a company accepted 
a bill, which was taken by the court to mean that the directors made a statement that 
they were sanctioned by the company to accept it on its behalf. However the 
statement was false and the directors were aware of this. Thus with regard to the 
circumstances, the directors were held personally liable to the other contracting party 
(Ferreira, 2005). This may be seen as a fraudulent misrepresentation which was 
reasonable relied upon by the other contracting party. In South Africa the law 
acknowledges actions for negligent misrepresentations. Therefore if the directors or 
officers of a company are not aware of the lack of authorisation, however they should 
reasonably know, one could still attribute personal liability as a result of a negligent 
misrepresentation (Fereirra, 2005).  
 
Fraudulent misrepresentation of belief relating to a company‟s ability to pay: 
 
The entry into a contract by a director or officer of a company relating to the an 
assumed obligation by that company to render performance is considered, by South 
African law, to be a representation by the said director or officer that they believe that  
the company concerned possesses the means to render the performance in question. In 
the event that at the time of the representation, the director or officer was aware that 
the company would be unable to render performance, then the said agents would be 
held personally liable for any ensuing damages as a result of the fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the director or officer‟s belief. As stated above, a negligent 
misrepresentation could also lead to a director or officer being held personally liable 
for subsequent damages. This is in the event that the director or officer ought 
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reasonably to have known that the company would be unable to render the 
performance specified in the contract (Ferreira, 2005).  
 
The representation made must be based on an actual aspect; therefore the 
representation which is scrutinised is that of the director or officer‟s belief regarding 
the company‟s ability to carry out its obligations. The belief in a fraudulent 
circumstance would not have been held or in a negligent circumstance would have 
been unreasonably held (Ferreira, 2005).  
 
Procuring a company‟s breach of contract or prevention of performance by the 
company of its obligations: 
 
A director or officer of a company may be held personally liable under the common 
law for losses arising out of the procurement of a breach by the company of its 
contractual obligations or preventing the company from observing with the said 
obligations. It may be thus deduced that a director or officer of may also be held 
personally liable for losses arising out of a failure to act in order to make certain that 
the company observes its contractual obligations. In Torquay Hotel Company Ltd v 
Couzens and others
62
 it was stated that if a third party interferes with a contracting 
party‟s ability to observe performance, that third party may be held personally liable 
for any resulting losses due to an actionable interference (Ferreira, 2005).  
 
Contractual and delictual liability: 
 
A breach of contract may be defined as a wrongful act by one contracting party, 
which causes damage to another contracting party. This may seem very similar to a 
delictual action as they are both a part of private law. However the two legal fields do 
possess some elementary differences.  
 
A breach of contract occurs when one party to a contract does not fulfil certain rights 
or obligations expected in the contract. Therefore the remedies for a breach of 
contract are essentially intended to enforce or execute the contractual duties. One may 
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say the remedies for breach of contract are intended to fulfil the contract (Neethling et 
al, 2006). This is in contrast to delict which is the violation of a person‟s legally 
recognised interests. In this manner the objective of a delictual remedy is damages; to 
put a person in the same position as before the infringement took place. Therefore 
contractual remedies are aimed at fulfilment, whilst delictual remedies are aimed at 
damages. This may be seen clearly in the case Trotman v Etwick:
63
  
 
“A litigant who sues on contract sues to have his bargain or its equivalent in money or 
in kind. The litigant who sues on delict sues to receive the loss which he has sustained 
because of the wrongful conduct of another, in other words that the amount by which 
his patrimony has been diminished by such conduct should be restored to him.” 
 
Both fields of law also have their own rules which apply; that of delict and contract 
law. These rules are generally not applicable to the other. It is also possible that one 
may be liable ex contractu and ex delicto (Neethling et al, 2006).  
 
In Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers
64
 the dissimilarities 
between an action in contract and an action in delict were pointed out by the 
Appellate Division. When one is attempting to decide whether or not to extend an 
action for a breach of contract to delict, it must first be ascertained whether there is a 
requirement for it. If there is a clear contractual connection between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, and ample remedies already exist then there is no reason to bring an 
action in delict. One may not apply certain delictual rules, such as that of the diligent 
paterfamilias in measuring the degree of diligence, to contractual situations as the 
matter would only be made more complex. Further, delict is not necessary in a 
contractual relationship as the contract itself should specify what the parties‟ 
respective obligations are. One may not remove the contractual terms which the 
parties to the contract agreed to with the intent of protecting themselves (Ferreira, 
2005). 
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Sui generis 
 
A director may be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duties towards the company 
when that director commits a breach of trust. That may be the case if the director acts 
in order to further his own benefits or if he causes prejudice to the company. The 
cause of action in the event of a breach of fiduciary duties by a director does not exist 
in delict or in contract. The actual cause of action is sui generis.
65
 However the 
Companies Bill aims to legislate against a breach of fiduciary duty by a director, thus 
eventually holding him liable under statute. Certain writers have suggested that delict 
should be the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty, as well as that sui generis should be 
a form of strict liability within the law of delict.
66
 However this has been to no avail.   
 
The South African Concise Oxford Dictionary defines sui generis as meaning 
„unique‟ from Latin origins meaning „of its own kind‟. That is precisely what sui 
generis is: unique legal rules and regulations which deal with specific instances. It is 
not possible to classify certain areas or to determine set elements, as is the case with 
delict. This will be described further under the common law fiduciary duty of 
directors.  
 
1.3 Directors’ common law duties 
 
Directors assume duties from contract, statute, the company‟s Memorandum of 
Incorporation, as well as common law. The common law duties may be categorised 
under fiduciary duties and a duty of care, skill and diligence. The common law duties 
will now be described commencing with the fiduciary duty towards the company.  
 
One must comprehend that a breach of common law duties will lead to liability under 
delict or sui generis. However as a result of the fact that courts and society are 
increasingly more willing to hold directors accountable, liability under delict and sui 
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generis is being codified under corporate governance codes and legislation (new 
Companies Act).  
 
The rest of this Chapter will illustrate how director‟s liability has been on the 
increase. This is as a result of society and courts wanting to hold directors accountable 
for company losses and failures. Society has made it the norm for company 
shareholders, and other stakeholders, to take directors to court when losses occur. 
This has been done by increased media exposure, as well as the fact that courts 
themselves are increasingly making judgements against directors. This in turn entices 
society to blame directors whenever a loss is sustained by a company. The following 
sub-headings will show that society is increasingly taking directors to court, whilst 
courts are increasingly holding directors accountable.      
 
1.3.1 Directors‟ fiduciary duty 
 
The South African law regarding fiduciary duties is derived from that of Roman-
Dutch law (Jones, 2007). This duty is a negative one in that it prescribes that directors 
actually reframe from doing wrong to the company (Bekink, 2008). A fiduciary 
relationship is entered into when one person manages the assets of another or has the 
right to act on that person‟s behalf. Thus a director controls the assets of the 
shareholders and has the power to act on their behalf. A director therefore must act in 
good faith regarding the company, must use his powers for the benefit of the 
company, and must avoid conflicts of interest between himself and the company 
(Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
The fiduciary duties of a director may not be in any way mitigated whether in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation, contract, or any other conceivable way.
67
 Further, it 
ahs been stated that an attempt to avoid the fiduciary duty is taken as an actual breach 
of the duty itself.
68
 As stated in the „Corporate Governance‟ chapter there is no 
difference between the fiduciary duties of an executive and a non-executive director. 
                                                 
67
 Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v RN Barrie (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 608 (C); Movitex Ltd v Bulfield 
1988 BCLC 104 (CH); McLennan (1991) 
68
 S v Ressel 1968 (4) SA 224 (A) 232; S v Shaban 1965 (4) SA 646 (W) 
 51 
This may be observed by certain decisions of the Appellate Division.
69
 The director‟s 
fiduciary duty towards the company offers the shareholders a first line of defence 
against wrongful acts on part of the directors. In the event that a director creates a 
benefit for himself or causes a loss to the company, as a result of a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, the loss or benefit may be recuperated by the company; the company 
may then opt to cancel the operation involved (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). The 
fiduciary duty of a director is held towards the company on which board he sits. This 
is the case even though the company on which board the director sits may be part of a 
group of companies. However the director still owes a duty to any subsidiary 
company, of the company on which board the director sits. The director in this case 
owes a duty to the subsidiary company to not allow the holding company to disallow 
the subsidiary to act in its own best interests (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).
70
 
 
One may categorise the fiduciary duties of directors towards a company as follows: 
the duty to avoid a conflict of interest, the duty to maintain and exercise an unfettered 
discretion, the duty to exercise powers for the purposes which they were conferred, 
and the duty to act legally, honestly and within their powers. These duties will now be 
looked at in turn and accompanied by the relevant case law (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
Duty to avoid a conflict of interest:  
 
The director being a fiduciary to the company has the duty to avoid a conflict of 
interest between himself and the said company. The director may not gain any benefit 
from his office with the exception of remuneration. In Cook v Deeks,
71
 company T 
was in the business of railway construction contractors and owned in equal proportion 
by four shareholder directors. Two of the directors obtained a new contract and 
created a new company D to perform the work. This was later ratified by a board 
majority vote of three to one. The three directors (including the two that obtained the 
new contract) stated that a part of the plant belonging to T must be sold to D and that 
T had no interest in the new contract. The minority director claimed against the other 
three in court (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
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The Privy Council held that the contract belonged to T and that the majority directors 
could not ratify their positions simply by being the majority. The directors‟ 
knowledge and reputation had been obtained whilst working for T and this position 
could then not be used to gain a personal advantage. Whilst still under the 
employment of T the directors owed a duty to the company to not allow a conflict of 
interest to arise. The directors would have to first end their positions as such, which 
could have been accomplished by dissolution of T at a general meeting.  
 
It is interesting to note that in 1916 the court was reluctant to create a rule regarding 
director‟s duties which would be so burdensome that one may decline the position of 
a director in order to avoid the duty. Yet the court held that once a director is in the 
fiduciary position he may not let his own interest conflict with that of the company 
which he is meant to protect. It was also stated that allowing a majority to vote away a 
company‟s interest in a contract as well as property owned by the company would be 
discriminatory to the minority (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd
72
 the defendant was the 
chairman of the board of the company, and the company itself was the plaintiff. The 
company had interests in a farm regarding the lease of certain mineral rights. 
However no deal was concluded and the defendant favoured a purchase of the farm. 
The plaintiff then went on to purchase a half-share of the farm through an agent for 
£60 000 and re-sell it to the company (in the form of a trust created to hold the farm)  
for £275 000. The Appellate Division held that the director was not allowed to make a 
profit as a result of his office due to the fact that he found himself in a position in 
which his interests conflicted with those of the company. This was a breach of his 
fiduciary duty toward the company. The plaintiff was ordered to compensate the 
company in form of the £215 000 benefit which he obtained.  
 
The benefit which the director derives from his position as such in a company is 
referred to as a secret profit. However the fiduciary duty toward the company still 
applies in the case that the benefit is obtained in good faith and with no detriment to 
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the company. The court will consider only whether the director obtained a benefit due 
to his office being held in the company; it matters not that the company itself may not 
have been disadvantaged by the situation (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Regal (Hastings )Ltd v Gulliver
73
 the company in question owned a cinema. The 
directors of the company wanted to purchase two other cinemas in order to sell them 
for a profit, however the company could not afford it. In order to do this a subsidiary 
company was created which had £5000 in £1 shares. The company then subscribed 
for 2000 shares and the directors and their friends undertook the other 3000 shares on 
par. The sale of the three cinemas to the new shareholders resulted in a profit for the 
directors. The company successfully sued the former directors for the profit which 
they had obtained. The court held that the directors made a profit out of their office in 
the company and this goes against their fiduciary duties towards the said company. 
This profit was only obtained as a result of the directors‟ office, which furnished them 
with certain knowledge, and it matters not whether it was done in good faith and with 
no actual loss to the company. Therefore the directors‟ liability does not necessarily 
depend on a breach of fiduciary duty but simply on the fact that a benefit was 
obtained consequent to their directorship (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
It is also considered a breach of the fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of interest if the 
director utilises information obtained as a result of his office in order to make a 
personal gain. In Magnus Diamond Mining Syndicate v Macdonald & Hawthorne
74
 
the defendant directors acquired information regarding a profitable piece of land as a 
result of their directorship in a company. The directors went on to purchase the land 
even though this caused obvious competition with their company. The court ordered 
the directors to transfer the land into the name of the company as well as to pay back 
any profits which were obtained consequent to the purchase (Cilliers & Benade, 
2000). 
 
In Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley
75
 the defendant, C, was an 
architect and managing director of the plaintiff company. C sought a contract with a 
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company, E, however the company informed him that it was unwilling to do business 
with the plaintiff company and offered the contract to C personally. C then went on to 
resign from his office with the plaintiff company on the basis of ill-health and 
consented to work with E. C was held liable to the plaintiff company for any 
advantage which he was accredited with as a result of the contract. This occurred even 
though the plaintiff company had no prospect of concluding a contract E. The court 
held that this was consequent to the fact that C made a profit only as a result of his 
position as a managing director for the plaintiff company (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O‟Malley76 (Canadian case) offered services 
regarding mapping and geophysical studies, mainly to government institutions. The 
two plaintiffs were former directors of the plaintiff company and had undertaken 
preliminary work regarding a project in Guyana. The Canadian government requested 
that the plaintiff company and others present tenders for the project. The defendants 
thus terminated their directorships with the plaintiff company and created their own, 
which was successfully received the contract. The court held that the defendants were 
liable to the plaintiff company as a result of the loss of the contract. The plaintiffs 
were in the position to win the contract only as a consequence of their knowledge 
gained through their directorships. Their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff company had 
been infringed.  
 
In Bellairs v Hodnett
77
 B, the appellant, was the exclusive shareholder of a property 
development company, N, one of the respondents. N owned a lot named N15 in the 
Township of Northcliff. In 1966 B and the other respondent, H, decided to develop 
the property jointly, therefore B sold H 33 of the shares he owned in B. It was then 
decided that N would purchase N19 which was adjacent to N15 and develop it. Later 
N20 which was adjacent to N19 was purchased by B in his personal capacity; B had 
formed a company named P in 1967 which would be a holding company for four 
township development companies comprising of N. H did not want to partake in P 
when it was offered. B sold his shares in N to P for R 28 300 and did not first offer it 
to H. the actual value of the shares was R 116 375 (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
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In 1970 H bought B‟s shares in N for R 232 750, after which N which was owned 
completely by H as well as H himself sued B for the profits which had accrued to him 
in purchasing N20. H claimed that B had a fiduciary duty towards N to purchase N20 
for the company and not himself. The claim was successful in the court a quo but on 
appeal the decision was overturned and the claims were rejected. The Appellate 
Division held that the scope of N‟s business was not to purchase more land in 
Northcliff therefore, no fiduciary duty existed on part of B. Regarding competition, 
the scope of N was to develop property owned by it, not to purchase more. H had 
been aware that B had other property interests from the outset; therefore the aspect of 
competition must have been foreseen by H. Therefore no breach of fiduciary duty was 
found (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd
78
 the managing 
director, L, of the plaintiff company had resigned from his office and whist still in the 
period of notice under his service contract, he constructed a company which would be 
in competition with the plaintiff company. Further, L interfered in the plaintiff‟s 
opportunity to acquire a raw material contract. L then attained the contract for the 
company he set up and convinced some of the employees of the former company to 
work for him. The action brought to court was one of damages for unlawful 
competition. The court held that L had breeched his fiduciary duty towards the 
plaintiff company in that he redirected the raw materials contract to himself, which he 
only had knowledge of as a result of his office with the plaintiff company. He was 
also liable as a result of encouraging employees of the plaintiff company to work for 
him. However the court held that it was not an unlawful act to set up a competing 
company. This was due to the fact that he had already terminated his office with the 
plaintiff and was entitled to create some form of employment for himself, even though 
this would place him in competition with his former employers.  
 
In Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC
79
 the appellant company was an 
on-line maintenance sealing company, which seals leeks in a plant or equipment 
without having to first switch off operations. The respondent was a close corporation 
(CC) which was formed by B (the former managing director of the appellant) and C (a 
                                                 
78
 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T)  
79
 Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T)  
 56 
former general manager of the appellant). The business of the respondent was in 
competition with that of the appellant. Both B and C had resigned from the appellant 
in June 1987 but C remained in the company‟s service until the end of July 1987. The 
bulk of skilled workers also left the appellant to work for the respondent in July 1987 
(Cilliers & Benade, 2000). 
 
Whilst still in the service of the appellant, C proposed a tender for work with Sasol 
and Natref on behalf of the appellant. Yet in July the respondent submitted a price list 
to Sasol in order to offer their services; these prices were slightly lower than that of 
the appellant. The appellant applied to the court for limited relief in that the 
respondent could not perform work for Sasol and Natref as a result of the quotations 
offered. The court held that the respondent retreat the quotations offered to Sasol and 
Natref. This was as a result of the former directors of the appellant utilising 
confidential information in order to arrange competitive quotations. This was a breach 
of fiduciary duties toward the former company.  
 
A director may serve on the board of numerous companies irrespective of whether the 
companies may be in competition with each other. However the director is not 
allowed to utilise the confidential information obtained in order to bestow a benefit on 
to either company (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). However a managing director may not 
hold any other directorships due to the fact that the being involved in the management 
of the affairs of a company will place the director in a situation where he is forced to 
deal with conflicting interests. Thus if a director is permitted to hold an office in 
alternate companies he may also do that for himself; therefore a director may compete 
with a former company of employment (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
The general rule is that in the event that a director enters into a contract with his 
company in which he has a conflict of interests, the contract is voidable if the 
company so decides (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). This rule is also applicable when the 
company contracts with another company in which the director has an interest. 
However the contract may not be voidable if an exclusion clause is placed in the 
Articles of Association allowing the director to contract with the company. If the 
clause is non-existent the contract will still be voidable after a general meeting held 
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by the shareholders in which an informed decision may be taken (Cilliers & Benade, 
2000).  
 
In Cyberscene Ltd and others v i-Kiosk Internet and Information (Pty) Ltd
80
 the 
applicant company applied for interdictory relief in order to inhibit the respondents 
(former directors of the company during the court trial), who during their 
directorships with the applicant attempted to launch a competing business. This was 
done by utilising information acquired as a result of their office at with the applicant 
company. Further, the applicants required that certain property of theirs be returned 
from the respondents. The court granted the applicants interim relief whilst awaiting 
final judgement (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). The court held that the respondents had 
used their office with the applicant company in order to create a competing company, 
whilst still working for the applicants. Further, the respondents used confidential 
information from the applicant company in order to create a business plan and 
marketing brochure for the competing company, thus unlawfully saving time and 
money in compiling their own. The respondents also utilised confidential information 
in order to gain access to certain business prospects belonging to the applicants. The 
fiduciary duty to not allow a conflict of interest to arise between the directors and the 
company had clearly been breached. The interim order was eventually made final.  
 
In Movie Camera Company (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and another
81
 the defendant was a 
technical supervisor who was employed by a company which rented motion picture 
camera apparatus. The company was sold to a subsidiary of a rival company in 1996; 
the subsidiary was the plaintiff. The defendant was made a director and in terms of the 
sale agreement was put under a restraint of trade. The restraint period was effective 
from 1 January 1997 until thirty months following the termination of the defendant‟s 
employment. In 1999 the defendant wished to resign and the company stated it would 
liberate from the restraint if he signed a new contract of employment with them. The 
defendant signed a new contract but resigned soon after. The plaintiff thus applied for 
specific enforcement of the original restraint by means of an interdict. The damages 
claimed by the plaintiff were twofold: one was a breach of the restraint agreement, 
and the other was a breach of fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff due to the fact that 
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the defendant was a director of the company. The later claim is relevant to this 
discussion (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
Regarding the alleged breach of fiduciary duty on part of the defendant; the court held 
that the director had not placed himself in a position where his personal interests 
conflicted with those of the company. It was stated that the director‟s actions did not 
amount to taking advantage of a corporate opportunity which was actually available to 
the plaintiff company. The court held that the defendant had not acted unlawfully in 
any other manner either. Thus an order was made that the plaintiff should for the 
defendant‟s defence costs.   
 
In attempting to determine whether or not a corporate opportunity was available to the 
company which the director took advantage of the court among other things referred 
to Havenga (1996).
82
 Havenga (1996) states that the South African courts have not set 
concrete procedures in order to determine a corporate opportunity. It seems however 
that certain general notions have been applied:  
 
- Can it be said that the opportunity actually belongs to the company?  
- Is the company justified in believing that the director would attain the 
opportunity for the company?  
- Is the company justified in believing that the director would give the company 
a chance to attain the opportunity? 
- Is the company justified in believing that the director would give the company 
a chance of attaining the opportunity?  
 
It is therefore necessary for the courts to decide whether the opportunity was in-line 
with the business of the company and whether it was reasonable for the company to 
expect the director to attain the opportunity on its behalf (Pretorius et al, 2006). The 
court referred to a Canadian case which is commonly looked at regarding corporate 
opportunities; Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O‟Malley83Judge Laskin J stated the 
following at 391:  
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“Among them are the factors of position or office held, the nature of the corporate 
opportunity, its ripeness, its specificness, and the director‟s or managerial officer‟s 
relation to it, the amount of knowledge possessed, the circumstances in which it was 
obtained and whether it was special or, indeed, even private, the factor of time in the 
continuation of fiduciary duty where the alleged breach occurs after termination of the 
relationship with the company, and the circumstances under which the relationship 
was terminated, that is whether by retirement or resignation or discharge.” 
 
The judge was referring to the fact that it is necessary to look at the circumstances of 
each case in question in order to determine whether a director has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the company not be in a position in which his interests conflict with 
those of the company in which he holds an office (Pretorius et al, 2006). This is 
relating to the taking advantage of a corporate opportunity. In the case of Movie 
Camera Company (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and another
84
 the court held that based on the 
facts the defendant had not breached his fiduciary duty towards the company. 
 
Duty to maintain and exercise an unfettered discretion:  
 
A company director has a fiduciary duty not to permit his sound judgement to be 
impeded. The director is also required to utilise his mind in an objective manner 
regarding the affairs of the company. Therefore a contractual agreement which 
requires that a director must vote in a certain manner; will not be enforced against the 
director in the event that the director believes it will be to the detriment of the 
company. In Coronation Syndicate Ltd v Lilienfeld and New Fortuna Co Ltd
85
 a 
director, L, bound himself in a contract with a third party, which required him to vote 
for the adoption of an agreement at a meeting of the shareholders of a company in 
order to increase the capital of that company from £70 000 to £127 000. The court 
held that the director had bound himself in an agreement with a third party; not even a 
shareholder. A shareholder would be expected to look out for his own interests as he 
is dealing with his own assets. However a director, in looking after other people‟s 
assets, has a fiduciary obligation towards all the shareholders of a company. The court 
stated that if a director binds himself to perform in a certain way, and subsequently 
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decides bona fide that this would not serve the best interests of the company; the court 
will not interfere with the director‟s judgement and compel him to act to the detriment 
of that company (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
However it must follow that where a director is bound in contract to perform in a 
certain manner, if the performance is to the benefit of the company, the director will 
be compelled to act as per the contract even if he consequently changes his mind. It is 
possible that a director may be appointed as a nominee who carries out the interests of 
certain shareholders, or other company objectives, however the said director must still 
only act towards those interests if it is for the benefit of the entire company (Cilliers & 
Benade, 2000). In the event that a director is appointed by a third party as a „puppet‟ 
who does not fully comprehend the business of the company; such appointment will 
be deemed illegal
86
. In S v De Jager
87
 it was stated that a former director will still owe 
a fiduciary duty to a company if he positioned a puppet director in order to still carry 
out his work at that company (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). King 2 talks about a shadow 
director, who is a person with whose instructions the directors of the company are 
accustomed to act. Shadow directors are discouraged by the King 2 report.  
 
In an English case, Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock Messrs
88
 two 
puppet directors of Mr. C prompted the transfer of company funds to Mr. C in order 
for him to purchase some of that company‟s shares. This was in breach of the UK 
Companies Act and the court held that the directors did not exercise any discretion 
and did not carry out their fiduciary duties toward the company. The directors simply 
did as they were ordered, just as a puppet would have done. 
 
Duty to exercise powers for the purpose which they were conferred: 
 
A director of a company may not utilise his powers bestowed upon him, as a result of 
his office, for any other purpose besides that for which they were given. The board of 
directors may not use its power to issue unissued shares in order to prolong its control 
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over the company. In Punt v Symons & Co Ltd
89
 the board of directors issued shares 
in order to acquire an adequate number of votes and amend the articles of association. 
This was then used to make sure that specified shareholders would not be able to 
appoint and remove directors. The court held that the powers of the board of directors 
were not used for the purpose for which they were conferred and the allocation of 
shares was removed (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).     
 
In Piercy v S Mills & Co
90
 the board of directors issued additional shares in order to 
preclude anymore directors from joining the board. This was carried out in order to 
make certain that the existing board of directors does not get converted into a 
minority. The court held that the board of directors may only use its powers in order 
to carry forward the best interests of the company; the act in question was done with 
the aim of protection of the existing board. The additional shares issued were thus 
removed (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Mears v African Platinum Mines
91
 the majority of the directors of a company 
passed a resolution which created a maximum call. This call could produce an amount 
which exceeded the requisite of the company within the minimum period given by the 
articles of association upon a shareholder who owned unpaid shares. Consequent to 
non-payment of the call the owner of all of the unpaid shares would have been barred 
from a general meeting of the company which was to be held five days following the 
termination of the notice of call. The meeting was extremely important regarding 
matters of relevance for all shareholders, as well as the company. Subsequent to an 
application by the shareholder who owned the unpaid shares, the court made an order 
interdicting the directors from seeing out the call resolution. No call could be made 
prior to the general meeting. The court held that although courts should generally not 
intervene in the developments of a limited company, such interference is justified if 
there is mala fides – the act of the directors which raises concern is incited by an 
ulterior motive. Directors may only use their powers for the purpose for which it was 
given to them (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). 
 
                                                 
89
 Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 CH 506 
90
 Piercy v S Mills & Co [1920] 1 CH 77 
91
 Mears v African Platinum Mines 1922 WLD 57 
 62 
The board of directors of a company is also prohibited from using its powers in order 
to obstruct a potential take-over bid for the shares of the company. It is considered a 
breach of a director‟s fiduciary duty to utilise his power to ensure that a majority gets 
outvoted; this is irrespective of whether the majority is part of a take-over operation. 
The board of directors may not use its powers to impede a take-over, only due to the 
fact that the board does not want the company to operate in the manner in which the 
new majority will run it (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). However the directors of a 
company will be considered as carrying out their fiduciary duties in the event that 
they prevent a take-over which will not be in the best interests of the company. The 
board may also not use its powers to allot shares in the company in order to overcome 
a majority (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd
92
 the plaintiff company, A, with another 
company owned 54.9% of the issued shares of company M. A made an offer for the 
remainder of the shares, but this was rejected by the board of directors as the price 
was too low. Company S, which was a rival company presented an offer for M, 
however this was rejected by A. The board of directors of M allotted unissued shares 
to S, which then meant that A was now in the minority. The board undertook this task 
in order to discontinue A‟s resistance. The bid from S would then be likely to be 
accepted due to the fact that A was in the minority. The court held that the allotment 
was unacceptable due to the fact that the self interest of the directors was involved. 
The directors had breached their fiduciary duty by using their power for an ulterior 
motive (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
Duty to act legally, honestly and within their powers:  
 
The board of directors has a fiduciary duty towards the company to comply with the 
limits of the powers of the company, as well as their own constraints of authority to 
act on behalf of that company. In the event that a director enters into an agreement 
with a third party on behalf of the company, which is outside the limits of the 
company itself, neither the third party, nor the company may rescind the agreement. 
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The director will be personally liable to the company in the event that any losses 
occur as a result of the transaction (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
Regarding the above, directors are actually in a peculiar position; as a general rule, an 
agent may bind the principal only in the event that he is authorised to do so and if the 
agent is acting within the ambit of his duty (Cilliers & Benade, 2000). However a 
director may bind the company if he is not empowered to do so. This will only be 
permitted if the agreement or contract is covered by the Turnquand
93
 rule or 
estoppel
94
. Therefore a company will be forced to see out the terms of a contract 
which was entered into beyond the powers of the director; however the director, 
having breeched his fiduciary duty towards the company will be personally liable.  
 
In S v De Jager
95
 a director and shareholder, J (defendant), of a public company 
which dealt in shares in the domain of banking, finance and insurance, removed 
company funds for his own interest and not that of the company itself. The defendant 
argued that between himself and another shareholder, S, an agreement was made 
regarding the payments. The court held that the argument was invalid due to the fact 
that a shareholder may not take part in the company‟s decision to be exploited in his 
capacity as a director. A director owes a fiduciary duty to the company and the assets 
of a company belong to the company itself. The shareholders have a right to the assets 
once the company is wound-up and the creditors have been paid off. These rules of 
company law may not be inhibited regardless of what the articles of association 
stipulate. The director in this case was attempting to preserve the advantage of limited 
liability as a shareholder, and yet release himself from his fiduciary duties toward the 
company (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
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There was a dissenting judgement however which stated that the shareholders of a 
company cannot be considered to commit theft in the event that the company (by 
resolution of the shareholders) rids itself of its assets in a manner which does not 
contradict the memorandum of association. The shareholders do not owe a duty to the 
company to act in its best interests.  
 
In S v Shaban
96
 the accused was a former director of an insurance company and was 
charged with fraud due to the exploitation of company funds. This was in breach of 
the director‟s fiduciary duties towards the company. The accused argued that at the 
time of the use of company funds he was no longer a director of the company; there 
were in fact two others in charge of the board, S and W. The court held that S and W 
were actually the puppet directors of the accused and followed his instructions 
blindly. The former director was found guilty as he still owed the company a fiduciary 
duty to act legally, honestly and within his powers (Cilliers & Benade, 2000).  
 
1.3.2 Directors‟ duty of care and skill 
 
In carrying out the fiduciary duties towards a company a director must also implement 
the required degree of care and skill. It seems to be established that in the event that a 
director fails to carry out an appropriate level of care and skill, that director will be 
liable to the company in delict for damages.
97
 
 
Lord Goldsmith, on the Lords Grand Committee, on the 9
th
 February 2006 stated that 
(DTI, 2007):  
 
“… we take the view that the „duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence‟ is 
not a fiduciary duty. It may be owed by someone who is a fiduciary. But that is not 
the same thing.” 
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A director may further be liable under contract if one exists between himself and the 
company, which is generally the norm regarding executive directors.  
 
The South African principles of the director‟s common law duty of care originated 
from the English law of tort. The generalisations regarding a director‟s standard of 
care toward a company were first laid out in English case law in cases such as 
Sheffield and South Yorkshire Permanent Building Society v Aizlewood [1889] 44 
ChD 412; Marquis of Bute‟s Case [1892] 2 Ch 100; In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co 
(No 2) [1896] 1 Ch 331; Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392; 
Re National Bank of Wales Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 626; and Prefontaine v Grenier [1907] 
AC 101 (Havenga, 2000; Bekink, 2008).  
 
English law originally did not make the duty of care extremely onerous on directors. 
At first a director would only be held liable for a breach of the duty of care if there 
was gross negligence involved. This can be confirmed in cases such as Turquand v 
Marshall [1869] LR 4 App 376 (ChD); Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb [1872] LR 5 
HL 480 (HL); Re Cardiff Saving Banks [1892] 2 Ch 100 (ChD); and Re National 
Bank of Wales Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 626 (Bekink, 2008). The very moderate approach to 
directors‟ duty of care was applied by the courts as a result of the prevailing public 
perceptions of directors at the time (Havenga, 2000): 
 
- The shareholders of a company should be responsible for the people whom 
they select to be directors. It is an inherent risk in business that the directors 
chosen may be incompetent; therefore shareowners have to bear the risk.    
- During the time of the early English cases there were not as many companies 
as there are today. The directors of these early companies were generally 
selected according to reputation as opposed to skill; moreover most of the 
directors were generally non-executive who, at the time, were not required to 
bear too much responsibility towards the company.  
- There was also a general notion that directors were inexperienced and did not 
possess the knowledge or skill of a professional.  
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In Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
98
 the directors of the company 
contracted on behalf of the company in order to acquire a plantation. This was centred 
on a fraudulent report of which the directors were aware. The directors did not make 
the effort to expose the problems with the report and the plantation and the company 
suffered a loss. The court held that the directors were not grossly negligent in the 
relevant case. (Cilliers & Benade, 2000)  
 
Although in some ways outdated, one of the most fundamental cases regarding 
director‟s duty of care and skill toward a company is In re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd
99
. In this case the chairman of the company, B, defrauded the 
company in question of £1 200 000. The action was brought against the other 
directors of the company who acted in good faith but nevertheless did not inspect any 
of B‟s actions or decisions. This was due to the fact the B was a highly regarded and 
trusted businessman. The court held that the shareholders of the company did not 
intend for all their finances to be looked after by only one director. Had this been the 
case there would not have been an entire board appointed. The duties were owed by 
all the directors of the company not just B on his own. However the directors avoided 
liability due to a clause in the articles of association which limited liability only to 
dishonesty. This clause was subsequently prohibited (McLennan, 1996). The case did 
however found certain common law principles which would apply to a director‟s duty 
of care (Cilliers & Benade, 2000):  
 
- The degree of skill which a director executes in the performance of his duties 
does not have to be any higher than that expected of a person with that 
director‟s knowledge and experience.  
- A director does not have to give continuous attention to the affairs of the 
company. The director has to perform his duties at board and committee 
meetings periodically, and it is not compulsory to attend all the meetings; only 
those which can reasonably be expected in the specific circumstances.  
- A director may delegate any duty to another official, which may be passed on 
according to the articles of association and the circumstances of the business. 
The director is justified in entrusting any official with the stated duties to 
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perform those duties reasonably and honestly; in the absence of any suspicion 
otherwise.  
 
The first proposal makes it clear that the test for negligence is mostly subjective. The 
degree of skill expected is one which that director actually has. That sets a very low 
standard as there is no minimum objective criterion to go by. The second proposal 
states that the director‟s duty is of an intermittent nature and this proposal is mostly 
outdated. The third proposal states that a director may delegate duties; however that 
director may not be negligent in doing so. The court will have to determine each case 
based on the prevailing circumstances. It has been stated that most of the decisions in 
the above English cases were relating to non-executive directors.  
 
South African position on the duty of care and skill of directors:  
 
It is generally agreed that it is possible to determine „care‟ objectively, however the 
„skill‟ factor is more complicated as it may fluctuate from person to person (Cilliers & 
Benade, 2000; Bekink, 2008). The problem is that a person may serve on the board of 
a company no matter what skills he may have. Therefore a person may serve on the 
board of a vehicle construction company and not have an in depth notion of building 
cars; he may for example be a legal specialist. That director must use whatever skills 
he does possess to his best ability for the benefit of the company. The South African 
case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen
100
 drew on the 
earlier English court decisions in order to set a standard for South African common 
law. In this case the plaintiff company sued the defendants as sureties due to loans 
made by the plaintiff to company I. The shares of I were held by the plaintiff 
company and its employees served on the board of I as nominees. The defendants 
stated that the plaintiff company had been reckless in the conduct of I‟s business 
which led to a prejudice against themselves; the defendants should not be held liable. 
The court held that a creditor has no obligation to exercise a duty of care. Therefore 
the judgement was handed down for the plaintiff company. This case also laid down 
three broad principles which were then applied to the South African common law 
regarding a director‟s duty of care and skill toward a company:  
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1. A director‟s required level of care and skill depends on the nature of the 
company‟s business as well as the responsibilities allocated to him. The court 
confirmed that there should be a difference between a full-time, executive 
director and a non-executive director. Whilst the first is comprehensively 
involved in the running of the business, the latter does not possess any 
particular duties. The non-executive director is not required to furnish the 
company with continuous attention as his duties are of an irregular nature. The 
non-executive director is only required to attend board meetings when it is 
reasonably required of him to do so. This confirms the position adopted by the 
court in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd.
101
 
2. The director of a company is not obligated to have any particular skill or 
knowledge. However the director is required to utilise the care and skill which 
can be reasonably expected of a person with his
102
 knowledge and experience. 
The director is further not liable for mere errors of judgement (Cilliers & 
Benade, 2000.  
3. The third proposition refers to the fact that a director may delegate any duties 
(which may be delegated) to other officials of the company. This is acceptable 
where there is no reason to suspect that the selected official will not perform 
the duties honestly. To add to this, a director may make use of information 
from management unless there is reason to believe otherwise. The director 
must be reasonable when accepting the advice or information and use his own 
knowledge to deliberate the material (Bekink, 2008).  
 
The above principles slowly started to get adjusted in subsequent South African court 
decisions. In Howard v Herrigel
103
 the respondents were the liquidators of company 
L. The case was brought against several defendants including Mr. H. The liquidators 
sought to hold the defendants liable for the debts of L under s424 of the Companies 
Act and alternatively, in the common law of delict for fraud. The claim succeeded 
only against Mr. H. The court held that in contrary to Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen, it is not correct to differentiate between executive 
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and non-executive directors for the purposes of determining their duties toward the 
company. It must be a universal norm that once a director accepts the position as 
such, he automatically becomes a fiduciary to the company and must observe due care 
and skill in carrying out these duties. It will be necessary to look at the fact of each 
case in the application of the rule. It may be relevant whether or not the director was 
involved in the company‟s business full time or part time; however the rules regarding 
duties and application of those duties must be homogenous for all directors.  
 
In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman
104
 the court concurred 
with the decision in Howard v Herrigel. The court stated that the test for recklessness 
is actually objective due to the fact that the director‟s conduct must be measured 
against that of the reasonable person. Once the minimum objective standard has been 
set, the test is also subjective as the director‟s conduct is measured against the 
reasonable director in that particular director‟s position. That means that one must 
look at what skill and knowledge the actual director, in fact possessed. The word 
„recklessly‟ must mean at least gross negligence. When a court decides on whether a 
director has been negligent or reckless the following factors must be taken into 
account: what business the company undertook, the role, function and powers granted 
to the director in question, as well as the company‟s financial situation (Bekink, 
2008). When enquiring into the subjective element of the test the court must also 
consider any supplementary knowledge and skill, which that particular director may 
possess (Bekink, 2008).  
 
In Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 164 the liquidator of Cape Investment Bank 
(CIB) was the plaintiff who sought to hold the director of CIB liable for certain 
payments. The claim arose as a result of a breach of fiduciary duties due to an interest 
in another company. The plaintiff failed to prove a causal connection between the 
alleged wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss to the company. The court however 
did concur with the decisions in Howard v Herrigel NNO and Philotex (Pty) Ltd v 
Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman in that the test for negligence is both objective 
and subjective. One must compare the director‟s conduct to that of a reasonable 
person in the same circumstances as the director in question. There must be an 
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objective minimum as well as a subjective standard which takes into account the skill 
and knowledge of the director, as well as the circumstances in which the company 
finds itself (Bekink, 2008).  
 
The UK and Australia; from a subjective standard to the codification of directors‟ 
duty of care and skill:  
 
Both the UK and Australia commenced with a subjective standard for negligence 
regarding a director‟s duty of care and skill toward a company. In both countries the 
test then became both objective and subjective and the duty was eventually codified. 
The two countries will now be looked at briefly. 
 
In the UK the community and legal attitude relating to directors started to change 
away from the lenient approach in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd. In 
cases such as Norman v Theodore Goddard
105
 and Re D‟Jan of London Ltd106 the 
court began to impose a subjective and objective standard on director‟s conduct 
regarding negligence. In Re D‟Jan of London Ltd the court applied s214 (4) of the 
United Kingdom Insolvency Act of 1986 which reads as follows (Bekink, 2008):  
 
“the facts which a director of a company ought to know or ascertain, the conclusion 
which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to take are those which ought to 
be known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonable diligent person having 
both 
a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the same function as are carried out by that director in 
relation to the company, and 
b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.” 
 
There is a clear use of both a subjective and objective test regarding the degree of skill 
which a director must use. Thus, if a director possesses special skill or knowledge he 
will be judged accordingly (Bekink, 2008). In Re Barings pcl (No5)
107
 the court stated 
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that directors have a constant duty to keep themselves informed of the company‟s 
business in order to make the best decisions possible. In Re Queens Moat House pcl 
(No2)
108
 the court stated that non-executive directors should exercise an independence 
of judgement and monitor executive management (Bekink, 2008). In the UK both the 
1973 and 1978 Companies Bills attempted to codify the director‟s duty of care and 
skill (Bekink, 2008). However this was eventually accomplished in the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 in s174:  
 
1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. 
2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a 
reasonable person with –  
i. the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions 
carried out by a director in relation to the company, and 
ii. the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director 
has.  
 
This has completely resulted in an objective and subjective standard regarding the 
director‟s duty of care and skill.  
 
In Australia the propositions from In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd were at 
first applied regarding the duty of care and skill. However as in the UK, the standards 
slowly started to become more onerous as the public sought greater protection of their 
assets (Bekink, 2008). This has been evident in the common law and statute. In 1958 
the State of Victoria in s107 of the Companies Act set out the duty of care, skill and 
diligence and stated that a director will receive a penalty, and will be liable for 
compensation to the company in the event of a breach. Other similar legislation was 
also passed such as the Uniform Companies Code of 1981 (Bekink, 2008). During the 
application of such legislation in AWA Ltd v Daniels
109
 the court stated that an 
objective standard is most appropriate for the director‟s duty of care and skill. 
Directors would be obliged to have a good understanding of the company‟s business, 
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as well as to take reasonable steps to supervise the concerns of the company (Bekink, 
2008). This was a very influential case which resulted in similar application in others. 
Other cases which followed an objective standard were: Metal Manufacturers v 
Lewis
110
; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich
111
; Australian Securities 
Commission v Gallagher
112
; and Vrisakis v Australian Securities Commission
113
 
(Bekink, 2008).  
 
The Uniform Companies Code was re-instated in 1991 as s232 (4) of the Corporations 
Law of 1991. This was then amended by s11 of the Corporate Law Reform Act of 
1992. Eventually the previous section was amended by s180 of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001. The relevant section reads as follows:  
 
1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would exercise if they: 
a. were a director of a corporation in the corporation‟s circumstances; and 
b. occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within 
the corporation as, the director or officer. 
 
 
The Australian Corporations Act has also codified the director‟s duty of care and skill 
to which one must apply both an objective and subjective standard.  
 
It seems that in the UK, Australia, as well as South Africa the duty of care and skill 
started out as extremely lenient on directors of companies. In fact, directors were only 
liable for gross negligence. This position has changed dramatically in all three 
countries as higher standards of care are being applied to directors of companies. It 
has been showed above that the UK and Australia have codified the duty of care in 
their relevant company legislation. South Africa too is aiming to achieve the same 
with the provisions of the Companies Bill of 2008. However this will be looked at in a 
later section. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
Directors‟ liability exposures have increased over recent years, according to the 
various sources on the subject. Liability at law may arise from the following areas: 
contract, delict, statute and sui generis. Under common law, directors owe two duties 
to the company which they serve: a fiduciary duty, and a duty of care and skill. Courts 
have tended to increase director liability by expanding the law of delict, which now 
allows for claims for pure economic losses. This may lead to liability to an 
indeterminate plaintiff for an indeterminate amount of loss. Legislation is also placing 
more onerous duties on directors and holding them more accountable for their actions 
taken on behalf of the company. Moreover, it is increasingly commonplace for 
directors to be held liable to third parties; more usually known as „stakeholders‟. This 
may include competitors, employees and the government. The company itself is 
increasingly expected to take up processes for corporate social responsibility; the 
weight of this task is being placed on the shoulders of the company directors.   
 
Society has also increased its expectations on directors; the world has moved away 
from the scenario where directors are put in place in order to achieve board prestige. 
Directors are also no longer thought to lack the necessary skill and knowledge to run a 
company. A director is now regarded as a professional who will be held liable 
according to the standard of skill and knowledge which he or she possesses. The 
media has played a major role in the increase of society‟s awareness of director 
liability.  
 
One can now get a sense of the increasing liability of company directors. This can be 
visible from the vast amount of cases which continue to expand the possible instances 
under which directors may be liable for not only losses to companies, but also losses 
to stakeholders. Directors were never meant to owe a fiduciary duty or one of care to 
anyone else, except the company itself; the situation has however changed.  
 
Director liability has already been expanding under delict and sui generis; now the 
common law duties are being placed in statute under the new Companies Act. This 
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will render it even easier to hold directors accountable. It is clear that society is more 
willing to take directors to court, whilst courts are more willing to hold the directors 
liable.  
 
This increased liability as a result of doctrinal issues has led to increased claims 
against directors. Thus, as a result there has been an increase in D&O liability claims. 
As director liability rises exponentially, so too will claims against directors. A 
positive relationship exists between liability and claims: as liability increases, claims 
increase too. If it is possible to hold someone accountable for a loss, the likelihood is 
that it will happen. This is especially true with regards to monetary losses. As society 
realises that others are holding directors liable for monetary losses to companies, 
many people opt for that option too. If courts are more willing to hold directors liable, 
than many more cases will be brought before the judge. Thus the notion of increasing 
liability and therefore increasing claims is actually a vicious cycle.   
 
The major corporate scandals, which have occurred worldwide as well as in South 
Africa, have been widely publicised. This has increased the responsiveness of 
potential plaintiffs.  The following chapter looks at some of the corporate failures 
which have occurred.   
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2 BREACHES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY 
LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA – COMPLEXITY ISSUES 
 
The second chapter aims to show that director liability has increased as a result of the 
escalating complexity of the modern business environment. The complexity issues 
examine the ever changing and increasingly complicated worldwide economic and 
corporate environment. This may also result in ever increasing corporate failures of 
enormous size, contributing to the increased claims against directors. 
 
The question is: why has there been such a worldwide requirement for updating and 
clarifying corporate governance and company law since the early 1990‟s, especially 
relating to company directors? As will be explicated later, corporate governance has 
been present for a long time, and the reasons for this will be understood in a while. 
However the urgency which has presented itself over the past twenty years may be 
arguably put down to an increase in company failures. Corporate failures are often 
ascribed to breaches of corporate governance or company law. In this manner new 
corporate governance codes are added and old ones are updated, in the hope of 
preventing future losses.  
 
However one may be missing the point; merely putting a law or regulation in place 
does not necessarily prevent persons from breaking the rules. Murder for example, has 
never been legal, yet there has never been a need to create a law against it. One must 
assume that creating a law against murder would certainly not reduce its occurrence at 
all. The point here is that persons that are willing to commit fraud will always do it no 
matter what corporate governance or legislation says. This holds even truer for 
negligence; putting a law in place against negligence will certainly not prevent 
persons from behaving that way as it is something which is not even done with intent.  
 
An economic crisis will occur, consequent to which many frauds are discovered. The 
reaction then is to put laws and regulations in place in order to stop that from 
happening again in the future. However these frauds do not necessarily cause the 
crises. The complexity of the modern economic world increases director‟s exposure to 
liability which in turn leads to increased claims against company directors.  
 76 
 
Corporate scandals and failures have also been present since the notion of the 
„company‟ itself was created. However major losses worldwide since the 1980‟s, 
which have generated substantive losses for shareholders and other stakeholders due 
to the complexity of the modern economic environment, director inabilities and fraud 
have, time and time again, sparked a public outcry. This is often fuelled by the media, 
leading increasingly to holding directors legally liable as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Society is ever-more willing to take directors to court, whist courts and increasingly 
willing to hold directors liable for company losses. A historical account of corporate 
governance and international scandals will be presented later on.  
 
This section is designed to familiarise the reader with South African corporate failures 
which have led to an increased interest in corporate governance, company law, and 
most importantly (for the purposes of this paper) codification of directors duties and 
liabilities. The impact of codifying duties and setting higher standards of liability for 
directors on D&O liability insurance will be the main objective of this paper. The 
following studies are presented in chronological order.  
 
Masterbond 
 
In 1991 the collapse of Masterbond was South Africa‟s most expensive corporate 
failure. The R 650 000 000 catastrophe unsettled the country; however on the 3
rd
 
September 1991, newspapers were advertising Masterbond‟s fantastic results; this was 
one month prior to the granting of the liquidation order against the company (Mail & 
Guardian, 15/03/2005).  
 
Masterbond was established in 1984 and when its directors stated (untruthfully) that it 
was registered by the South African Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank). Investment 
consultants as well as the media began to recommend the group‟s ideas as reliable 
financial proposals for investors. The company would soon produce desirable 
announcements guaranteeing 21% returns on investments (Fin24.com, 02/09/2002). 
Financial disgrace was inevitable as short-term borrowings from investors were 
matched by long term investments into property schemes.  
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Investors were „sold‟ a portion of land Kaliya, which was a unit at Club Mykonos in 
Langebaan on the West Coast South Africa. Among other schemes Masterbond also 
invested in Marina Martinique (a development in Port Owen, which was rendered 
ineffectual due to poor design) and Fancourt in Constantia. The investors were 
unaware that they had purchased shares that were non-existent on a likewise portion 
of land in fabricated share-block schemes (Mail & Guardian Online, 15/03/2005). 
The investors were told that money was being put into Masterbond projects; the truth 
was that funding was placed in numerous schemes to which the money was being 
further lent. 
  
Unfortunately the funding which supported the various Masterbond schemes was 
provided mostly by pensioners; approximately 20 000 of them. The team which was 
appointed by the curators during liquidation to investigate Masterbond were told that 
funds were flowing into the debenture at such a high rate, one month prior to the crash 
that the staff were struggling to cope (Business Day, 06/03/2006). The period of July 
to October 1991 saw R 131 000 000 lent to borrowers, R 76 000 000 was received in 
interest and capital repayments from borrowers, as well as an inundation of new funds 
for investment of R 44 000 000.  
 
In November 1997 the first report on Masterbond found many instance of exploitation 
by directors and auditors, as well as severe deficiencies in the supervisory system and 
contraventions of sections of the South African Companies Act which are intended to 
protect investors. A class action arrangement was unavailable to the investors who 
suffered losses (IOL, 29/04/2001). This would have offered a reasonable prospect of 
success against the directors of Masterbond; however those affected were elderly with 
modest monetary abilities. This deterred litigation.  
 
The former directors of Masterbond were convicted in the Cape Town Supreme Court 
on seven charges of fraud and handed ten years in prison. Ernst & Young, 
Masterbond‟s former auditors negotiated a R 40 000 000 out-of-court settlement with 
investors and further accepted losses of R 232 000 000 in further claims due to 
inadequate auditing measures (Mail & Guardian, 15/03/2005). A noticeable investor 
of R 140 000 created the Masterbond Victims‟ Association and faced an uphill battle 
to recover losses from the directors. Unfortunately 16 Masterbond investors 
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committed suicide as many lost their entire pensions. The name (and amounts 
claimed) of the D&O insurance company which underwrote Masterbond is 
confidential; however one can safely suggest that the respective monetary amount was 
substantial. 
 
Tollgate 
 
In August 1997 the R 28 630 000 fraud trial commenced regarding Tollgate Holdings 
Ltd (Tollgate). At the time this was one of South Africa‟s most prominent corporate 
scandals. Only one director (first) was present at the trial, as the chairman and other 
colleague director at Tollgate had fled to the United Kingdom (UK) in 1993 (Mail & 
Guardian, 05/08/1997).  
 
In 1998 the high court-sanctioned inquiry by the Browde Commission into the 1992 
collapse of the Tollgate group of companies was complete. The report stated that the 
former chairman of Tollgate played a major role in the breakdown of the company. 
This was said to have been due to dishonesty of senior management as well as 
ignorance of legal principles regarding which govern companies (Mail & Guardian, 
03/09/1998). Testimony from a previous director of Tollgate showed that the former 
chairman in question had exploited company funds in order to purchase antique 
furniture, acquire personal entertainment activities, as well as maintaining a private 
helicopter in the UK. During the financial year of 1991/1992, no company board 
meetings took place at all. The report recommended that the former chairman be 
extradited from the UK in order to face charges of fraud in the South African courts 
(Business Times, 05/03/1998).  
 
The report further absolved Absa Bank, a Tollgate creditor whom the company in 
question owed over R 300 000 000, of any wrongdoing or negligence whilst 
observing Tollgate‟s finances a short while prior to its downfall. This is due to the fact 
that Absa did not take on the responsibility of a director and was not involved in 
management or running of the business (Mail & Guardian, 03/09/1998).  
 
The first director of Tollgate was acquitted after being found „not guilty‟ in the Cape 
High Court on eight charges of fraud and theft relating to liquidation in 1992. The 
 79 
colleague director was also found not to have been involved in the demise of Tollgate, 
following the court trial (Business Times, 05/03/1998). However evidence still 
implicated the former chairman of the company due to the fact that Tollgate funds 
were transferred into a Swiss bank account belonging to the man in question.  
 
It is worthwhile mentioning briefly the part played by Absa and the Reserve Bank in 
the Tollgate saga. In 1990 Tollgate was carrying a hefty amount of debt, as was 
discovered by the former chairman who arrived around that time from the UK to take 
charge of the company. In 1992 Tollgate shares plummeted as rumours began to 
circulate regarding insider trading as assets of the company were being sold to 
directors and funds were transferred into offshore bank accounts. At the end of 1992, 
Tollgate Holdings Ltd. owed Absa R 300 000 000 through TrustBank (Mail & 
Guardian, 03/09/1998). Tollgate‟s chairman argued that Absa‟s objective of 
liquidating the company was unnecessary and it was due to bad management on part 
of TrustBank, Bankcorp and the parent company, Sanlam. Nevertheless, Absa went 
ahead with the liquidation and Tollgate was condemned.  
 
Absa was created in 1991 when the United Building Society bought Allied Group and 
Volkskas, Trustbank and Part of the Sage Group were taken on. Rumours circulated 
regarding trickery in the take-over of Allied. However in 1992 TrustBank was 
collapsing and the Tollgate issue was widely blamed. It seems that poor management 
at TrustBank would inevitably have led to its collapse in any case. The South African 
Reserve Bank then secretly assisted TrustBank with an amount R 1.1 – billion (the 
well known, so-called, „lifeboat‟. This is a normal occurrence as long as it serves the 
economic interests of the country (Mail & Guardian, 03/09/1998). However many 
claimed that the Reserve Bank was simply sympathetic to TrustBank‟s major 
shareholder, Sanlam, in providing the monetary relief. What followed was a number 
of cross-border accusations as to who was at fault regarding the demise of Tollgate 
and why the Reserve Bank kept the rescue a secret.  
 
It must be noted that regarding any matter, wherever liability is pinned is only one 
aspect, the other is the importance of sound corporate governance systems which 
promote transparency and accountability. With such standards in place it is more 
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difficult to reach concerns such as the ones mentioned regarding Tollgate Holdings 
Ltd. 
 
Macmed 
 
In 1985 Macmed was created following a management buy-out of Kendall, which was 
a subsidiary of Colgate South Africa. By 1987 turnover had already reached R 5 000 
000 and the company was listed on the Development Capital sector of the JSE. In 
1996 Macmed completed a black empowerment deal with Thebe Investment 
Corporation; making Thebe the largest shareholder. The year 1997 brought about the 
acquisition of Sherwood Medical in order to create export potential throughout Africa. 
In 1998 Macmed Zimbabwe was listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. In 1999 
Macmed‟s turnover reached R 673 000 000, whilst Intramed, Seravac and Fine 
Chemicals Corporation were acquired (Financial Mail, 29/10/1999). However by 
September that year the shares were suspended on the JSE and by October the 
simultaneous Chairman and CEO, Mr. M, as well as the group company secretary, 
Mr. H, were suspended and submitted their resignations. In mid-October 1999 
Macmed was placed under provisional liquidation and the debt owed to a consortium 
of sixteen banks was set at R 986 000 000 (Financial Mail, 29/10/1999). 
Unfortunately for the shareholders it was already too late; Macmed shares were 
trading at R 0.25, which is outrageous considering that the same shares were available 
for R 5.20 only eighteen months prior.  
 
At its peak the company owned approximately 96 subsidiaries as it did business in 
Africa (Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia) and the United States (US). Macmed was 
mainly involved in the sale of specialised hospital equipment, hospital development 
and the sale of hospital consumable products (Mail & Guardian, 18/11/2005). This 
was mainly done through the black empowerment partner, Malesela Holdings. During 
liquidation an inquiry was performed in terms of Section 417 of the Act, which allows 
the Master of the High Court to summon any person or information regarding the 
reasons for the company‟s collapse. This was further followed by an application of 
Section 424 of the Act in order to hold the directors personally liable for the debts of 
the company, as trade was performed in reckless or insolvent circumstances (Business 
Report, 21/11/2005).   
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It became evident that numerous fraudulent acts were performed in order to create an 
image that Macmed was financially sound and to aid the directors in making profits 
from share options. This was done by convincing the banks to continue lending. In 
November 2005, three executives of Macmed were arrested by the Scorpions on 
charges of fraud, corruption and racketeering. They were released on bail of R 500 
000 each by the Pretoria High Court. The sixteen that banks had lent money to 
Macmed included Standard Bank, Absa, Imperial Bank, Nedbank, Peoples Bank, 
Mercantile Bank and Nedcor (Business Day, 02/01/2005).  
 
The main accusations were aimed at Mr H, who due to the 1991 collapse of Sure 
Group, was an un-rehabilitated insolvent and was disallowed from being a Macmed 
director (Business Report, 23/01/2004). However it was found that although he was 
the company secretary, Mr H had acted as a de-facto financial director. In the course 
of the civil trial it was found by forensic auditors, KPMG, that Macmed‟s 1998 and 
1999 financial statements displayed no trace of the reality of the company‟s financial 
position. The published financial statements claimed that 1998 and 1999 produced a R 
31 000 000 and R 51 000 000 profit respectively; in reality losses had been incurred to 
the values of R 14 000 000 and R 95 000 000 respectively (Business Day, 
02/01/2005).  
 
The consortium of banks filed a lawsuit against the former auditors of Macmed, 
Fisher Hoffman PKF, due to the fact that they had been encouraged to lend money to 
the medical supplies company based fraudulent financial statements. The initial 
negligence lawsuit was for R 870, 000, 000; however a settlement of R 23, 000, 000 
was reached with the auditor‟s professional indemnity (PI) insurer (Business Day, 
02/01/2005).  
 
The courts did however dispatch a powerful message to company directors when Mr. 
H and Mr. M were found personally liable by the Pretoria High Court, for the R 647 
000 000 debts of the company, in the civil trial (Business Day, 02/01/2005). Former 
employees and innocent directors of Macmed also lost out as liquidators demanded R 
51 000 000 for share options which had not been exercised.   
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This case study emphasises the emerging pattern of corporate governance and 
legislation (Section 424 of the Act) to render any person who is involved in the 
reckless trading, or intentionally defrauds a company‟s creditors, personally liable for 
any losses incurred – without constraint. This is not only occurring in South Africa, 
but also in other parts of the world, as countries like Australia are codifying director‟s 
duties in order to increase accountability. 
 
LeisureNet 
 
On the 13
th
 of September 1996 Financial Mail reported that if one had purchased 
shares in LeisureNet in 1995, by the time the article was in print the value of the 
investment would have trebled. In 1995 LeisureNet shares were trading at R 1.00; in 
September 1996 the shares were worth R 3.25. The company was exciting and sound, 
especially when considering that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Industrial 
index only increased by 15% that year (Financial Mail, 13/09/1996).  
 
LeisureNet was the owner of the Health and Racquet Club chain of fitness gyms. The 
company had 900 000 members and 7 000 employees at the end of 2000. The last 
accounts presented an annual turnover of over R 1 – billion. LeisureNet was 
provisionally liquidated in 2000; it had liabilities of R 1.2 – billion and assets of R 
302 000 000.  Members who had entered into ten, twenty and even forty-year 
contracts found themselves holding worthless pieces of paper. The company would 
eventually be bought out by Richard Branson‟s Virgin Group and renamed „Virgin 
Active gyms‟ (Mail & Guardian, 03/04/2002). When LeisureNet was under final 
liquidation in 2000 some of the following liabilities were discovered (Mail & 
Guardian, 07/12/2000): 
 
- International Bank of South Africa; R 115, 900, 000 
- Wesbank; R 4, 200, 000 
- BoE Limited; R 19, 700, 000 
- Cape of Good Hope Bank; R 3, 600, 000 
- Barclays Bank; R 25, 000, 000 
- Stannic; R 3, 400, 000 
- Saambou; R 7, 500, 000 
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- Absa Bank; R 13, 600, 000 
- Bankfin; R 14, 500, 000 
- Rand Merchant Bank; R 6, 200, 000 
- Nedbank; R 79, 000, 000  
- PSG Bank; R 15, 000, 000 
- Marriot Merchant Bank; R 1, 800, 000 
- Citibank; R 17, 400, 000 
- Commerzbank; R 45, 100, 000 
 
LeisureNet owned 85 gymnasiums in South Africa as well as a Planet Hollywood 
franchise at the V&A Waterfront (Cape Town), and had a 50% investment in 
Millennium Expotainment, owner of IMAX theatres. The company also owned 57.8% 
of the issued share capital in Healthland International, which owned seventeen 
subsidiaries, which further owned twenty-two health clubs in the UK, Germany, New 
Zealand, Spain, Australia, France, Belgium and Sweden. It seems that 
uncompromising international development of Healthland regarding a financial 
commitment of R 82 000 000 damaged LeisureNet‟s resources (Mail & Guardian, 
07/12/2000).  
 
In April 2002 two executive directors of LeisureNet were arrested by the Scorpions; 
the two men faced charges of fraud, income tax and VAT evasion (Mail & Guardian, 
03/04/2002). In October 2005 the directors reached a R 30 000 000 settlement with 
the liquidators, which was 2.5% of the initial R 1.2 – billion claim (Business Day, 
13/10/2005). The CEOs were then cleared of civil charges; however the criminal 
charges were not brushed off as smoothly. In August 2006 the former executives of 
LeisureNet were acquitted of the main charge of fraud regarding a R 1 900 000 
kickback. However the two men could still face other criminal charges of fraud, 
money laundering, theft, and income-tax evasion. The former directors were then 
discharged on counts under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 80 of 1998, the 
Income Tax Act 28 of 1997 and a Companies Act charge of reckless trading (Mail & 
Guardian, 23/04/2007).  
 
Eventually, in April the former executives were handed down eight and seven years 
jail sentences. More accurately, the jail sentences were of twelve years of which four 
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and five years were suspended. One month prior, the men had been convicted on 
charges of fraud relating to R 12 000 000 of an undisclosed interest in a German gym 
venture, which LeisureNet acquired in 1999. The charge was finalised even though 
the former executives paid back the R 12 000 000 plus an additional R 4 500 000 to 
the liquidators (Mail & Guardian, 23/04/2007).  
 
The former LeisureNet executives were sentenced in the Cape High Court where the 
acting Judge, Dirk Uijs, rightly stated: “You let society down very, very badly… 
Business, economic enterprise, economic intercourse, is based on trust.” (Mail & 
Guardian, 23/04/2007). This quote is extremely important in the context of corporate 
governance. The systems of checks and balances are in place in order to avoid exactly 
what occurred at LeisureNet. The amount covered by the D&O liability insurer of 
LeisureNet is unclear; however this case shows the importance of possessing such 
cover as well as the potential costs to the insurer of rogue company directors. The aim 
of the codification of director‟s duties is to further prevent these unfortunate 
occurrences; however the potential outcomes on D&O liability insurance are thus far 
unknown. 
 
Regal Bank 
 
In June 2001 Regal Treasury Private Bank Ltd. (Regal Bank) was placed under 
curatorship due to the fact that it had lost the trust of its shareholders and depositors. 
Numerous reasons may be cited for the bank‟s collapse:  
 
- The Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Mr. L, carried on the business of the bank 
and the holding company (Regal Treasury Bank Holdings Ltd.) in a reckless 
manner. The said Mr. L was not a fit and proper person to be in the position of 
CEO and director of the Bank. 
- Regal Bank‟s board of directors acted in breach of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 
(Banks Act), other banking regulations, the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
(Companies Act), as well as South African standards of good corporate 
governance.  
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To make matters worse, the external auditors, Ernst & Young, breached the Public 
Accountants and Auditors Act 80 of 1991, by consenting to the release of the 2001 
preliminary financial statements of the holding company without completing the audit 
in a proper manner (Myburgh Commission, 2001). Further, the Reserve Bank fell 
short in October 2000 by not taking appropriate action regarding the removal of Mr. 
L.  
 
According to the Report of the Commissioner, Myburgh SC (available online: 
www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/WCEV/A83BCC8822AD8FF8C422
56B720046D15F/?opendocument), Mr L did not exercise the utmost good faith and 
integrity, as well reasonable care and skill regarding Regal Bank. The CEO also did 
not always act in the best interests of the bank, whilst often allowing a conflict of 
interest to exist between himself and the company, as well as the shareholders. The 
management of the bank was incompetent and Mr. L acted dishonestly and 
fraudulently. Corporate governance was given minimal attention.  
 
Regal Bank‟s inconsistencies relating to legislation and corporate governance could 
cover an entire academic paper on their own; however this is not the aim of this paper. 
Nevertheless some of the wrongdoings will be mentioned briefly (Myburgh 
Commission, 2001).  
 
- Mr. L forced certain directors to resign without proper justification. 
- In contrast to the advise of the Reserve Bank and the King Report on 
Corporate Governance 1994 (King 1), Mr. L became chairman and remained 
CEO of Regal Bank with support from the board of directors.  
- Mr. L also appointed a family member as chairman with support of the board 
of directors, once again contrary to the advice of the Reserve Bank.   
- In July 1999 Mr. L handed out an unlawful order to the asset management 
division of Regal Bank not to sell any shares of the holding company on 
behalf of its clients, as this would lead to a lowering of the share price.   
- It was alleged that any board members who disagreed with the CEO would be 
forced to resign.  
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- In financial statements it seemed as though Regal Bank had no bad debt; this 
was due to the fact that no review of credit existed. Review of credit is 
common practice in other banks.  
- Executive directors and senior managers of Regal Bank received shares in the 
said bank in order to compensate them for the fact that they were under-
remunerated and no specification was made for pension. Non-executive 
directors only received remuneration in the form of shares.  
 
In 2001 Regal Bank collapsed after a run on deposits had the consequence of R 250 
000 000 being withdrawn in two days as a result of Ernst & Young retracting the 2001 
financial statements of the holding company, which had previously been signed off 
(Business Report, 16/02/2004). Mr. L was arrested in May 2003 when it was found 
that he had received secret payments from Regal Bank of over R 3 000 000 in fifteen 
months. This was on top of a basic salary of R 38 000 as well as a R 10 000 monthly 
expenditure allowance.  
 
The Myburgh Commission recommended that certain directors and officers of regal 
Bank must be criminally charged on eighteen counts of fraud, contraventions of 
sections 38, 226, 249, 250, 251, 286, 288, 298 and 305 of the Companies Act, and 
sections 75 and 91 of the Banks Act. By 2007 Mr. L appeared in court in order to be 
charged regarding six counts of fraudulent misrepresentation and two for 
contravention of the Companies Act (MoneyWeb, 16/08/2007). Prosecution of 
commercial crime is hampered by red tape and legal complexities. This is made far 
worse by the fact that the accused will always attempt to hamper investigations by 
counter-attacking the accuser. This is yet another illustration of the importance of 
corporate governance and the manner in which directors of a company may abuse 
their responsibilities. It seems that D&O liability insurance is of increasing 
importance as codification of directors duties looks to simplify the manner in which 
rogue directors are prosecuted. 
 
Saambou 
 
Saambou was South Africa‟s seventh-largest bank prior to its collapse in 2002. The 
bank failure occurred when depositors lost their confidence and frantically withdrew 
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over R 1 – billion of savings. When the bank went under curatorship in February 
2002, it possessed 35 000 clients as well as R 16 – billion in assets (Issued Statement 
by South African Reserve Bank, Registrar of Banks and Curator, 17/01/2003).  
 
In 2005 Saambou Bank‟s former CEO, the late Mr. M, as well as former directors, 
Mr. C and Mr. E, were arrested by the Scorpions. The men faced ten charges of fraud, 
one of theft as well as two of contravening the Companies Act to which they pleaded 
not guilty. The charges which entailed R 640 000 000 were due to allegations that 
certain schemes undertaken had not taken into account the risk to the company and 
separate disclosures were not provided regarding the schemes concerned in the 
financial statements of Saambou Bank and Saambou Holdings, as is required by law 
(Business Day, 30/01/2008).  
 
The Saambou Holdings share scheme was approved in 1992 in order to supply senior 
managers with incentives. The bank issued „phantom‟ shares to its staff at a price 
which reflected the company‟s share price at the time. Over 500 000 shares, which 
were unpaid, were given to managers in 1993 at a price of R 0.87 each. The first 
payouts occurred in 1998 and 1998 were equal to R 30 000 000. The company had not 
prepared for the risk; therefore the large payouts affected the primary capital of 
Saambou. The payouts were not disclosed separately in the financial statements of 
Saambou Holdings or Saambou Bank from 1997 to 2001 (Business Day, 31/01/2008). 
The scheme was negated in 2000, which was then followed by another share incentive 
scheme. This was created in order to reconcile the debt owed as a result of the 1992 
phantom scheme.      
 
The approach was for a trust to purchase shares from Saambou Holdings on behalf of 
three private companies. Saambou forwarded R 96 000 000 to the share incentive trust 
in 2001; when the bank went under curatorship in 2002, the incentive companies were 
indebted the amount to Saambou. The setback was that the loans were unsecured and 
dependent exclusively on the share price. Once again, no provision was made for the 
loans in the financial statements, which should have stated the risks; such as that 
interest was not payable. The aim had been to hedge the fixed requirement of the 
phantom scheme and to raise more secondary capital (Business Day, 01/02/2008).   
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However, in early 2008 the Pretoria High Court discharged the two directors of 
Saambou as it was found that there was no evidence of wrongdoing. Mr. C stated at 
the beginning of the trial that he was never a director of either Saambou Bank or 
Saambou Holdings and was simply respecting orders from superiors in the normal 
course of his work. It seems that the decisions to execute the allegedly fraudulent 
schemes were taken before Mr. C had started working for Saambou, and the directors 
had taken the measures based on expert advice. The judge found that the accused did 
gain from the schemes and that the operations expressed by the prosecution had been 
authorised by the bank‟s board of directors (Business Day, 01/02/2008). 
 
Even though it was found that there was no breach of corporate governance or 
legislation by the directors involved, this case still exemplifies the importance of the 
mentioned regulation. A perception of breach led to a trial which could have held the 
directors personally liable for hundreds of millions of Rands. This case is also 
relevant due to the fact that, as will be seen later on, D&O insurers still have to bear 
the legal costs of a successful court defence. Even when directors are found not guilty 
the insurers still have costs involved. For this reason an increase in corporate 
governance and legislation which holds directors more accountable is of concern to 
D&O insurers. 
 
Deel-Smith 
 
The Financial Mail in 2001 quoted Mr. D as saying: “The danger is that the activities 
of a few Long Term Capital Managements or Nick Leesons give the investor entirely 
the wrong impression of products that originated in a desire to limit risk, rather that 
gear it up.” (Financial Mail, 20/04/2001) The products that Mr. D was referring to 
were investments in futures and derivatives which he claimed his company could use 
as a safety net for those wanting to develop and protect their pensions. This Financial 
Mail article ironically entitled “Low Risk As A Way Of Life” was referring to the 
Deel-Smith & Company (an investment management company) and Deel-Smith 
Benefit Administrators (a retirement fund administrator), which were started up by 
Mr. D in 1997.  
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Unfortunately for investors, in October 2002, the Financial Services Board (FSB) was 
successful in their application to the High Court of South Africa requesting that the 
Deel-Smith group of companies be placed under curatorship (Business Report, 
28/11/2002). This was subsequent to inspections performed by the Registrar of 
Pension Funds, the Registrar of Financial Markets and a surveillance division of the 
JSE (Press Release by FSB, 17/10/2002).  
 
The reports presented revealed that the financial records of the companies 
investigated were deficient and the undertakings were intermingled. The directors of 
the companies completely disregarded the boundaries of the entities. It seems that 
client investments were moved without consent and the investment vehicles utilised 
were never discussed. There were material losses in the futures and options; however 
there were no funds accessible to settle future margin requirements (Press Release by 
FSB, 14/07/2003).  
 
A representative of Deloitte & Touche was appointed as curator of the Johannesburg 
based companies: Deel-Smith Investment Holdings Limited, Deel-Smith & Company 
(Pty) Ltd, Deel-Smith Benefit Administrators (Pty) Ltd, Deel-Smith Securities (Pty) 
Ltd and Deel-Smith Nominees (Pty) Ltd.  
 
One month later the curatorship was extended to include five pension funds run by the 
Deel-Smith group. This was due to allegations against the former trustees and 
administrators regarding maladministration and misappropriation. The curator stated 
that four of the funds were not feasible as their liabilities exceeded their assets, and 
the fifth fund was technically solvent but would be unable to carry on as it had lost 
crucial staff and could not continue to observe the rules of the JSE. The five umbrella 
pension funds were (Press Release by FSB, 14/07/2003):  
 
- Small and Medium Enterprise Independent Preservation Pension Fund; 
- Small and Medium Enterprise Independent Pension Fund; 
- Small and Medium Enterprise Independent Provident Fund; 
- Small and Medium Enterprise Independent Retirement Annuity Fund; and 
- Small and Medium Enterprise Independent Preservation Provident Fund 
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The pension funds had experienced losses of over R 18 000 000, which meant that 
over 350 members were left with not retirement funding. The assets remaining in the 
funds were under R 1 500 000. Losses were incurred due to the fact that directors had 
not followed the regulations regarding pension fund investment and funding had been 
used by Mr. D in investments on behalf on non-pension fund members (Press Release 
by FSB, 21/07/2004).   
 
In this manner, another R 50 000 000 was lost which was held in private client 
portfolios managed by Mr. D. This brought total losses to nearly R 70 000 000. The 
endeavour was concealed by drawing up fictitious statements of investment returns in 
order to create time for the investments to turn around. This was not quite what Mr. D 
had in mind regarding low-risk investment. Further, it was also discovered that Deel-
Smith and Company was not registered as an investment manager as is required 
regarding the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (as amended). The directors of the Deel-
Smith group could be held liable under criminal and civil law.  
 
It is interesting to note that the retirement funds had been insured for losses resulting 
from negligence, fraud and dishonesty of officers; however the insurance company, 
Santam, would not indemnify the insured. This was on the basis that material facts 
were discovered to have been in existence prior to the inception of the policy, which 
were not disclosed to the insurer (MoneyWeb, 21/07/2004).  
 
Even though this study involves umbrella pension funds, it was the breach of 
corporate governance by the directors of the holding companies that resulted in losses. 
It is not difficult to realise how important corporate governance can be when so many 
elderly are left without a pension. 
 
Unifer 
 
In January 2002 Absa saw its shares plummet 27% when its micro-lending subsidiary 
ran into R 1.5 – billion bad debt. Unifer was created in 1999 as a result of a merger 
between four companies: Creditsure, Unibank, Global Insurance Company and MBI 
Underwriting. Supergroup also sold their emerging market interests to Creditsure. 
According to the non-executive chairman of Unifer, the company was meant to be the 
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second largest micro-lender behind Theta. The prospects were of a 50% return rate 
per annum and the company would soon enter diverse markets in southern Africa 
(Business Times, 01/05/1999).  
 
By August 2001 Absa had acquired a 60% share in Unifer Holdings Ltd. The collapse 
of Unifer upset South Africa‟s banking industry when Absa had to deal with the R 2.2 
– billion losses incurred by the micro-lender. The scandal was due to gross 
mismanagement which resulted in Absa‟s profits being halved for that financial year 
Mail & Guardian, 02/06/2003).   
 
Investigations into the collapse of Unifer exposed the following possible causes 
(Business Report, 03/07/2003):  
 
- conflicts of interest among management;  
- unsustainable growth in the quantity and volume of loans;  
- unauthorised granting of loans; 
- executives received unfitting payments from brokers; and 
- a breakdown in control systems by the unauthorised provision of codes for 
credit control systems. 
  
Much controversy was centred on the accounting treatment of R 27 000 000 income at 
Lantern Financial Services, a subsidiary of Unifer in based in East London; the 
company was acquired systematically in the period of 1998 to 2000. It was alleged 
that, in order to lend out more funds and create an impression of more business, an 
excessive amount of loans were authorised but recorded in separate books. The effect 
was that it seemed as though not that much funding was leaving Unifer. The amount 
lent actually exceeded the limits set by regulation (Financial Mail, 01/02/2002). 
Another major issue was that low-quality loans were added to Unifer‟s books; 
management would control the loans as well as businesses in which they had a direct 
interest. The safer loans were always directed towards personal interests. In this 
manner, Unifer gathered quantity not quality regarding loans.  
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Thus a number of Unifer staff members faced criminal and civil charges following the 
collapse of the company. In 2004 the former company secretary of Unifer admitted 
liability and agreed to pay the FSB a sum of money.  
 
Absa instituted a rescue plan in order to minimise the losses to the subsidiary; the 
scandal cost the banking group around R 1.78 – billion. However Absa did recover 
with a profit of R 3.4 – billion in 2003. The bank has since increased control over 
Unifer by delisting it from the JSE, buying out minority shareholders and forming a 
new division named UB Microloans. Unibank‟ banking licence was annulled in 
March 2003 (Business Report, 03/07/2003).  
 
This case example is important as corporate governance systems are now forcing 
directors to take a more proactive role in the decisions taken by the companies they 
are employed by. This corporate collapse did not involve any directors, however 
management too has a duty toward the company and D&O insurers could find 
themselves liable. 
 
Tigon 
 
Tigon Limited was primarily a money lending and financial services company, based 
in Peitermaritzburg – KwaZulu-Natal, which imported and dealt in the wholesale of 
food, sport equipment as well as Phillips electronic products. Some management of 
KwaZulu-Natal farms was also undertaken. The company was the top performing new 
listing as well as the top performer on the JSE in 1995 and 1996 respectively 
(Financial Mail, 1997).  
 
The intricate labyrinth of charges faced by former Tigon executives, Mr. P and Ms. B, 
has left many baffled. Numerous allegations from 1997 until 2002, when Tigon 
collapsed and Mr. P was arrested, are still being investigated and the court trial is still 
pending in 2008. One must understand that this is in part due to the fact that former 
Tigon executives have attempted numerous means to stall the process. Provided that 
the allegation are well founded, the executives of Tigon managed to deceive the JSE, 
the South African Reserve Bank, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), as well 
 93 
as thousands of investors in order to attain hundreds of millions of Rands (Financial 
Mail, 1997).    
 
It is alleged that the breaches of legislation and corporate governance began in 1997, 
when another company under Mr. P‟s control, Shawcell Holdings, was listed on the 
JSE only due to countless lies. On the foundation of overstatements regarding Tigon 
and Shawcell, a 1998 transaction was completed in which Tigon bought R 58 000 000 
for a telecommunications company named Europoint. Tigon then inflated the value of 
the intellectual property of Europoint to R 1.2 – billion. Europoint was then sold to 
Shawcell for the said amount, which deceptively inflated the profits and assets of 
Tigon. The deceptions also permitted Shawcell to list on the JSE and illegally shift 
assets out of South Africa (Business Day, 03/05/2005).  
 
PSC (Progressive Systems College) Guaranteed Growth fund was chaired by Ms. B, 
whom together with Mr. P enticed investors in order to attract monetary funding. The 
glossy and impressive brochures guaranteed a yearly growth rate beyond that of the 
JSE. However the former managing director and founder of PSC, Mr. M, in a 
desperate attempt to minimise a five year prison sentence entered into a plea bargain 
with the prosecution. This was subsequent to serving out eleven months for being held 
personally liable under Section 424 of the Act regarding the losses of PSC. In return 
Mr. M will have to present evidence against Mr. P and Ms. B (Business Report, 
02/03/2008).  
 
The truth about PSC is astonishing; approximately four thousand investors were lured 
into spending R 250 000 000 into the fund of which there is nothing left (Business 
Day, 2005). The money was unlawfully expropriated by the executives of Tigon: 
funds either directly or indirectly landed up with Mr. P and Ms. B as well as with 
companies controlled by them. PSC funds were in actual fact routed to Tigon, 
Shawcell, Awethu Trust, EBN Trading, Synergy Management and Brangus Ranching, 
which were all controlled by Mr. P (Business Day, 10/13/2005).  
 
One example in which the funds were abused was a plot intended to assist non-
residents to get money out of South Africa without declaring it to the authorities. It is 
claimed by prosecutors that foreigners holding South African stocks would sell their 
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shares and utilise the money in order to purchase shares in Shawcell (illegally on the 
JSE to begin with) through a Hong Kong based company named Plenny. The 
Shawcell shares would than be sold back to Plenny which would shift approximately 
78% of the money out of South Africa, whilst awarding Mr. P and Ms. B with 22% of 
the commission (Business Day, 10/13/2005).  
 
Mr. P and Ms. B are now facing countless charges including contravention of the 
Income Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Stock Exchange Control Act 40 of 2001, the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, as well as exchange control regulations (Business 
Report, 02/03/2008).  
 
The Tigon study shows clearly why breaches of corporate governance and legislation 
by company executives have led to an increasing need to hold directors more 
accountable, as well as to activate more extreme measures of checks and balances. 
 
Corpcapital 
 
In 2002 Corpcapital Ltd (the old one was formed out of TPN Ltd in 1997), a public 
company listed on the JSE, published its Annual Financial Statements. Little did 
anyone know that the seemingly prosperous company would be turned into an inter-
director corporate dilemma; an „affair‟ which would last for years and lead to the 
collapse of the company. Mr. F was a co-founder of Corpcapital and a director who 
opted to resign in 2002 alleging a considerable breach of corporate governance and 
legislation on behalf of the company and its directors. Among other things this would 
also lead to an out-of-court settlement regarding invasion of privacy, in which Mr. F 
accused Corpcapital of instructing the Associated Intelligence Network (AIN), a 
private investigation company, to probe into his affairs (Business Day, 25/08/2006).         
 
It was alleged that between 1999 and 2003 the directors of Corpcapital created 
fictitious financial statements regarding the value of a subsidiary, Cytech, and 
breached other ethical and legal borders. An investigative report was commissioned in 
2003 and handed to the Trade and Industry Minister in 2004.  
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The main issue was that of Cytech, an online gambling subsidiary in which 
Corpcapital held 50% shares when it commenced operations in 1999. The shares 
would be later diluted to 47.5%. The problem was that Corpcapital bought its stake 
for R 4 500 000 and re-evaluated the worth at R 149 000 000 in one year and R 221 
000 000 in the next, utilising questionable means. It seemed that in 2000 Corpcapital 
took R 101 000 000 of the difference in the Cytech valuation and added it to its own 
profits. Further, R 23 000 000 was paid as bonuses to directors that year. Cytech 
would later be sold for R 20 000 000 (Business Day, 21/06/2005). It was alleged, by 
Mr. F, that had it not been for questionable accounting methods and mark to market 
accounting (which values future financial instruments based on current market price), 
that the year 2000 would have been a period of financial decline for Corpcapital.  
 
In 2001 there was a merger between three entities to create Corpcapital (new). The 
three companies were Corpgro, Corpcapital (old) and Corpcapital Bank. Mr. F 
claimed that the inflated valuation of Cytech influenced the merger, which would not 
have been a success without the perceived profit of Corpcapital (Business Day, 
21/06/2005).  
 
The main allegations were centred on the former CEO, Mr. L, and the chairman, Mr. 
E. The dispute would last about four years, which would cost the South African 
taxpayer around R 10 000 000. The investigative report was held by the Minister for 
an extensive amount of time and when released, it vindicated the accused. It was 
concluded, in the 1 800 page report, that the on-goings of the Corpcapital group was 
not being conducted in an unjust manner or inequitably towards the shareholders. 
Although it was stated that Corpcapital did not fraudulently inflate profits in order to 
boost director bonuses, mention was made that Cytech should have been disclosed 
separately in the income statements. Further, KPMG did not evaluate the company, 
but simply reviewed the valuation performed by management. It was therefore 
assumed by the company that the valuation was correct (Business Day, 06/06/2005).  
 
The negative perception of the CEO, Mr. L, also assisted in fast-tracking the downfall 
of Corpcapital due to previous business ventures. The scepticism from investors, 
analysts as well as the press was boosted during the dispute with Mr. F which led to a 
loss of credibility of the company (Business Day, 01/12/2006).  
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This case example does not involve an actual breach of corporate governance or 
legislation; however it is useful in that it points out the importance of transparent 
governance, director reputation and accurate auditing. 
 
Fidentia 
 
The Cape based asset management company (financial services and technology), 
Fidentia, was placed under provisional curatorship by the Cape High Court in 
February 2007 (Business Report, 02/02/2007). This was the most prevalent corporate 
scandal arising in the financial services sector up to that point. At the time Fidentia 
Holdings and its two subsidiaries, Fidentia Asset Management and Bramber, were 
holding nearly two billion Rands of investors money (IOL, 24/02/2007).  
 
Unfortunately the funding was made up of R 1.47 – billion from the Living Hands 
Umbrella Trust, which paid out money invested in Fidentia by the Mineworkers‟ 
Provident Fund to orphans and widows of those who deceased in mining accidents 
(Fin24.com, 07/02/2007). Another R 245 000 000 was invested by the Transport 
Education and Training Authority (TETA).    
 
A team was set up by the Financial Services Board (FSB) which investigated Fidentia 
and delivered an alarming method of doing business. Such things were mentioned as 
misrepresentation towards clients, misappropriation of client funds, misrepresenting 
investments, material conflicts of interest (regarding directors) and deficient corporate 
governance standards (Mail & Guardian, 15/03/2007). The director of Fidentia as 
well as certain followers used much of the monetary funding received for personal 
interests and contravened a number of laws which govern the administration of a 
company, the manner in which asset management should be handled and the general 
methods of fund trust protection. The scandal even went far enough to dispose of 
double-entry bookkeeping - to a certain extent (Business Day, 14/02/2007).  
 
The occurrences found at Fidentia which were condoned by the directors were 
outrageous. Some fabricated enhancements in the valuations of assets were recorded 
as income, whilst other existent sources of income, when stopped (Sante Wellness 
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Certre), were not recorded as losses at all. Transfers of funds were performed among 
Fidentia companies which were then shown as income – in reality this effect should 
have been neutral (IOL, 24/07/2007). In order to enhance the public image of 
Fidentia, invested funds were used to sponsor sports organisations such as Boland 
Rugby and Manning Rangers; these were then recorded as capital investments. Due to 
the fact that at one stage a director of Fidentia was also an auditor at the same time 
(which goes against statute and corporate governance code); it was unproblematic to 
back-date certain transactions in order to avoid legal duties and taxation (IOL, 
24/07/2007).     
 
The director of Fidentia finally came under scrutiny when a business relationship with 
Kopano, the business unit of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), became adverse. Fidentia was sued for millions of Rands utilising the 
untrue profits which had been produced. The financial statements illustrated the 
excessive spending of the company and the directors: the monthly salary bill of 
Fidentia Holdings was R 20 000 000 (excluding executive bonuses), R 2 000 000 per 
month was spent on „staff welfare‟, and R 4 000 000 per month was spent on 
entertainment (IOL, 24/07/2007).   
 
The funds which were „invested‟ by Fidentia Asset Management was being used to 
purchase other companies at unreasonable prices, and companies which were running 
at a loss such as Motshati Holdings which was insolvent (R 15 000 000 was paid for a 
26% share). R 100 000 000 per month was being used to pay operational costs of the 
Fidentia group companies (IOL, 24/07/2007).   
 
Funds were also utilised to compensate a director for failed personal investments and 
business schemes. When a personal venture would go wrong it would be sold to 
Fidentia at a profit. An example is that of the commodities trading company, Bayview 
Commodities, which had accrued a loss of R 8 000 000 when the director sold it to 
Fidentia for R 14 000 000. As will be seen later, this is a major illegality regarding the 
Companies Act and corporate governance rules. Numerous assets which were held in 
the name of a company director were reflected in the books of Fidentia companies as 
assets belonging to those companies (IOL, 10/02/2007). Some examples are Cape 
Town properties and farms in the Eastern Cape. The wife of a director was also 
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provided with a beauty centre in Canal Walk compliments of Fidentia, which was 
then sold back to the company when losses were incurred.   
 
The director of Fidentia and the co-accused (former accountant) face charges of theft 
and fraud which total over R 200 000 000. The directors have now been imprisoned – 
one was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on arrival in Los 
Angeles after fleeing to Australia shortly before the Scorpions were given permission 
to investigate the matter (Business Day, 02/02/2007). It remains to be seen how much 
personal liability the directors will incur. A quarter of the staff at Fidentia was 
retrenched straight away in order to cut overhead costs while many more lost their 
jobs. In the meantime, companies purchased by Fidentia at inflated prices are being 
built up and sold in order to provide compensation to the widows and orphans of the 
deceased mineworkers. Such an example is that of Infinity (Business Day, 
14/02/2007). In this case extreme amounts of personal liability will be incurred by the 
company directors due to fraud and theft; more adequate systems of corporate 
governance as well as checks and balances may have had the ability to lessen the 
losses.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The modern era has witnessed a vast increase in the size and complexity of companies 
operating within an integrated economic system. Companies no longer small or 
operate in a single country, but undertake complex inter-company, inter-continental 
ventures, operating within a global economy. This is such that often accounting 
methods have not possessed the capacity to keep up – as was the case with Enron. 
Further, accounting standards have been forced on companies in which directors have 
little say in the matter. The diverging needs of companies and goals of accounting 
methods have often led to financial ruin, under which circumstances, directors are 
held accountable. World economic factors must also be taken into account, for 
example, the US releases employment figures and the South African equity market 
declines. Company directors may increasingly be held accountable for factors which 
on the face of it are out of their control. 
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The reality is that the economic world has become more complex. This has resulted in 
larger and much more expensive company failures. The complexity issue has led to 
increased director‟s liability exposure. As company failures increase in size and 
number, so too does the need to hold somebody accountable. One has already seen 
that society and courts are looking to hold directors liable for company losses. The 
increased probability of company failures due to complexity issues means that 
director‟s exposure to liability increases too.  
 
An increase in potential director liability, as a result of the complexity of the modern 
economic world, means that there is an increase in claims against directors. Therefore 
there would potentially be an increase in claims against D&O insurance policies. As 
per the increased claims against directors due to increased liability, as a result of the 
doctrinal issues (Chapter 1), so too does increased liability as a result of the 
complexity issues lead to increased claims against directors. The increased exposure 
to liability of directors due to the complexity of the modern economic environment, 
has led to increased claims against company directors.  
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3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Chapter three looks at the first mitigating step which was taken which should, to some 
extent, contain claims against directors; that of codes of corporate governance 
practice. This is not to say that the central purpose of corporate governance codes is to 
contain director liability; however it is intended that less causes for claims should 
result.  
 
As a result of certain corporate failures in the UK (such as Maxwell, BCCI and Polly 
Peck) and in the US (such as Drysdale Government Securities, Washington Public 
Power Supply System, Baldwin-United Corp., and ESM Government Securities) the 
Treadway Commission and the Cadbury Commission were set up in the US and the 
UK respectively. It was recommended that investigations take place into corporate 
governance and thus the Cadbury Report was eventually published in 1992. This led 
to numerous codifications of corporate governance all over the world, including South 
Africa with the King Reports (1994 & 2002).  
 
This chapter will look at corporate governance as a mitigating step regarding director 
liability. A conclusion will finally be drawn as to whether or not it has been, or will 
be, a successful undertaking. If the corporate governance codes have been successful 
in containing director liability, then claims against company directors should 
decrease.  
 
3.1 Definition  
 
„Corporate governance‟ is subject to broad and narrow definitions. Predominantly, 
most definitions situated in corporate governance codes worldwide refer to a form of 
control; of company, corporate management, and of corporate conduct (European 
Commission, 2002). The most straightforward definition is probably that found in the 
Cadbury Report: “Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are 
directed and controlled.” (Cadbury, 1995). This simplistic description is also adopted 
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by the South African Institute of Directors King Report on Corporate Governance, 
1994 (King 1). However, other more elaborate definitions do exist:  
 
- “Corporate governance… involves a set of relationships between a company‟s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.” (OECD Principles, 1999)  
- “Corporate governance comprehends that structure of relationships and 
corresponding responsibilities among a core group consisting of shareholders, 
(supervisory) board members and managers designed to best foster the 
competitive performance required to achieve the corporation‟s primary 
objective.” (Millstein Report to OECD, 2000:13) 
 
Other collective themes regarding definitions of corporate governance are: 
 
- „supervision‟ of the respective company or management, 
- a legal framework, rules and modus operandi, private sector behaviour, and 
- defining the relationships between shareholders, and the boards and 
management.   
 
The King Report on Corporate Governance (2002) (King 2) states that corporate 
governance is primarily involved in two concepts; that of performance and 
conformance. The report goes on to declare that it is necessary to find a balance 
between the two notions (King 2, 2002: 8). Corporate governance may be classified as 
broad or narrow. The narrow model refers to governance of companies from within. 
One example is that of monitoring by the board of directors: the board possesses the 
legal capacity to observe management and take action accordingly. Regular board 
meetings in theory ensure that any obstruction of regulations are brought out in the 
open and dealt with immediately. Non-executive directors are there to provide an 
independent and non-biased opinion of the dealings of the company.  
 
Remuneration may also be used as an internal control; this means that some portion of 
the executive‟s salary is related to performance. This is used as an incentive to avoid 
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errors and opportunistic behaviour. The broad definition encompasses controls over 
the company from the outside. Some examples include the following: state 
(legislation) and judiciary (precedent rulings) control over companies, the demand for 
financial statements, and media pressure. The last example is extremely important and 
vastly unexplored. The media has become instrumental as a corporate governance 
tool, especially in the age of information technology. It is one of the first institutions 
that many unsettled financial analysts turn to and holds the ability to influence public 
perception. Future studies should be directed toward the influence of the media on 
corporate governance (Romano, 1998). The intention behind internal and external 
governance controls is to protect the interests of company stakeholders, as well as to 
defend against market failure due to malpractice (Rossouw, 2002).  
 
Although corporate governance has come under the spotlight since the early 1990‟s it 
has actually been in existence ever since the separation of ownership and control of 
companies occurred. This paved the way for a requirement, on part of the owners or 
investors, of systems to regulate and monitor the functioning of managers. The 
emergence of corporate governance was especially accelerated due to the Industrial 
Revolution: up until then a business had involved owners and undertakings were for a 
once-off purpose. The requirement of substantial amounts of capital led to the 
incorporation of companies and the need for continuity. The high amount of 
shareholders and continually growing complication of processes necessitated the 
development of controls and regulations in order to protect the concerns of company 
owners (Wixley & Everingham, 2005).  
 
Before the discussion on corporate governance can continue it is important to see 
where the need for it came from. It is thus necessary to embark on a brief examination 
of agency theory.  
 
3.2 Agency theory 
 
The pioneering paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) defines the agency relationship 
as a contract under which one individual (principal) appoints another individual 
(agent) to perform a service on his behalf. As a result, the principal assigns some 
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decision-making authority to the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) go on to explain 
that if both parties to the contract are utility maximizers it is likely that the agent will 
not always act in the best interests of the principal. Companies were defined as “… 
legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals.” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310) 
 
It is then in the best interests of the principal to try and restrict the departure from his 
best interests by setting up incentives for the agent and incurring certain monitoring 
costs. This is where corporate governance comes in. Monitoring costs are spent on 
undertakings in order to control, measure and observe the activities of the agent. 
Some examples are that of corporate governance codes and auditing measures 
(McColgan, 2001).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) further suggest that in some cases it may be in the 
interest of the agent to disburse resources in order to assure that no action will take 
place that will prejudice the principal, or that the principal will be compensated in the 
event that a loss does occur. These expenditures are called bonding costs and it is 
arguable that D&O liability insurance may be an example, even though the cost of 
this specific type of insurance is borne by the company. Agents will stop sustaining 
bonding costs when the marginal reduction in monitoring is equal to the marginal 
increase in bonding costs (McColgan, 2001).  
 
However regardless of monitoring and bonding costs, it is improbable that the 
interests of managers and shareholders are likely to be completely parallel. According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency losses will still occur due to conflicts of 
interest; this is known as the residual loss. This is as a result of the fact that the costs 
of total implementation of the principal-agent contract will overshadow the benefits 
derived. The consequence is an optimal level of residual loss, which is a trade-off 
between management limitation and reduction in principal losses (McColgan, 2001).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of monitoring payments 
by the principal, bonding spending by the agent and the residual loss incurred.  
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It is evident that the main source of obstacle regarding agency theory is that of 
information asymmetries. Asymmetrical information occurs when one party (in fact 
both) to a contract has more knowledge regarding critical information required in the 
contract than the other (Douglas, 1989). For example, a shareowner may inspect the 
CV of a potential director/manager; however one can never truly know the applicant‟s 
abilities, expertise or honesty. In fact the potential agent may be aware of who would 
be a better candidate for the position, however the principal will not. In this manner 
one gets a glimpse of the first market failure known as adverse selection. Due to 
asymmetrical information, low-quality applicants are selected. This will tend to drive 
out high-quality workers from the pool, which ultimately may lead to a collapse. 
Additional information on adverse selection may be acquired in Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) and Akerlof (1970).  
 
Another market failure which may occur due to information asymmetry is that of 
moral hazard. Once a director/manager is selected, the shareowner may not know 
how the work is actually performed. Whether or not the director keeps himself well 
informed or works hard enough (shirking). The director may also be opportunistic and 
purse his own self-interests (Shapiro, 2005). Will the director take advantage of the 
perquisites that are inherent in the job function? Anyone who has ever: made personal 
calls from the office, used the internet at work to monitor the stock market, or 
outsourced work to close contacts even though their competitors may have been better 
equipped, will have contributed to the moral hazard factor of their employing 
company. Additional reading may be done on moral hazard in Shavell (1979).   
 
An understanding of information asymmetry is crucial for the discussion on directors 
and corporate governance. The contractual relationship between shareholders and 
directors is one of a principal-agent nature. In order for the shareowners to ensure the 
interests of managers/directors are aligned with their own, corporate governance 
structures are put in place. In the event of a breach on part of a director, of either 
corporate governance codes or legislation, the director may be held personally liable 
for any losses incurred. That is where D&O liability insurance is vital.  
 
It seems that agency theory is interested in solving two problems which occur in 
agency relationships: the first is the fact that the objectives of the principal and agent 
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are likely to be inconsistent, the second is that it may be costly or impossible for the 
principal to ensure that the agent is performing in the best interests of the company 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The problem may be seen as one of risk-aversion; the principal 
and agent may also have dissimilar risk appetites and therefore it will be difficult to 
achieve the aims of the company.   
 
It is worth mentioning that two types of agency theory exist (Jensen, 1983): positivist 
and principal-agent. Positivist researchers concentrate on the classification of 
instances in which the principal and agent are expected to possess incompatible 
objectives and thus providing for the governance mechanisms which constrain the 
agent‟s „selfish‟ behaviour. Principal-agent work is connected to the general theory of 
the principal-agent relationship and its relevance in the work environment. Research 
conducted entails listing assumptions and creating mathematical proofs (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
 
Having looked at the origins of corporate governance one can now endeavour to 
describe other crucial factors which are necessary in the understanding of this type of    
corporate regulation. It is necessary to remember that corporate governance did not 
come about as a result of increased research in the area of agency theory in the 
1970‟s; to the contrary both corporate governance and the principal-agent problem 
have existed since the separation of ownership and control of companies. This is a 
crucial section in the understanding of where the need for D&O liability insurance 
comes from.  
 
It is appropriate to conclude this section as Jensen and Meckling (1976) began; with a 
quote from Adam Smith‟s Wealth of Nations: “The directors of such companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people‟s money than their own, it cannot 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for 
their master‟s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation form having it. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.” (Smith, 1776: 700).  
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3.3 Significance of corporate governance  
 
When looking worldwide, it is clear that shareholder activism is on the rise. This is 
evident from an increasing amount of shareholder claims against company directors 
and an increase in corporate governance codes and legislation. Shareholder activism 
may be defined as the monitoring of performance and corporate governance of 
companies by shareholders, be they individuals, groups or institutions (Investopedia). 
There is undoubtedly a general consensus that improved corporate governance 
structures will result in increased shareholder returns; however due to the multifaceted 
relationship between the two variables, academics have generally not succeeded in 
proving a positive relationship.  
 
With this in mind McKinsey & Company undertook the „Investor Opinion Survey‟ 
which was published in 2000. The objective of the study was to determine how 
shareholders perceive and value corporate governance in developed and developing 
economies. The study was performed in conjunction with the World Bank and the 
Institutional Investor‟s Regional institutes.    
 
According to the McKinsey & Company (2000) survey a soundly-governed company 
is defined as having a majority of outside directors on the board who possess no 
management ties, formal assessments must be performed on directors, and the 
company must be receptive to investor requests regarding information on governance 
issues. To add to this, directors should hold substantial stockholdings in the company, 
and a percentage of directors‟ pay must be in the form of stock options. Utilising then 
mentioned criteria for good corporate governance, the following key results were 
discovered:  
 
- Of over 200 global institutional investors, more than 80% signalled a 
motivation to pay a premium for shares in a well-governed company over a 
poorly governed one with a comparable financial record.  
- 75% of investors stated that the board of directors‟ practices are at least as 
crucial as financial performance when assessing companies for investment. 
This was especially predominant in Latin America. This finding is crucial to 
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the study performed in this dissertation, as it demonstrates that a director‟s 
procedures are as important as financial performance in the eyes of investors. 
Therefore on the other hand, poor director performance may lead to a 
highlighted demand for compensation which is where D&O liability insurance 
comes in.  
- Investors were found willing to pay a premium for good corporate governance 
systems. However the amounts of premium differed across certain countries: 
UK investors were willing to pay 18% more for shares in a soundly-governed 
company, compared to one with poor governance and similar financial 
performance. In emerging economies the premium rose to 27% in countries 
such as Indonesia and Venezuela.      
 
The importance of corporate governance (quantified) was further reinforced in the 
McKinsey & Company 2002 Global Investor Opinion Survey. The reinforcement of 
the quality of accounting disclosure was of top priority. Some of the key findings of 
the survey were:  
 
- Investors still viewed the quality corporate governance on par with financial 
indicators when assessing investment options. 
- Investors were willing to spend a premium on companies which demonstrate 
good corporate governance measures. The mentioned premiums were: 12 – 
14% in North America and Western Europe, 20 – 25% in Asia and Latin 
America, and over 30% in Eastern Europe and Africa.    
- Over 60% of investors stated that corporate governance measures would lead 
them to avoid certain companies, whilst 33% said that poor governance would 
lead them to completely avoid certain countries regarding investment.   
- Other findings were: support for a global unified accounting system, a need 
for systems to deal with corruption, requirement for board of directors‟ 
transparency and accountability, board independence, and a need to enforce 
existing regulations.   
- The relative slight decrease in the significance of corporate governance may 
have been due to the fact that many countries introduced governance-related 
reforms which settled the investor‟s urgent needs.  
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Yet another study was performed by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
entitled: „Governance and Performance in Corporate Britain‟ which was released in 
2008. The research enquired into whether good corporate governance leads to 
stronger operating performance and whether it leads to higher share price returns. The 
findings suggest a positive answer to both those questions. The ABI‟s Institutional 
Voting Information Service (IVIS) was utilised in order to measure the quality of 
company governance over a four-year period (2004 – 2007 inclusive). The 
information was then compared to data on company performance and shareholder 
returns provided by Thompson Financial. The 361 companies which were assessed 
were all in the FTSE All-Share Index.     
 
The key findings may be summarised as follows (Selvaggi & Upton, 2008):  
 
- The years which marked major governance concerns (red top) were strongly 
and negatively correlated with performance. Companies which had a red top 
underperformed other companies by about 3 to 5 percentage points per year.    
- Companies which breached pre-emption guidelines on share issues had an 
annual decrease of 3 percentage points as well as a 0.2 point decrease in the 
market value of assets.  
- A glaring indication was found that corporate governance leads to better 
performance rather than good performance leading to better governance.  
- Over the study period, the shares belonging to well-governed companies 
produced an extra return of 37 basis points per month. 
- The share-price returns volatility seemed to be lower regarding portfolios of 
well-governed companies.   
- A significant finding which has been difficult to attain thus far is that: the 
balance of the board of directors is significant. An increasing number of Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) on a board improves performance, however if the 
increase is too high it will lead to a decrease in profitability.  
 
There is little doubt in any person‟s mind that corporate governance plays a 
significant role in investor decisions and therefore the global economy. The 
McKinsey & Company reports, as well as that of the ABI, illustrate the value which is 
placed on governance systems, with a great emphasis on directors who perform a key 
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function in the corporate governance of a company. More than ever this shows the 
importance of protection of the mentioned directors which will most likely come in 
the form of D&O liability insurance.  
 
3.4 Good corporate governance 
 
3.4.1 Characteristics of good corporate governance  
 
According to King 2 the following characteristics are typical of good corporate 
governance:  
 
- Discipline: This is the commitment by a company‟s senior management to 
observe and take part in conduct which is collectively recognised and received 
as correct and proper.  It is referred to as corporate discipline.  
- Transparency: It is crucial that outsiders have the ability to analyse a 
company‟s actions, economic activities, as well as non-financial aspects 
regarding business. Information must be available in an honest, accurate and 
timely manner. Investors should be offered a true picture when deciding on 
investment options.  
- Independence: This concept refers to the mechanisms which are in place in 
order to minimise or annul potential conflicts of interest which may occur, 
such as a dominant director or shareowner. No undue influences should be 
acceptable.  
- Accountability: Any individual working for, or acting on behalf of, a company 
must be held accountable for the actions or decisions taken. Mechanisms must 
be created in order to allow investors to enquire and consider actions taken by 
the board of directors and its committees.  
- Responsibility: Responsibility relates to conduct which allows for corrective 
action to occur in the event of mismanagement. The board of directors is 
accountable to the company; however it is required to act with responsibility 
towards the stakeholders of a company.  
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- Fairness: There must be mechanisms in place which take into consideration 
the interests of all who hold an interest in the company. Therefore rights must 
be acknowledged equally irrespective of dominant or subservient positions 
regarding the company.   
- Social responsibility: The concept of corporate social responsibility has 
attracted much attention as it is becoming increasingly evident that companies 
should be conscious of, and react to social issues. The emphasis here is placed 
on ethical standards. The organisation should be responsible not just for 
creating an economic profit but also take due regard to environmental and 
human rights matters. It is said that companies will consequently receive 
indirect economic gains, such as a corporate reputation, by taking social 
factors into account.  
 
Tricker (1984) explicates the corporate governance process regarding four activities:  
 
- Direction: This involves creating the long-term strategic direction of the 
company.  
- Executive action: Executives have to be implicated in crucial company 
decisions, which should be made with regards to timely and accurate data.  
- Supervision: The board of directors must monitor and oversee management 
performance on a regular basis. Reports should then be produced in order to be 
inspected.  
- Accountability: This concept is once again mentioned as due respect must be 
awarded to those who require accountability.  
 
3.4.2 Triple bottom line 
 
Another important evolution in corporate governance is that of the triple bottom line 
approach. This change in corporate governance thinking adopts the economic, 
environmental and social aspects of a company‟s activities. According to King 2, the 
economic feature entails the financial and non-financial activities applicable to that 
company‟s business. The environmental side comprises of thee effect on the 
environment of the product or service created by the company. The social facet adopts 
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values, ethics as well as the mutual relationships with stakeholders besides 
shareholders. The basic notion is that ownership creates responsibility – to more than 
just shareowners.  
 
3.4.3 Corporate social responsibility 
 
The concept of corporate social responsibility states that a company‟s obligations to 
the society from which it profits reach beyond the legislative measures set up by the 
state. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development defined corporate 
social responsibility as the persistent dedication by companies to act ethically and 
factor in the economic development, whilst enhancing the quality of life of the 
workforce as well as the local community and society at large.  
 
Although many view corporate social responsibility as a cost, it may have benefits for 
the company in question. That is with respect to reputation, attracting and maintaining 
a good and ethical workforce, and acquiring assistance in times of collapse (Collier & 
Robberts, 2001).  
 
3.5 Corporate governance structures 
 
There exist two major corporate governance board structures on an international basis. 
One is referring to the unitary and two-tier board systems. The unitary system may be 
referred to as the Anglo Saxon model which is derived from the first UK Companies 
Act of 1844 (Wixley & Everingham, 2005). This was as a result of the concept of a 
company first being considered a separate legal entity from its owners. The basic 
notion is that shareowners appoint executive directors (which involve a managing 
director and CEO) as well as non-executive directors. 
 
In the mainland of Europe, one major corporate governance structure developed most 
predominantly in Germany – the two-tier system. The board of directors is actually 
composed of two sections; a supervisory board and a management board. The 
supervisory board (which represents both shareowners and employees) possesses no 
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executive power but does however retain the authority to select, endorse or subtract a 
manager of the board (McConvill et al, 2005). The management board is responsible 
for the day-to-day management of the company as well as the obligation to report to 
the supervisory board at certain time periods.    
 
Although one may point out some structural differences between the two systems (the 
number of dissimilarities are lessening), many similarities do exist regarding board 
practices (Weil et al, 2002): 
 
- Both systems acknowledge a supervisory and a managerial function; however 
the differences between the two are more prescribed in the two-tier structure.  
- It is common in both the unitary and two-tier board structure for directors to 
be appointed by the shareowners; however in some states the employees may 
elect supervisory board members too.  
- The unitary board and the supervisory board (of the two-tier system) select the 
members of the managerial body – which is the management board in the two-
tier system or the managers to whom authority is delegated from directors in 
the unitary arrangement. 
- The unitary board and the supervisory board (of the two-tier system) are 
responsible for making certain that financial reporting and control systems 
operate correctly, as well as that the company is complying with the legal 
system.   
 
3.6 Significant corporate governance occurrences   
 
The aim of this section is to create a chronological summary of the major corporate 
governance events and codes which have shaped the constantly evolving subject 
matter. Due to the fact that directors hold such an important function in the 
application of corporate governance it is therefore crucial to attain a background 
understanding of the topic.  
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3.6.1 1987: Treadway Report  
 
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission 
– named after the chairman, Mr. JC Treadway Jr.) was established in the US in 1985. 
The Treadway Commission was formed as a result of some dramatic corporate 
failures in the US during the 1980‟s such as Drysdale Government Securities, 
Washington Public Power Supply System, Baldwin-United Corp., and ESM 
Government Securities (Grundfest & Berueffy, 1989). US Congress was questioning 
whether or not the failures could have been avoided and what better audit practice 
measures should have been in-force.  
 
According to the Treadway Report (1987), the Treadway Commission‟s primary 
purpose was: “… to identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting and steps to reduce its incidence.” „Fraudulent financial reporting‟ was 
defined as “Intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, that results in 
materially misleading financial statements.” This could be performed in several 
manners: distortion of corporate records, falsified transactions and misapplication of 
accounting principles.  
 
The three primary objectives of the Treadway Commission were (Grundfest & 
Berueffy, 1989):  
 
- to discover potential of fraudulent financial reporting and the effects on the 
integrity of financial reporting, as well as methods of prevention and 
detection,  
- to discover the role of the independent public accountant in fraud detection, as 
well as the necessary auditing standards changes which should occur, and  
- to discover the corporate characteristics which lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting.  
 
Some of the proposals made by the Treadway Commission which were endorsed by 
the SEC included (Grundfest & Berueffy, 1989):  
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- A requirement that a „management report‟ should be handed in with the 
company‟s annual financial report regarding responsibility for financial 
statements and controls. 
- A requirement that independent accountants review quarterly financial data 
prior to release.  
- A suggestion that corporate directors and officers may be barred or suspended 
from service regarding acts or omissions of fraudulent financial reporting.   
 
It is interesting to note that the term „corporate governance actually originated in the 
US during the 1970‟s and law journals, and would slowly be incorporated into British 
culture.  
 
3.6.2 1992: Cadbury Report 
 
The UK based report entitled Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, chaired by 
Sir Cadbury, is still today considered a great milestone in the progress of corporate 
governance. This is probably due to the fact that the recommendations made in this 
report have been to varying degrees applied in the European Union (EU), US and the 
World Bank to name but a few. As was the case of the Treadway Report, the Cadbury 
Report was mostly produced as a result of certain corporate failures, which this time 
occurred in the UK during the 1980‟s.  
 
Maxwell Communication Corporation was one of the world‟s largest media groups 
and incorporated in 1964 (FundingUniverse.com). Certain high-risk undertakings led 
the Maxwell into extreme debt, which was being financed by diverting finances from 
the company‟s pension funds. After Mr. Maxwell‟s death it materialised that some of 
the company‟s subsidiaries possessed liabilities exceeding assets and that £440 000 
000 was missing from the pension funds. During the same time the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International failed when billions of dollars went missing belonging to 
depositors, employees and shareholders. Concurrently a textile company named Polly 
Peck went under in 1990 as a result of serious fraud (FundingUniverse.com).     
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As a result of the corporate failures, the Cadbury Committee was appointed to 
examine the UK corporate governance system and propose steps in order to restore 
investor confidence. The Cadbury Report contains a Code of Best Practice 
predominantly associated with the composition of the board of directors, the 
appointment and independence of non-executive directors, the service contracts and 
remuneration of executive directors, as well as the company‟s financial reporting 
mechanisms and controls.  
 
The central recommendations which were proposed are as follows (Arcot & Bruno, 
2006):  
 
- non-executive directors must be selected for precise terms of office; 
- non-executive directors should be independent of management; 
- service contracts must not exceed three years; 
- executive remuneration should be shaped by a Remuneration Committee, 
which consists of mainly or completely non-executive directors only; 
- an Audit Committee should be established which must comprise of at least 
three non-executive directors.  
 
Consequent to the publishing of the Cadbury Report and Code of Best Practice, the 
London Stock Exchange instituted a requisite into the Listing Rules, that all 
companies submit a report of compliance or non-compliance with the provisions in 
annual reports.  
 
3.6.3 1994: King 1 
 
Corporate governance in South Africa was authoritatively commenced following the 
publication of the King Report on Corporate Governance (King 1) in November 1994. 
the King Committee on Corporate Governance was created in 1992 with former High 
Court Judge, Mervyn E. King as chairman. The assignment was undertaken with the 
support of the Institute of Directors (IOD) of South Africa in order to deliberate the 
issue of corporate governance, in line with the rest of the world.  
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Although at the time South Africa had seen its fair share of corporate failures, the 
undertaking was not prompted as a result of this; it was due to concerns regarding the 
competitiveness of the South African private sector consequent to the reenrolment of 
the country into the global economy (Armstrong et al, 2005). The end of the apartheid 
era and the commencement of democracy brought hope to many; however it also 
resulted in many challenges. Corporate governance was acknowledged as crucial to 
the well-being and revitalisation of South Africa‟s capital markets as well as to the 
possibility of a commercial economy (Malherbe & Segal, 2001). Corporate 
governance would be critical in augmenting the international investor‟s confidence in 
the new democracy.  
 
King 1 was innovative as it inquired past the financial and regulatory outlooks of 
corporate governance and encouraged an integrated methodology to good governance 
concerning a wide range of stakeholders
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, whilst looking at the triple bottom line. 
This move formalised the requirement that companies acknowledge that they do not 
operate outside of the societies and environments in which they do business.  
 
The King Committee‟s task was more extensive than that of the Cadbury Code as it 
also included a Code of Ethical Practice for business enterprises in South Africa. 
Further, the undertaking was complicated as the special circumstances abound in 
South Africa had to be considered, especially those of previously disadvantaged 
communities (King 1, 1994). This only exemplifies the monumental task which was 
performed. It was thus decided that five task groups would be created which would 
explore five aspects of corporate governance (King 1, 1994): 
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 Corporate governance is slowly moving away from the Shareholder Perspective toward the 
Stakeholder Perspective. In a sense this looks at whose interests the board of directors is aiming to 
achieve as well as who the directors are ultimately accountable to. The Shareholder Perspective states 
that a company aims to maximise shareholder wealth. Shareholder value is satisfactory in the 
maintenance of investor confidence. The residual risk holders are seen to be the shareholders alone; 
therefore directors are ultimately accountable to shareholders (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000). The 
Stakeholder Perspective states that the aim of a company is to satisfy numerous goals of all those 
involved with or affected by the company‟s on-goings. The company‟s undertakings should be aimed 
at preserving the allegiance of multiple stakeholders. All stakeholders are seen to be the residual risk 
holders; therefore directors are accountable to all (Ayuso & Argandona, 2007). Some examples of 
„stakeholders‟ are: employees, creditors, government and trade unions. Although the stakeholder 
approach is noble in premise, it is often extremely difficult to execute in practice. It is often said that in 
the board of directors being accountable to all they are in fact accountable to none.  
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- Director task group: approached the responsibilities of executive and non-
executive directors as well as the availability of information to stakeholders.  
- Audit task group: inquired into the role of auditors, remuneration and 
nomination committees and the interim report.  
- Stakeholder Links task group: explored the relation between numerous 
stakeholders. 
- Ethics task group: developed a Code of Conduct which established the ethical 
practices in business undertakings.  
- Compliance task group: examined the issue of acceptance and implementation 
by all parties concerned of the recommendations.  
 
The main purpose of King 1 is to promote the highest standards of corporate 
governance in South Africa. The Code was accepted worldwide as a groundbreaking 
achievement towards good corporate governance practices.   
 
3.6.4 1997: Asian financial crisis  
 
The East Asian currency crisis occurred round about July of 1997 during which time 
the supply of capital from foreign investors ceased. This led to major liquidity 
setbacks in Asian capital markets, which had a negative impact on local economies as 
a result of inadequate capital and investor nervousness (Cheung & Chan, 2004). The 
crisis is thought to have commenced in Thailand as a result of the financial 
breakdown of the Thai Baht and then spread to the rest of East Asia. South Korea and 
Indonesia were also seriously affected, whilst Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the 
Philippines were also substantially impacted. India, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam 
were also involved but to a lesser extent, whilst Japan had already been suffering from 
an economic downturn.  
 
According to a study performed at country level, there is evidence that frail legal 
institutions for corporate governance were the fundamental reason in aggravating the 
stock market downturns during the Asian financial crisis (Johnson et al, 2000). 
Weaker investor protection leads to greater susceptibility to events which deteriorate 
investor confidence.  
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In 1998 the Symposium – Corporate Governance in APEC: Rebuilding Asian Growth 
– was held in Australia in order to put forward propositions regarding corporate 
governance in Asia. It was agreed the one of the most influential determinants of the 
vulnerability of Asia‟s corporate and financial sectors was a deficiency of sound 
corporate governance. Most of the insufficiencies were that of a lack of disclosure and 
accountability standards in banks and companies. Some of these included poor 
accounting and auditing standards, weak regulatory processes for shareholder 
protection and faint risk assessment practices (APEC Symposium, 1998).  
 
The Asian financial crisis did however have the positive effect of improving corporate 
governance standards in the region. Asian corporate governance codes and standards 
would soon be created: 
 
- Corporate Governance Principles: A Japanese View (1997) 
- SET Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies (1998) in 
Thailand  
- Desirable Corporate Governance in India – A Code (1998) 
- Code of Best Practice (1999) in Hong Kong  
- Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (1999) in South Korea 
- Code for Good Corporate Governance (2000) in Indonesia  
- Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000) 
- ICD Code of Proper Practices for Directors (2000) in the Philippines 
- Code of Corporate Governance (2001) in Singapore  
- Taiwan corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles (2002)  
 
3.6.5 1999: CACG Guidelines 
 
The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) was created in 
1998 as a reaction to the Edinburgh Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in 1997. The scope of this meeting was to promote excellence in 
corporate governance in the Commonwealth. The CACG was established with two 
principal aspirations in mind:  
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- To encourage good standards of corporate governance and business systems 
throughout the Commonwealth; 
- To assist the advancement of organisations which will be able to progress, 
teach and distribute such standards.  
 
The first edition of the CACG Guidelines was introduced at the International 
Corporate Governance Symposium, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. It 
was stated that regulatory barricades between national economies have been lessened 
and global competition for capital has increased; investment capital will only stream 
towards countries that have implemented efficient corporate governance standards. 
The standards have to include investor protection, satisfactory board practices and 
accounting standards. Corporate governance is important as it will ensure the 
Commonwealth‟s: profitability, competitiveness, stability, relations with global 
players and relations with stakeholders.  
 
The CACG Guidelines are there to ease best business practice in both the public and 
private sectors. The guidelines are neither compulsory nor rigid and are designed to 
have the ability to evolve. That is in order to ensure that the Guidelines remain 
flexible and responsive to progress in the global environment.  
 
The Guidelines were aimed at boards of directors as it was stated that it is the 
responsibility of the company directors to guarantee good corporate governance. 
There must be a relationship between the board, management, shareholders and other 
stakeholders. The board of directors is said to be accountable to shareholders and 
responsible for relations with company stakeholders. The fifteen CACG Guidelines 
are as follows:  
 
- Leadership: the board must exercise leadership in directing the company 
whilst ensuring transparency, accountability and responsibility.  
- Board appointments: the board must ensure an efficient process for board 
selection which selects directors that add value to the company.  
- Strategy and values: the board must establish the company‟s values and 
purpose, as well as to ensure implementation.  
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- Company performance: the board must monitor and evaluate the company‟s 
strategy, policy and management performance.  
- Compliance: the board must ensure the company‟s compliance with applicable 
laws, regulations and rules of best business practice.  
- Communication: the board must ensure efficient communication between the 
company, shareholders and stakeholders.  
- Accountability to shareholders: the board must make certain that the lawful 
interests of the shareholders are provided for.  
- Relationships with stakeholders: the board must make certain that the 
company‟s stakeholders are acknowledged and resolve establish fruitful 
relationships.  
- Balance of powers: the board must ensure that no individual or group has 
complete power; this may be accomplished by separating the roles of CEO and 
chairman and providing a mix of executive and non-executive directors.  
- Internal procedures: the board should consistently reassess internal processes 
as well as the systems of financial reporting and control.  
- Board performance assessment: the board should repeatedly consider its 
performance as well as that of individual directors including the CEO. 
- Management appointments and development: the board should appoint a CEO 
and take part in appointment of management, as well as training and 
development.  
- Technology: the board should ensure that the technology used by the company 
is up to date in order for the organisation to remain a healthy competitor.  
- Risk management: the board must ascertain crucial risk areas and performance 
indicators and monitor these aspects.  
- Annual review of future solvency: the board must ensure annually that the 
company will remain a going concern in the following fiscal year.  
 
3.6.6 1999/2004: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Council met 
at Ministerial level during April 1998 in order to request that the OECD, together with 
 121 
national governments, relevant international organisations and the private sector; 
create a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines.  
 
The Principles were created in order to support member and non-member states in the 
evaluation and improvement of the legal, institutional and regulatory structure for 
corporate governance in their countries. The Principles may also be utilised by stock 
exchanges, investors, companies, and others that are interested in developing good 
corporate governance.  
 
It is acknowledged by the OECD that there is no single model of good corporate 
governance. However the OECD isolated certain factors worldwide which inspire 
good corporate governance. The Principles were developed using these common 
elements and are improved upon to encompass the various models that exist. The 
OECD Principles are non-binding and are not prescriptive; their rationale is to operate 
as a basic reference point. The Principles are also meant to evolve and adapt to an 
ever-changing world which will ensure innovation in the field of corporate 
governance (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999).  
 
The OECD Principles were published in 1999, however they were revised and a new 
report was published in 2004. The revision was performed in order to consider the 
later developments and new knowledge in OECD member and non-member states. It 
was agreed that policymakers were more conscious of the positive contribution that 
good corporate governance makes to financial market stability, investment as well as 
economic growth. Companies were also more aware of the manner in which good 
corporate governance factors in their competitiveness (OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 2004).  
 
The following is a summary of the OECD Principles (2004) which encompasses the 
first version:  
 
- Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework: the 
corporate governance system must encourage transparent and efficient 
markets. There must be consistence with relevant laws and a statement must 
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be made regarding the separation of responsibilities among supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement powers.  
- The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions: the corporate 
governance system must protect as well as assist the application of 
shareholders‟ rights. This should cover basic rights such as shareholders‟ 
registration as well as a right to take part in decisions regarding major 
corporate change. Effective shareholder participation must be ensured at 
general meetings.  
- The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: the corporate governance structure 
must make certain the equitable treatment of all shareholders, which includes 
minority and foreign shareholders. Effectual rectification must be easily 
accessible in the event that a shareholder suffers from a violation of rights. 
Insider trading and self-dealing must be forbidden; this may be facilitated by 
allowing members of the board to specify when any self interest may arise 
regarding a company transaction.  
- The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: the corporate governance 
framework must acknowledge the rights of stakeholders which may be 
instituted by law or by means of mutual agreements. There must be a 
committed co-operation between companies and stakeholders in order to 
create wealth, jobs, as well as providing the going concern of enterprises. 
Stakeholders should be provided with effective compensation in the event of 
an infringement of their rights.  
- Disclosure and Transparency: the corporate governance structure must provide 
for precise and timely disclosure regarding information relating to the 
company. This includes finances, functioning, ownership, as well as the 
governance of the company. Accounting and auditing are of utmost 
importance here.  
- Responsibilities of the Board: the corporate governance system must ensure 
the strategic direction of the company as well as the successful monitoring of 
management by the board of directors. In turn, the board must be accountable 
to the company and the shareholders. The board must only take informed 
decisions, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and with the best 
interests of the company and shareholders in mind. The board must also 
employ objective independent judgement regarding company affairs.  
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3.6.7 1999/2005: ICGN Principles 
 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) was established in 1995 as 
a result of interest from institutional investors, companies, financial intermediaries, 
academics and others concerned with the advancement of global corporate 
governance practices. It is the objective of the ICGN to encourage conversation 
between international investors, as well as to facilitate a contribution to corporate 
governance by owners of companies.  
 
The ICGN endorsed the OECD Principles and stated that it is respectable record of 
minimum acceptable standards for investors and companies worldwide. However the 
ICGN considered it necessary that the OECD Principles have some augmentation in 
order to give them weight. It seemed that companies and investors required assistance 
on the implementation of the OECD Principles. The ICGN therefore encourages 
companies to implement the OECD Principles as magnified in the ICGN Statement on 
Global Corporate Governance Principles (1999 – revised in 2005). The most 
significant points on the OECD Principles are extracted and condensed in order to 
provide greater guidance to the interested parties. Many of the Principles have also 
been added to by the ICGN.  
 
In 2005 the ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles (Revised) 
was published. The revision was an indication of the OECD Principles (2005) review, 
as well as new principles developed by the ICGN. The ICGN revision supports the 
OECD Principles (2005) and once again adds additional principles of corporate 
governance.  
 
The following is a summary of the ICGN (2005) Principles:  
 
- Corporate Objective-Shareholder Returns: the overall objective of the 
company is to optimise shareholder returns in the long term. This may be 
achieved by ensuring the long term prosperity of the business by 
implementing an appropriate strategy.  
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- Disclosure and Transparency: companies must reveal relevant information on 
a timely basis in order for investors to make knowledgeable decisions. The 
company must also disclose issues regarding ownership and voting rights. 
These include risk factors and corporate governance issues. The flow of 
information must be guaranteed by the board of directors.  
- Audit: the ICGN supports the progression of superior accounting and financial 
reporting standards. It is also recommended that worldwide accounting and 
auditing practices be harmonised in order to have comparable attributes. 
Annual audits must also be carried out on behalf of shareowners and the audit 
must be undertaken by external and independent auditors. These auditors must 
be selected by the Audit Committee of the board and approved by the 
shareholders. The board of directors is then required to approve the Audit.  
- Shareholders‟ Ownership, Responsibilities, and Voting Rights and Remedies: 
as in the OECD Principles, shareowners must be facilitated with the means to 
exercise ownership rights, as well as to be granted protection and access to 
vote. Shareholders also have the right to partake in major corporate 
governance changes regarding the company. Remedies must be available and 
easily accessible to shareholders in the event of an infringement of their rights.  
- Corporate Boards: in line with international codes of corporate governance, 
the ICGN Principles endorse all types of board structures, as long as 
governance rules are adhered to. The code specifies director‟s duties such as 
monitoring of management and oversight of financial statements (director‟s 
duties are discussed later on). Directors should possess certain competencies 
regarding skills and knowledge in order to properly carry out their duties to 
the company and shareholders. Board evaluation and independence are also 
advocated.  
- Corporate Remuneration Policies: it is vital that remuneration is aligned with 
the interests of shareholders.  
- Corporate Citizenship, Stakeholder Relations and the Ethical Conduct of 
Business: the board of directors is accountable to shareholders and is 
responsible for the active management of relations with stakeholders. 
Companies have the responsibility to comply with all relevant laws and 
regulations in the course of their business. The board of directors is 
responsible for upholding, application and the establishment of a culture of 
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integrity. Companies must implement a code of conduct in order to assure 
corporate social responsibility and to embrace the concept of the triple bottom 
line.  
- Corporate Governance Implementation: companies must ensure that there is 
compliance with and disclosure regarding corporate governance codes and 
systems. It is necessary to disclose which corporate governance code is 
applicable, whether there is compliance, and in the event of non-compliance, 
the reasons for not doing so. Should governance issues arise between the 
board of directors, shareholders and management, these should immediately 
be dealt with through negotiation, mediation or arbitration.  
 
3.6.8 2000: Euroshareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 
The European Shareholders Group (Euroshareholders) is a confederation of European 
shareholders associations. The confederation was established in 1990 and its 
headquarters are in Brussels. The establishment‟s mission is to stand for the interests 
of individual shareholders in the European Union (EU). The primary purposes are:  
 
- The facilitation of harmonisation throughout the EU on topics such as 
minority shareholder protection, transparency of the capital markets and cross-
border proxy voting. 
- The development of shareholder value in European companies.  
- The reinforcement of corporate governance issues in the EU.  
 
The Euroshareholders Guidelines are based on the OECD Principles (1999), however 
they are more particular and comprehensive. The Guidelines are meant to provide for 
the specific requirement of the EU. The following is a summary of the 
Recommendations contained in the Euroshareholders Guidelines (2000): 
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Objectives:  
 
- The central aim of a company is to maximise shareholder wealth in the long 
term. The company‟s should state their financial objectives and strategy in the 
annual report. 
 
Influence of the Shareholders/Voting Rights 
 
- Resolutions which have an elementary consequence on the nature, size, 
structure and risk profile of the company, as well as those which change the 
corporate position of shareholders must be subject to shareholder approval.  
 
Takeovers and Defensive Measures 
 
- If an anti-takeover or defensive measure limit, the influence of shareholders on 
the company it should be evaded.  
- Mergers and takeovers must be regulated and compliance must be supervised.  
- There should be a landmark (threshold) regarding the stake which a 
shareholder holds in a company; in the event that the limit is exceeded the said 
shareholder must be obligated to provide an offer for the remaining shares.   
 
Right to Information 
 
- It is the company‟s duty to information instantly regarding an influence on 
share prices, as well as information relating to shareholders that pass a 5% 
threshold.  
- The auditors of a company must be independent and should be elected at 
general meetings.  
- Shareholders must have the ability to add entries to the programme of the 
AGM. 
- Shareholders must be supplied with price-sensitive information via regular as 
well as electronic means.  
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Role of the Board(s) 
 
- Shareholders have the right to nominate members of minimum one board, as 
well as the ability to file for dismissal. Shareholders also have the ability to 
offer suggestions regarding applicant members to the board.  
- Non-executive directors should have a limit on the membership of a board of 
twelve years.  
- At any time, a maximum of one non-executive board member may have 
served as an executive board member of the company.  
 
3.6.9 2000: The Combined Code 
 
The UK Committee on Corporate governance aimed to construct a set of principles 
and code which was comprised of the Cadbury and Greenbury codes, as well as the 
Committee‟s own input. The London Stock Exchange also had contributions to make 
in the form of alterations and consultation.  
 
The Combined Code in the first part of its report will require the company to describe 
on the manner in which it applies the principles of the Code. Companies have the 
freedom to decide on how the report will be laid out in order to explicate their 
principles of corporate governance. It is in the interests of the shareholders to appraise 
this section of the company report. In the second part of the report by the company 
will have to verify that it compliance with the Code or provide an explanation in the 
case of non-compliance. Companies must be able to explain digressions from best 
practice. Those who evaluate the company‟s report must keep in mind the special 
circumstance of the entity in question.   
 
It must be borne in mind that the Combined Code is not intended to deviate from the 
Cadbury and Greenbury reports; the aim is to supplement the previous work and 
combine them.  
 
Section 1 of the Combined Code holds the corporate governance principles as well as 
code provisions relevant to all listed companies incorporated in the UK. Section 2 
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holds principles and code stipulations related to institutional shareholders regarding 
voting, communication with the company and appraisal of the company‟s governance 
structures.  
 
The following is a summary of Section 1 regarding the board of directors (Combined 
Code, 2000):  
 
- The company should contain a board which must control and lead the entity. 
- The office of the CEO and Chairman should be held by different individuals.  
- The board must contain a balance of executive and non-executive directors. 
- Information must be available to the board promptly in order to make 
appropriate decisions.  
- A formal and transparent system must be available for appointments on the 
board.  
- Directors must be present for re-election at a minimum of three year periods.  
 
3.6.10 2002: King 2 
 
Since the inception of King 1 in 1994 numerous changes occurred in South Africa. 
Two democratic elections had been held and a third was soon underway; South Africa 
was now a fully-fledged member of the international community. A revision of South 
African corporate governance was essential. There was domestic and international 
pressure for the update: international pressure came from the constantly upgraded 
worldwide corporate codes which have already been discussed, as well as from 
institutional investors. Institutional investors act on behalf of others and pool 
resources together in order to invest funds. In the US alone institutional investor 
assets increased 144% from 1990 to 1998; $6.3-$15 trillion (Monks & Minow, 2008). 
Corporate governance is therefore of utmost importance with respect to institutional 
investors such as banks, mutual funds, insurance companies and pension plans. 
Domestic pressure came from the fact that the South African society was changing 
and an African renaissance was underway (Rossouw et al, 2002).  
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The review was based upon four principal Guiding Principles:  
 
- the review of King1 and the evaluation of its prevalence against international 
and local developments; 
- the reconsideration and elucidation of the „inclusive approach‟115 proposed in 
Kind 1 regarding the sustainable success of companies; 
- to acknowledge the escalating significance of non-financial issues worldwide, 
as well as to consider and recommend reporting on social and ethical 
accounting, auditing and reporting. Issues such as safety, health and the 
environment must also be considered; and 
- to advocate on the compliance with a new Code of Corporate Governance for 
South Africa may be measured and based on outcomes. A „balanced 
scorecard‟116 method must be adopted for reporting.  
 
Task teams were once again appointed; however this time their scope was to review 
specified areas of corporate governance. The task teams selected were the following 
(King 2, 2002):  
 
- Boards and Directors task team: considered matters regarding board practice, 
the status and responsibilities of executive, non-executive and independent 
directors, as well as executive and non-executive director remuneration. The 
„Business Judgement Rule‟ was also looked into.  
- Accounting and Auditing task team: deliberated the advancements in auditing 
and non-audit practices, accounting standards in South Africa in comparison 
to international standards, and auditor skills required.  
- Internal Audit, Control and Risk Management task team: reconsidered the task 
and purpose of internal audit, as well as that of the internal auditor with 
international standards kept in mind. Risk management was also considered as 
a factor for boards and companies with respect to risk management.  
                                                 
115
 The Inclusive Approach refers to the acknowledgement of stakeholders (including community, 
customers, employees and suppliers) as important in the development of the company‟s strategy.   
116
 The Balanced Scorecard is a strategic management tactic created by Dr. Kaplan of the Harvard 
Business School and Dr. Norton. The model involves four standpoints from which to view an 
organisation: financial, customer, learning and growth, and internal business process (JISC INFONET).  
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- Integrated Sustainability Reporting task team: dealt with areas of reporting 
regarding issues which were non-financial. Some examples are stakeholder 
partaking in ethics and ethical reporting, as well as social issues such as black 
economic empowerment.  
- Compliance and Enforcement task team: deliberated the supervision and 
enforcement of statutory and regulatory codes and legislation already in 
existence in South Africa. This was done in order to recommend on how to 
develop observance of such governance guidelines.  
 
Public listed companies in South Africa have to produce an annual compliance 
certificate and submit it to the JSE. This is a statement that the company will conform 
to the listing requirements of the JSE. Directors themselves have to individually state 
that they will carry out their duties towards the company and comply with the listing 
requirements of the JSE. This adds more potential liability to the company directors. 
Directors have many duties with regards the JSE requirements which include issues of 
financial statements, press releases and company dividends among others (Mammatt 
et al, 2004). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to study the JSE requirements; 
however more information on this topic may be obtained from the JSE website: 
www.jse.co.za.  
 
3.6.11 2002: Principles of Corporate Governance – United States  
 
In the US the Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of 
leading companies which has overtime produced numerous papers on corporate 
governance. Some of these include: Statement on Corporate Governance (1997), 
Executive Compensation/Share Ownership (1992), Corporate Governance and 
American Competitiveness (1990), Statement on Corporate Responsibility (1981), 
and The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly 
Owned Corporation (1978). 
 
Due to the ever increasing character of change, innovation and progress in the US and 
worldwide, the Roundtable decided to restate its guiding principles on corporate 
governance. The following is a summary of these corporate governance principles:  
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- The primary duty of the board is to choose the CEO and supervise the ethical 
business of the company regarding senior management and the CEO.  
- Management has the responsibility to conduct the business of the company in 
an ethical manner in order to maximise shareholder value. Management must 
also be aware of the company‟s risks as well as where income is derived from. 
A conflict of interest must never be allowed to arise between management and 
the company. 
- Management holds the responsibility under the supervision of the board and 
the audit committee to ensure that accurate and timely financial statements are 
produced in order for shareowners to make informed business decisions.  
- The board of directors and audit committee have the responsibility to appoint 
an independent accounting company to audit the financial statements produced 
by management. The independence of the auditor must never be compromised.  
- The accounting firm bears the responsibility to ensure that it is independent, 
with no conflicts of interest, and that it employs competent staff. The 
independent accounting firm also bears the responsibility to inform the board 
of directors, via the audit committee, of any faults in the company‟s 
accounting systems and weaknesses in internal controls.  
- The company bears the responsibility of interacting with its employees in a 
fair and equitable manner.  
 
The Principles of Corporate Governance (2002) looked at the role and function of the 
board of directors and management, as well as the company‟s relationship with 
shareholders and stakeholders.  
 
3.6.12 2002: US Corporate Scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
In July, 2002 the President of the US, George W. Bush, signed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act also referred to as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act (SOX). It is often stated that SOX was a response to numerous 
corporate and accounting scandals that occurred in the US between 2001 and 2002; 
this is predominantly correct. However the Act was not swiftly pieced together in 
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order to create a fast reaction; to the contrary the provisions had been deliberated by 
the Senate and Congressional committees for a number of years (Monks & Minow, 
2008). The Act in question would be the most considerable piece of federal legislation 
regarding public companies in the US since that which created the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) consequent to the 1929 stock market crash
117
. The 
focus of SOX is on penalties due to breach, and disclosure of financial and corporate 
governance information.  
 
Prior to a brief explication and summary of SOX it is essential to describe some of the 
more significant corporate scandals which occurred ahead of the inception of the Act. 
Those considered for discussion are Enron, Tyco and Worldcom, however others did 
occur such as Adelphia and Peregrine Systems.  
 
Enron: 
 
The origins of Enron may be traced as far back as the formation of Northern Natural 
Gas Company in 1932. However the actual company was founded by Mr. L in 1985 
through the merger of Houston Natural Gas and Internorth. These were natural gas 
pipeline companies. The company would transport gas from producers to buyers. 
Enron possessed the biggest network of interstate pipelines. The company sought 
further expansion and diversified. Enron became a trader of electricity, coal, steel, 
paper and pulp, water, and broadband fibre optic facilities (Healy & Palepu, 2003). 
The company would become an international conglomerate trading its products and 
services in financial markets. From 1990 until 1998 Enron‟s stock increased by 311%.  
 
Due to the intricate nature of Enron‟s business the company took advantage of certain 
accounting limitations in order to portray an unrealistic impression of its financial 
results. This was easily done as the contracts Enron was involved in were long term 
and current accounting regulations use the present value structure in order to portray 
business transactions (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Management therefore utilised a 
system known as mark-to-market accounting in order to forecast future earnings. The 
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 The SEC was created by Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
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primary reason for all the hidden losses at Enron was the fact that beyond natural gas, 
the company‟s business endeavours were largely unsuccessful.  
 
Enron‟s losses remained hidden for so long due to poor corporate governance 
structures within the company. There was a lack of transparency and oversight which 
was fuelled by the negligence of the company‟s auditors, Arthur Andersen. In October 
2001 Arthur Anderson initiated the shredding of documents concerning Enron and by 
December that year Enron filled for bankruptcy (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Mr. S, CEO 
of Enron, was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. The corporate governance and 
legal infringements were so extreme that Mr. S stated in court (unconvincingly) that 
he had no knowledge of the corporate scandal which brought Enron to its knees. 
When the Enron stock price was at its peak of $90, the executives who were aware of 
the fraud which was taking place began to secretly sell their shares; whilst convincing 
other shareholders that the price would continue to increase. On the 28 of November 
2001 news of Enron‟s losses reached the public and stock prices dropped to below $1 
almost immediately.  
 
Tyco: 
 
Tyco International Ltd. was created as Tyco Inc. in 1960 as an investment and holding 
company. The main aim was the funding of research for inventors and private sector 
experiments. The company grew rapidly and in 1972 it listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). In the 1980‟s Tyco continued to grow through acquisitions – 
business ranged from medical supplies to electrical components (Monks & Minow, 
2008). The 1990‟s saw the arrival of a new CEO, Mr. K, who managed to increase the 
size of the company considerably by utilising aggressive acquisition policies.  
 
However the exponential increase in the size of the company saw its corporate 
governance standards decline. Monitoring of management decreased and the systems 
were non-transparent (Monks & Minow, 2008). It would later come to light that the 
former CEO and chairman, Mr. K, as well as the former CFO stole $600 000 000 
from the company. In 2005 both men were found guilty on thirty counts, which 
carried a prison sentence of twenty-five years.  
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Worldcom: 
 
Following the corporate scandals such as Enron and Tyco, the Sarbanes Bill would 
look to make considerable modifications to the operations of auditors, boards of 
directors and security analysts. However due to great opposition to the Bill, in 2002 it 
seemed it would not be passed as legislation. The situation changed when the 
Worldcom scandal became public (Monks & Minow, 2008).  
 
Worldcom was the second biggest long-distance telephone company in the US, 
behind AT&T. The enlargement of the company was augmented by the acquisition of 
another telecommunications company named MCI Communications. In June 2002, a 
statement was made that Worldcom had exploited $3.8 – billion expenses by „turning‟ 
them into assets. Other expenses had been paid by using resources from reserve 
accounts, which had the effect of falsely increasing the company‟s income.  
 
Mr. E, the CEO of Worldcom had convinced the board of directors to provide him 
with massive personal loans, which he used in a failed attempt to hide the company‟s 
losses. Mr. E was convicted of conspiracy, fraud, as well as the falsification of 
documents intended for the SEC and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. 
Worldcom‟s CFO pleaded guilty to conspiracy, fraud and the preparation of false 
statements in order to conceal the company‟s losses. By the end of 2003 investigators 
were lead to believe that Worldcom‟s assets had been inflated by $12 – billion.  
 
Sarbanes-Oxley: 
 
The passing of SOX saw the creation of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants whose members are appointed by the SEC. The following is a summary 
of the organisation‟s primary functions (Monks & Minow, 2008):  
 
- Registration and inspection of public accounting companies. 
- Setting report standards relating to auditing, ethics, independence, and quality 
control.  
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- Carrying out investigations and proceedings on public accounting companies 
in the event of suspected malpractice.  
 
The following is a brief summary of the most relevant sections of SOX 
(SoxLaw.com):  
 
Section 302 (Title 3): Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports 
 
Statutory financial reports must contain certifications that: 
- Signatory officers have reviewed the report. 
- No material untrue statements or omissions are contained in the report.  
- The financial statements represent the true financial condition of the company.  
- Signatory officers have reviewed the internal controls of the company.  
 
Section 401 (Title 4): Disclosures in Periodic Reports 
 
- Financial statements may not contain incorrect information 
- Financial statements must include off-balance sheet liabilities and 
transactions.  
 
Section 404 (Title 4): Management Assessment of Internal Controls 
 
- Annual reports must contain a statement on the adequacy of the company‟s 
internal control structure and system regarding financial reporting.  
- The statement must consider the efficiency of the internal controls and 
systems.  
- The registered accounting company must certify the mentioned statement.  
 
Section 409 (Title 4): Real Time Issuer Disclosures 
 
- The company must immediately reveal information pertaining to alterations in 
financial stance or operations.  
- The information must be simplified and presented graphically hwere 
appropriate.  
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Section 802 (Title 8): Criminal Penalties for Altering Documents 
 
- Penalties, fines and/or up to twenty years imprisonment are imposed for the 
alteration or destruction of documents with the intent to obstruct, impede or 
influence a legal investigation.  
 
3.6.13 2009: King 3 
 
In March 2009 the Draft Code of Governance Principles for South Africa by the King 
Committee on Governance was released for public comment. This is the much 
anticipated Third King Report which will be used in South Africa. The Draft Report 
states that the new King Code was a necessity as a result of the new South African 
Companies Act, as well as the international transformations in corporate governance 
tendencies. Some of the included international trends are: alternate dispute resolution, 
risk-based internal audit, IT governance, shareholders and remuneration, and 
evaluation. The King 3 Report will be applied from March 2010, up until which time 
King 2 will continue to be employed.  
 
The Report emphasises the fact that the South African Corporate Governance Codes 
do not follow the US trend of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; that is a „comply or else‟ 
system.
118
 This means that non-compliance would lead to legal action. The Report 
states that the US system leads to a waste of time and cost for companies. This is due 
to the time-consuming procedures as well as the expenses involved in carrying out the 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The board of directors is charged with the 
responsibility of compliance which ultimately takes away from the company‟s main 
aspiration of performance.  
 
It is for this reason, amongst others, that South Africa will use a „apply or explain‟ 
system; in other words companies and their boards of directors will have to explicate 
why they did not utilise with King 3 in the event that they do not. This removes the 
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pressure of possible burdensome sanctions which may cripple company operations. 
The ultimate objective should be that the best interests of the company are given the 
most importance; should this be done without compliance (and to the detriment of no 
other), it is believed that that should be good enough. One must bear in mind that 
although South Africa does not apply a „comply or else‟ style approach, corporate 
governance is beginning to be legislated as in the new Companies Act; therefore legal 
sanctions could eventually become a reality.  
 
The main principles applied to the King 3 report are:
119
  
 
- Leadership;  
- Sustainability; 
- Innovation, fairness and collaboration; 
- Integrating sustainability and social transformation; and 
- Renewal of sustainability reporting.  
 
The importance of the role of the board of directors with regards to corporate 
governance is emphasised by the fact that Chapter One is entitled „Boards and 
Directors‟. It is not the aim of this dissertation to discuss the King 3 Draft in great 
detail however the following is a brief summary of the „Role and function of the 
board‟ as described in Chapter One:  
 
- The board should be the central mechanism for corporate governance. This 
should be accomplished by managing relationships between the board itself, 
the company and all the relevant stakeholders. The endurance and success of 
the company should be a key concern for the board. Stakeholder involvement 
in the company must be a reality.  
- The company must come across as a responsible corporate citizen. This has 
been discussed in the dissertation with respect to corporate social 
responsibility, which is increasing in importance worldwide in terms of 
company governance. Therefore the environment in which the company 
operates must be or concern.  
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- The board is responsible for the creation and continuation of an ethical 
corporate culture. The board must ensure that it demonstrates a support for 
good ethical behaviour within the company.  
- The board must be involved in the creation and implementation of the 
company‟s strategy. This must be integrated with the reality of risk which the 
company faces. Finally the board is required to ensure the sustainability of the 
company‟s success. 
- Further to sustainability, this must be regarded as a business prospect; the 
company is no longer there only for the benefit of shareholders. The triple 
bottom line of social, economic and environmental performance must be taken 
into account.  
- The board is required to appoint a CEO as well as to set up structures for 
delegation of authority.  
- The board is responsible for the risk management procedures of the company. 
This involves the setting of the company‟s risk appetite, overseeing the risk 
management procedure, as well as setting up a risk committee when necessary 
to do so.  
- The board must act in the best interests of the company. This involves both the 
common law duties of care and skill as well as the fiduciary duty to act in 
good faith. The Report states that a director could be held personally liable for 
monetary damages incurred by the company as a result of the director‟s failure 
to uphold common law duties. This must be governed by the new Companies 
Act according to the Report.  
- The board as well as the directors must manage conflicts of interest. No 
personal interests may ever be regarded as move valuable than that of the 
company.  
- The board must ensure that a risk-based internal audit is in place.  
- The board must ensure that financial reporting is carried out in a reliable and 
honest manner.  
- The board must report on the usefulness of the internal financial controls.  
- The board must ensure that full disclosure is made in a timely manner of 
relevant fact with regards to the company. This involves transparency between 
the board and relevant stakeholders.  
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- The board must ensure the efficient and successful resolution of internal and 
external disputes.  
- The board must ensure that the company has procedures in place with regards 
to compliance with relevant laws and regulations.  
- It is the duty of the board to ensure that business rescue proceedings are taken 
up as soon as the company is distressed. Business rescue is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 4 of the dissertation.  
 
It will be interesting to see how the King 3 Code will apply in conjunction with the 
new Companies Act, which are both due to be passed in 2010. These two measures of 
regulation were created to apply in conjunction with one another, however it remains 
to be seen whether or not the two mitigating steps will actually contain director 
liability.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance has existed since the separation of ownership (shareholders) 
and control (management) of companies. It was thus necessary to introduce the board 
of directors in order to oversee the relationship between the company, shareholders 
and management. Interest in corporate governance increased in the US and UK due to 
certain corporate failures which led to the Treadway and Cadbury Codes being 
published. For nearly two decades since, corporate governance has increased in 
importance worldwide. This has been as a result of: 
 
- Institutional investors have demanded high corporate governance standards 
due to the large quantities of funds which are invested on behalf of others. 
This is apparent as some institutions have created their own corporate 
governance standards as benchmarks for investment (CACG Guidelines, 
1999).  
- The importance of all stakeholders has increased to some extent; some 
corporate governance codes imply possible director liability towards all 
stakeholders. Thus principles of corporate governance have widened to 
include stakeholders (stakeholder theory).  
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- In South Africa the transition from apartheid to democracy has increased the 
need for sound corporate governance principles in order for South African 
companies to compete on a global level for investor funding.   
- There has been an ongoing series of corporate governance failures and 
scandals worldwide, which have continued to persist. Corporate governance 
has increasingly attempted to hold boards of directors more accountable and to 
recommend governance systems, which support transparency and 
accountability. Such has been the case that many states are now codifying 
director‟s duties and liabilities within company legislation. This is the case of 
South Africa regarding the Companies Bill.  
 
It is important to remember that without reliable corporate governance standards, a 
country stands the chance of watching investor funds surge elsewhere. It is the board 
of directors that are responsible and accountable for the implementation of company 
legislation and governance standards. Directors are therefore faced with a parallel 
increase in responsibility and liability. 
 
It seems evident that the question, of whether or not the various corporate governance 
codes have been successful in containing claims against directors, answers itself. The 
answer unfortunately is that it has not contained director liability. Some of the greatest 
corporate failures and scandals occurred at the beginning of the 2000s; not only in 
South Africa (Leisurenet) but also elsewhere – such as Enron in the US. These 
occurrences took place well into the great tide of corporate governance codes, which 
had been put in place worldwide throughout the 1990s. It will be shown in chapter 
five (Directors and Officers Liability Insurance) that the highest claim frequency and 
severity occurred during the hard market of the early 2000s; this is according to 
studies performed by the Tillinghast D&O Liability Surveys.  
 
Another self-evident conclusion may be drawn by the fact that corporate governance 
principles are now being codified by legislation. It will be shown in Chapter Four that 
an increasing amount of countries have codified directors‟ duties. A trend has formed 
under which certain aspects of corporate governance relating to directors are being 
legislated. This in a sense shows that corporate governance codes have not managed 
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to contain claims against directors, and therefore countries are now turning to 
statutory law.  
 
A possible explanation for the fact that the codes of practice have not sufficed to 
contain claims against directors is that they act like a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand the codes may contain director liability, whilst on the other they place more 
onerous responsibilities on company directors. A failure to comply with the necessary 
requirements of the codes leads to a motive for another claim. The amount of 
publicity which the codes have received has also played a part in informing potential 
claimants of the reasons why directors are at fault. Thus the corporate governance 
codes have led to increased expectations of company directors; much of the focus is 
placed on directors themselves.   
 
There is thus only one link between the codes of corporate governance and the 
corporate failures which have occurred: there was a hope that the codes of practice 
would reduce the company failures. The codes of corporate governance have been a 
response to the corporate governance failures worldwide. Whilst the codes were 
aimed at reducing corporate failures and therefore reducing director liability – which 
would in turn reduce claims against company directors – this mitigating step may not 
have succeeded. Whatever positive impact (on claims against directors) the codes of 
corporate governance may have had has been outweighed by the doctrinal and 
complexity changes, as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two respectively.  
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4 IMPACT OF THE NEW COMPANIES ACT ON DIRECTORS AND 
OFFICERS LIABILITY  
 
In chapter four one looks at the second mitigating step relating to directors‟ liability; 
legislation. It would be impossible to analyse all relevant statute which affects 
corporate directors and officers. A list of all relevant legislation in South Africa is 
provided in Appendix 2. This dissertation however is mainly focused on the new 
South African Companies Act (due to be passed into legislation in 2010).  
 
According to the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) Symposium 
(2008), the following countries have revised their company legislation and related 
laws which have increased directors‟ duties and liabilities: 
  
- Ireland, Australia, Israel, Italy, France, Spain, EU Transparency Directive, 
Mexico, China, UK, Japan, Canada, and the US.  
 
South Africa has followed suite and it will be interesting to see if this second 
mitigating step works to contain claims against directors. In 2004, the Department of 
Trade and Industry (dti) South Africa, produced a policy paper, South African 
Companies Law for the 21
st
 Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, in the 
Government Gazette, in which the Minister of Trade and Industry stated that the dti 
decision to “… review and modernise company law in this country was based on the 
need to bring our law in line with international trends and to reflect and accommodate 
the changing environment for business, both in South Africa and globally.” (dti, 2004: 
Foreword).  
 
Thus in 2007, the dti put forward the Republic of South Africa Companies Bill (the 
Bill). The dti consulted with business practitioners, academics, other experts (local 
and international), as well as the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) and summarised five objectives regarding potential future South 
African law. These five objectives are:  
 
- Simplification  
 143 
- Flexibility 
- Corporate efficiency: including a clarification of board structures and director 
responsibilities, duties and liabilities. 
- Transparency: including acknowledgment of director accountability. 
- Predictable regulation.  
 
Due to the fact that the legislation has not been passed yet, this dissertation will study 
the Companies Bill and make some assumptions as to what the outcome will be. 
These assumptions will then be tested in the final chapter by performing a Delphi 
Technique study as well as a separate study which entails separate interviews with 
experts in D&O insurance, director liability and corporate governance. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to consider the impact of the new company legislation 
on corporate directors and officers. This will be carried out by looking at the sections 
of the Companies Bill which affect directors and officers under Chapter Two 
(Formation, Administration and Dissolution of Companies), Part F (Governance of 
companies). The relevant sections will be examined individually.  
 
The new company legislation is a response to the corporate governance failures 
worldwide, as well as the inability of corporate governance codes to mitigate director 
liability. Whilst this is aimed at reducing corporate failures and therefore reducing 
director liability – which would in turn reduce claims against company directors – this 
mitigating step may also not succeed. Whatever positive impact (on claims against 
directors) the new legislation might be outweighed by the doctrinal and complexity 
changes, as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two respectively. 
4.1 C67 – First director or directors 
 
A „first‟ director is the incorporator of the company; thus if more than one person 
incorporated the company more „first‟ directors will exist. The first director will be 
expected to serve as such, until such time that the minimum requisites of the Bill are 
met, regarding the required amount of directors. The first director may also serve until 
the Memorandum of Incorporation has first appointed ample directors in accordance 
with c66 (4)(a)(i) or first elected in accord with c68.  
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In the event that the sum of the incorporators of the company, the ex officio directors, 
and the directors to be selected in accord with c66 (4)(a)(i), does not add up to the 
minimum amount required by the Bill or by the Memorandum of Incorporation, the 
board of directors will be required to call for a shareholders meeting. This must be 
done within forty working days of incorporation. The purpose of this shareholders 
meeting is to elect an adequate number of directors to fill in the vacancies on the 
board. S208 (2) of the Companies Act states that all the subscribers to the 
memorandum of a company will be deemed directors until directors are appointed. 
The Bill does not mention any distinction between the liability of a first director and 
that of a normal director.  
 
4.2 C68 – Election of directors  
 
The directors of a company must be elected by persons who hold the right to vote at 
such elections. This is excluding first directors, directors appointed in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation, and ex officio directors. The elected director will then 
serve for an indeterminate term or as long as the Memorandum of Incorporation 
specifies.  
 
The vote must be arranged such that a series of votes is carried out. That is, the 
persons who have the right to vote will vote for an individual to fill one vacancy. This 
vote must be performed until the board of directors has an adequate content. Each 
voting right may only be exercised once and the vacancy is filled if the majority of 
votes support the nominee. This process is standard unless the Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise.  
 
The board of directors has the power to appoint a person temporarily, if that person 
satisfies the requirements for election, in order to fill a vacancy on the board, until the 
vacancy is taken up according to an election. This is unless the Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise. The person who is serving temporarily possesses all 
the powers, functions, duties, and liabilities of a normal director of a company. It is 
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important in that case that the temporary director is furnished with adequate D&O 
cover during the time served.  
 
4.3 C69 – Ineligibility and disqualification of persons to be director or prescribed 
officer 
 
For the purposes of this section the term „director‟ includes an alternate director,120 
prescribed officer, a board committee member, or an audit committee member. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the person is a part of the company‟s board of directors.  
 
With regards to this section, if a person is ineligible or disqualified, that person may 
not be elected or appointed as a director. The person may further not consent to the 
election or appointment and may not act as a director of the company. The company is 
prohibited from allowing a person who is ineligible or disqualified from acting or 
serving as a director. Here it is relevant whether the company had knowledge of the 
ineligibility or disqualification. It seems that according to the Bill‟s definition of 
„knowledge‟ if a person ought to know something but does not, he is deemed to have 
the actual knowledge. Therefore a company must not be negligent in this respect. This 
definition of knowledge will be looked at further in c78.  
 
Upon ineligibility or disqualification, a person‟s office as a director is terminated 
instantaneously. That is unless the board has removed a director in terms of c71 (3) in 
which case the vacancy does not arise until the later of the two conditions found in 
c70 (2). If a person is placed under probation by a court in terms of c162 (Application 
to declare director delinquent or under probation) or s47 of the Close Corporations 
Act,
121
 that person may not serve as a corporate director unless the probation itself 
stipulates otherwise. The Memorandum of Association may also implement additional 
bases of ineligibility or disqualification, as well as any minimum standards which 
must be met by the directors of that company.  
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 An alternate director is defined in the Bill as a person who is appointed or elected to serve on the 
board of directors as a replacement for another person who was appointed of elected.  
121
 Close Corporations Act, No 69 of 1984  
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The following are the grounds under which a person is considered ineligible to be a 
company director:  
 
- if it is a juristic person; 
- if the person is an emancipated minor, or under similar legal constraints (these 
are not specified); and 
- in the event that any of the conditions set out in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation are not met by the person in question.  
 
The following are the grounds under which a person is disqualified from being a 
company director:  
 
- a court has prohibited the person from being a director; 
- a court has proclaimed that the person is delinquent in terms of c162 of the 
Bill or s47 of the Close Corporations Act; 
- the person is an unrehabilitated insolvent; 
- the person id disallowed by public regulation from serving on the board of 
directors of a company; 
- in terms of misconduct connected to dishonesty, the person has been stripped 
of an office of trust; or 
- if the person has been convicted, in South Africa or abroad, and imprisoned 
without the option of a fine, or fined more than the prescribed amount, due to 
theft, fraud, forgery, perjury, or an offence involving:  
 fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty; 
 the promotion, formation or management of a company; 
 a person who is disqualified or ineligible to be a director but 
nevertheless still consents to such an office or still acts as the director 
of a company;  
 a person who is placed under probation and still takes the office of a 
director; 
 the Companies Bill, the Close Corporations Act, the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the Securities Services Act 36 of 
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2004, or Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
 
If a person is disqualified due to removal from a position of trust or as a result of 
theft, fraud, forgery, perjury, or an offence involving the above statutes, that 
disqualification will be terminated at the later of either five years subsequent to the 
removal from office, or on conclusion of the sentence which was handed down. This 
is unless there has been an extension on recommendation of the Commission. The 
commission may apply at any time before the termination of the disqualification in 
order to have it extended; the court may do so with a five year period at a time if it is 
considered necessary for the wellbeing of the public. The court must take into 
consideration, the behaviour of the disqualified person at the time in which the 
application is made.  
 
A person who is disqualified in terms of the above may still be a director of a private 
company. However this may only be the case if all the shares are held by the 
disqualified person, or alternatively all the shares are also held by persons related to 
the disqualified person. Those relatives are required to consent, in writing, their 
approval for the disqualified person to be a director of the private company.  
 
It is a concern of the Commission to create and sustain a public register of all persons 
who are disqualified from being a director or on probation.  
 
4.4 C70 – Vacancies on board 
 
When a directorship is terminated a vacancy opens up on the board of a company. The 
company is required to file a notice within ten business days once a person takes up or 
vacates the office of a director. This may occur if the term of office has ended, if the 
Memorandum of Incorporation stated a fixed term which has ended, or if, in case of a 
first director, a sufficient amount of directors have been elected. A vacancy will also 
arise on the board of a company in the event that:  
 
- a director resigns or dies; 
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- an ex officio director concludes the office which entitled him to a position as a 
director; 
- a director no longer resides in South Africa and all other directors of that 
company live abroad; 
- the director becomes incapacitated and is unable to perform the necessary 
duties of the board; 
- a director is confirmed as delinquent by a court or is put on probation. The 
terms of the probation must make it impossible for the director to perform the 
required duties; 
- a director becomes disqualified or ineligible to serve on the board of a 
company; or 
- a director is removed either by a resolution of the shareholders, by a resolution 
of the board, or by an order of the court.  
 
In the event that the board itself has removed a director in terms of c71 (3), a vacancy 
will not arise until the later of either the end of the time allowed for filling an 
application for review as in c75 (5) or the permission by the court for the order. 
However the director will nevertheless be suspended from office during that time.  
 
If a vacancy occurs on the board an election must take place at the subsequent annual 
general meeting if the company is required to hold such. Otherwise within six months 
consequent to the vacancy at a shareholder‟s meeting, held for the purpose of an 
election, or at a poll
122
 of persons entitled to vote in such an election. A vacancy on 
the board may mean that a company is left with no directors, or no directors that 
reside in South Africa; in this event a person who holds the right to vote in the 
election of a director may summon a meeting with that purpose as its scope. The court 
will provide relief in order for the meeting to take place so long as it can be shown 
that the order will preserve the rights of shareholders and prevent any oppression of 
such.  
 
                                                 
122
 According to c60 (3) a director may be elected by a written polling of all shareholders who have the 
right to exercise voting rights with respect to a director election.  
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4.5 C71 – Removal of directors 
 
A director of a company may be removed from the board by an ordinary resolution 
passed at a shareholders meeting. The shareholders who pass the resolution must have 
the right to vote at the election of the directors. This resolution will have effect even 
though the Memorandum of Incorporation may stipulate otherwise, or even if an 
agreement has been reached, between the director to be removed, and the company 
itself, or other shareholders. The right to remove a director is in supplementary to 
c162, the application to a court to declare a director delinquent, or the fact that a 
director may be put on probation. However the director must be given a chance to 
make a representation to the company regarding the removal from office before a vote 
can take place. Therefore the director in question must be furnished with a copy of the 
meeting as well as the resolution.  
 
In the event that a company has more than two directors and there is an allegation by 
either a director or a shareholder that one of the directors of the company has:  
 
- ineligible, disqualified, or incapacitated; 
- decided not to reside in South Africa, and no other director of that company 
does; 
- neglected or abandoned the functions and duties of a director; 
 
the remainder of the board of directors will be required to decide, by resolution, 
whether or not to remove the director in question from office. Once again the director 
will first have to be provided with the opportunity to make a representation prior to an 
actual vote on the resolution. The director must be furnished with a copy of the 
meeting and the resolution, as well as the reasoning behind the proposed matter.  
 
If the director is removed due to a resolution passed by the board as stated above, the 
said director has a time space of twenty business days to request a court to review the 
board‟s decision. The same applies to a director who voted to have the director in 
question removed, in the event that the board decided not to remove that director. Any 
director who had his decision declined may apply to a court to review the decision of 
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the board. The court may then either concur with the board‟s decision or alternatively 
remove the director if the requirements for removal have been satisfied. However the 
applicant director will be liable to the company for the court expenses in the event 
that the board‟s decision is not overturned.  
 
If a company has less than three directors, a removal of a director may not be 
contemplated by a resolution of the board of directors. However a shareholder or 
director of the company will be allowed to apply to the Companies Ombud
123
 in order 
to remove a director if the requirements are met.  
 
C171 of the Bill does not forbid a director who has been removed from office from 
application to a court for damages resultant from the loss of office of a director, or 
any other loss of office which occurred as a result of being removed.  
 
4.6 C74 – Directors acting other than at a meeting 
 
Any decision taken by a director which can be voted on at a board meeting may be 
implemented by the written consent of a majority of the company directors. This is 
valid as long as all the directors have been furnished with notice of the matter which 
is to be decided on. The Memorandum of Incorporation may however specify against 
this. A decision which has been approved by a majority of directors in writing is 
considered to be as valid as one which was accepted by a vote at a board meeting.  
 
4.7 C75 – Director’s personal financial interests  
 
For the purposes of this section the term „director‟ includes an alternate director, 
prescribed officer, a board committee member, or an audit committee member. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the person is a part of the company‟s board of directors. 
 
                                                 
123
 Cl193 of the Companies Bill calls for the establishment of a juristic person known as the Companies 
Ombud. The Companies Ombud will be required to resolve disputes regarding the application of the 
Bill (if passed into legislation), other dispute resolution, as well as to perform any task assigned to it by 
the Bill or any other law. This is according to cl195.  
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According to c75 (3) if a person is the sole director of a company but does not possess 
all the issued securities of the company, that director may not endorse or bind the 
company into an agreement, in which he or a related person to him holds a personal 
financial interest. The director also may not conclude any other business of the 
company in which he or a person related to him has a personal financial interest. 
However the director with a personal financial interest in the business of a company 
may enter into an agreement or make decisions regarding an agreement if such is 
permitted by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders. The director must first reveal 
his interest in the matter to the shareholders of the company.  
 
A director should disclose his personal financial interest in any matter to the board or 
to the shareholders (if that director is the sole director of the company) in writing and 
in advance. The written notice by the director must explain the nature and extent of 
his interest.  
 
In the event that a director has a personal financial interest, or is aware that a related 
person to him has a personal financial interest in a matter, which is being considered 
by the board of directors, that director is required to: 
 
- reveal his interest as well as the nature of it, prior to deliberation of the matter 
at the board meeting; 
- expose any relevant information which the director has on the matter; 
- reveal any other relevant knowledge on the matter which the board may 
require; 
- leave the board meeting consequent to the revelation of a personal financial 
interest and any relevant information thereof;  
- not participate in the matter any further than regarding the revelation of 
information; and 
- not complete any document relating to the matter unless required to do 
otherwise by the board of directors.  
 
While the director is absent from the board meeting as a result of a personal financial 
interest in a matter under deliberation, that director is still considered as in attendance 
in order to establish that enough directors are present, to create a meeting. However 
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the director is then not considered present in order to ascertain whether a resolution 
has adequate backing.   
 
It is possible that a director, or a person related to a director, may attain a personal 
financial interest in a matter that has already been accepted by the company. If this is 
the case, that director must immediately reveal the nature and extent of the interest, as 
well as how the interest was obtained, to the board of directors or the shareholders (if 
that director is the sole director of the company).  
 
Any transaction or agreement that is accepted by the board of directors, or the 
shareholders will be considered legitimate, notwithstanding any personal financial 
interest of a director, or person related to him. This will only be the case if it was 
approved in accordance with c75 or it has been ratified by an ordinary resolution of 
the shareholders.  
 
According to c75 (8) if a director with a personal financial interest in a matter fails to 
fulfil the conditions of this section, an interested person may apply to a court, to 
validate a transaction or agreement approved by the board or the shareholders.  
 
C75 is inapplicable to a director if the decision in question affects all the directors of 
the company or a class of people, unless the members of that class are only directors 
or persons related to the directors. This section may also not be used in order to 
remove a director in terms of c71. C75 will not be applicable to a director or a 
company if one person possesses all the interests of all the issued shares of the 
company and is the only director of the company.  
 
C75 relates to the South African Companies Act s234 – s240 (Interest of a director in 
contracts). Regarding s234 – s240, if a director has any significant interest in a 
contract, which is relevant to the company‟s business, that director must reveal this 
interest to the board. If the contract is accepted at a general meeting, the notice 
assembling the meeting must divulge the mentioned interest. The information 
unveiled by the director regarding interest in a contract at board meetings must be 
minuted. This information must also be documented in a register which must be 
available for examination to the public.  
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C75 has broadened the scope of s234 – s240 by including „any‟ personal financial 
interest of a director as opposed to an interest in a contract relevant to the company. 
C75 may be said to prevent the director from reaching a situation where he can breech 
the fiduciary duty to not have a conflict of interest with the company. S177 of the UK 
Companies Act states that a director has a duty to declare any interest in a proposed 
transaction or arrangement. S177 (5) of the UK Companies Act states that a director 
must still make disclosure of an interests even when he „ought reasonably to be aware 
of‟ an existing interest. That means that a director may not be negligent and not 
realise that an interest exists in a company matter. Thus an objective test will be 
applied in the UK by the courts in order to ascertain whether or not a director ought 
reasonably to have known of an interest in certain company business. This 
„negligence‟ factor has not been provided for in the South African Companies Bill. 
 
4.8 C76 – Standards of directors conduct 
 
For the purposes of this section the term „director‟ includes an alternate director, 
prescribed officer, a board committee member, or an audit committee member. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the person is a part of the company‟s board of directors. 
 
According to c76 (2) a director must not utilise his office as such or any information 
acquired whilst in the capacity of a director to gain an advantage for himself or any 
other person with the exception of the company. The director must also not knowingly 
cause harm to the company or any of the company‟s subsidiaries. These duties are of 
a fiduciary nature; the director‟s duty to avoid a conflict of interest necessitates that a 
director may not use his position in the company to gain any benefit for himself or 
anyone else besides the company. This is obviously with the exception of directors‟ 
remuneration. The fiduciary duty is a negative one which requires that the director 
must not cause harm to the company.  
 
The Companies Bill‟s definition of the word „knowingly‟ must be taken into 
consideration; the director must either actually possess knowledge that harm is being 
caused to the company, or be in a position in which the director reasonably ought to 
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have knowledge. This means that a director may not be negligent regarding the 
causation of harm to a company.  
 
C76 (2) (b) states that a director must convey any information to the board as soon as 
possible, unless it is reasonably believed that the information is irrelevant, available to 
the board, or the public. The director will also not be required to reveal information to 
the board if he is compelled not to by ethical or legal commitments.  
 
The fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of interest was always well-established in 
common law; and the duty not to make a personal gain as a result of the being in the 
position of a director developed from there. This is evident in cases such as Cook v 
Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC), Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 
1921 AD 168, Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 (HL), and 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443; [1972] 2 All 
ER 162 among others. The legislators most probably inserted the section which 
prevents directors from making a personal gain as a result of the directorship, as a 
precautionary and clarification measure.  
 
The following clause of the Companies Bill is crucial regarding the codification of 
directors‟ common law duties. C76 (3) reads as follows:  
 
3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director - 
a) in good faith and for a proper purpose;   
b) in the best interests of the company; and 
c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of 
a person – 
i. carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
ii. having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
 
C76 (3) (a) and (b) refer to the directors‟ fiduciary duty towards the company. The 
common law duty is now spelt out in the Bill intending to be passed as legislation. A 
fiduciary is expected to perform his required powers and functions in good faith and 
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for a proper purpose. The director must carry out his functions for the purpose which 
they were conferred. This is as in the cases Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 CH 506, 
Piercy v S Mills & Co [1920] 1 CH 77, Mears v African Platinum Mines 1922 WLD 
57, and Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 1126 (PC). 
According to c76 (3) (b) the director must also act in the best interests of the 
company, as a fiduciary is expected to perform.  
 
C76 (3) (c) legislates the directors‟ duty of care, skill and diligence. The international 
trend toward an objective and subjective standard relating to the test for negligence 
has been followed. This may be seen in the UK Companies Act of 2006, as well as the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001.  
 
C76 (3) (c) (i) sets the objective test as the acts of a director are considered in contrast 
to the standard of conduct of a notional reasonable diligent person. One would inquire 
into how a reasonable person would act if that reasonable person is carrying out the 
duties of the director in question. C76 (3) (c) (ii) sets the subjective standard; the 
actual knowledge, skill and experience of the director in question is transferred to the 
notional reasonable person. In other words the notional reasonable person must be 
part of the same rank as the director in question. Therefore if a director possesses any 
special or higher knowledge, skill and experience, that director is expected to apply 
the special attributes in the duties toward the company. In this manner, a director with 
special skills will be expected to perform according to those attributes. The objective 
and subjective test entails that a director will be required to have the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may be reasonably expected of a person with the 
same responsibilities as that director toward the company, as well as the knowledge, 
skill and experience of the director in question.  
 
This objective and subjective standard regarding directors‟ actions is also in line with 
international common law trends. In the UK a case example in which an objective and 
subjective standard is utilised is that of Re D‟Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561 
(Ch) where the Insolvency Act of 1986 was applied. In Australia an objective and 
subjective standard was applied in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich 
[1991] 5 ACSR 115 (SC, Vic). The South African equivalent in case law is that of 
Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA).  
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It is useful to have an objective standard from which to commence; a reasonable 
director. However this does not leave much room for flexibility, therefore the 
subjective elements make it possible to take into account the actual director‟s abilities, 
as well as the circumstances in which the company finds itself. The court will be 
required to account for purposes of the specific director in a company, as well as the 
size of the company itself. A director must be cautious when accepting an office as 
such, due to the fact that if the director does not have a minimum level of knowledge, 
skill and diligence which is expected of a notional reasonable director, that director 
will be held personally accountable in the event of a loss (Bekink, 2008).  
 
The South African Companies Bill has not defined, or differentiated between, 
executive and non-executive directors. This means that the common law position in 
Howard v Herrigel NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) has been adopted; a director is a 
fiduciary of a company irrespective of whether he is executive or non-executive. It 
must still be borne in mind that the courts will probably still look at whether the 
director was executive or non-executive as a factor when judging certain conduct 
(Bekink, 2008).  
 
C76 (4) (a) states that a director will have fulfilled the duties in c76 (3) (b) and (c) – 
to act in the best interests of the company and to act with due care, skill and diligence 
– under three conditions:  
 
- if the director took reasonable steps to become informed about the matter; 
- if the director possessed no material personal financial interest in the matter 
and could not reasonably believe that any related person had a personal 
financial interest in the matter; or the director or a related person had a 
personal financial interest but complied with the requirements in c75;  
- if the director had a rational basis for believing, and did in fact believe that the 
decision taken was in the best interests of the company.  
 
This section introduces the concept of the „business judgment rule‟ into South African 
law. In order to understand this better, a brief discussion of the business judgment rule 
is essential.  
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The business judgment rule:  
 
The business judgment rule was first developed in the US relating to the director‟s 
duty of care. In order for the business judgment rule to apply, a director must make a 
decision regarding the business of the company. If the decision turns out to cause a 
loss, the director has a defence in that he acted on an informed basis, in the best 
interests of the company, and in good faith (Jones, 2007). In the US, the application of 
the rule depends to a large extent on the circumstances of each case. If a company is 
on the brink of insolvency, a director is expected to have taken a greater amount of 
care with the company‟s finances than a director of a company that is thriving.  
 
The business judgment rule was created “… because of a desire to protect honest 
directors and officers from the risks inherent in hindsight reviews of their 
unsuccessful decisions, and because of a desire to refrain from stifling innovation and 
venturesome business activity.” (The American Law Institute, 1982 quoted by 
Havenga, 2000: 28). This rule was intended to protect directors who do not have the 
luxury of assessing a business decision in retrospect at the time when the decision 
must be made. The courts are generally not willing to second-guess directors‟ choices 
due to the fact that doing business is not the objective of a judge. This was well 
explicated by Lord Greene MR in 1942: “They [directors] must exercise their 
discretion bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the 
interest of the company”.124 It is a general concept that any profitable business venture 
involves an element of risk. Sometimes even the safest endeavour may turn out to be 
unprofitable. Hence directors should not be held liable in the event that a decision 
taken in good faith, which is well informed, and with the best interests of the 
company in mind, turns out to be wrong.  
 
However in the US the advent of the business judgment rule has led to the devaluation 
of the duty of care (Jones, 2007). In fact, the US has slowly started to move away 
from the use of the business judgment rule, as is shown in: In re Walt Disney Co 
Derivative Litigation 825 A 2
nd
 275 (Del Ch 2003); Telxon Corp v Meyerson 802 A 
                                                 
124
 In re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) at 306 as quoted in McLennan (1996) at 94.  
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2
nd
 257 (Del 2002); Krasner v Moffat 826 A 2
nd
 277 (Del 2003); and In re Oracle 
Corp Derivative Litigation 824 A 2
nd
 917 (Del Ch 2003).
125
 It must be borne in mind 
that although the business judgement rule was created in the US, it has never been 
inserted into legislation there. However the Australian Corporations Act No. 50 of 
2001 in s180 (2) has codified the business judgment rule.  
 
In South Africa the King Reports of Corporate Governance of 1994 and 2002 both 
suggested that there should be an inquiry into whether the directors‟ duty of care 
should be limited by statute in forthcoming company law. The reports recommended 
that if a director makes a decision in good faith and satisfies three criteria, that 
director should not be held liable if a loss results due to a poor business decision. The 
three criteria suggested were: the decision is informed, the decision is rational, and 
that no self-interest is involved.
126
 Hence the Companies Bill has codified the 
business judgment rule. The introduction of this foreign legal concept has been 
heavily criticised by many legal experts for the following reasons:  
 
- South African law encompasses an objective and subjective test for negligence 
regarding the director‟s duty of care. The subjective standard requires that a 
director act with the care, skill and diligence as may reasonably be expected of 
an individual with that director‟s skill and knowledge (Havenga, 2000). 
Therefore a director will not be held accountable for mere errors of judgment.  
- If all three of the criteria are met in order for the business judgment rule to be 
applicable, then the director has already carried out the fiduciary duty and the 
duty of care and skill (McLennan, 1996). Therefore the business judgment rule 
would be superfluous.  
- According to Jones (2007), in South Africa, there has only ever been one 
case
127
 in which a director has been held liable for a breach of the duty of care. 
The addition of the business judgment rule seems unnecessary, as there is no 
need for it.   
- The South African Companies Act under s248 (1) provides for relief for 
directors by the courts when proceedings against the director involve 
                                                 
125
 Jones, E (2007) „Directors‟ Duties: Negligence and the Business Judgement Rule‟, SA Mercantile 
Law Journal, 19 
126
 King Report on Corporate Governance at 9; paragraph 3.4 – 3.5.    
127
 Niagara Ltd (in liquidation) v Langerman & others 1913 WLD 188 
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negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust. If the court believes that 
the director acted honestly and reasonably, and in the circumstances of the 
case it would be fair to excuse the director; the court may do so. 
- C77 (9) will be discussed under the relevant section. This legal exoneration by 
the courts of directors has no counterpart in the US. The South African law 
therefore covers this action adequately (Havenga, 2000).  
- One must keep in mind that US corporations law differs considerably from 
South African company law; therefore transplanting foreign concepts locally 
from abroad may lead to negative outcomes (Havenga, 2000).  
 
It is difficult to ascertain how the courts will apply this new concept in conjunction 
with existing common law. If a director has carried out the fiduciary duty and the duty 
of care, the courts may not deem it necessary to apply the business judgment rule due 
to the fact that the conditions would already have been met. S248 of the Companies 
Act and c77 (9) of the Companies Bill require that the court may decide to exonerate a 
director. However the business judgement rule under c76 (4) (a) will compel the court 
to excuse a director. It will be interesting to see if the courts will be able to decide 
which section to apply depending on the circumstances.  
 
C76 (4) (b) states that a director may rely on any persons contemplated in subsection 
(5), which will be looked at next, any person to whom the board legally delegated the 
authority to perform a function of the board, and any information, opinions, 
recommendations, reports, statements, financial statements or financial data prepared 
or presented by persons contemplated in subsection (5).  
 
C76 (5) lists the persons whom the director may rely on for information, these are:  
 
- employees of the company who the director reasonably believes to be 
competent; 
- legal counsel, accountants or other professionals who the director reasonably 
believes to be experts in the relevant field; or 
- any board committee of which the director may not be a member, unless the 
director believes that the said committee is not reliable.  
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4.9 C77 – Liability of directors and prescribed officers 
 
For the purposes of this section the term „director‟ includes an alternate director, 
prescribed officer, a board committee member, or an audit committee member. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the person is a part of the company‟s board of directors. 
 
C77 (2) (a) states that a director may be held liable as per the common law regarding 
a breach of fiduciary duty for any loss, damages or costs incurred by the company 
consequent to a breach by the director of the following duties:  
 
- gaining a personal financial interest as a result of the position of a director; 
- using the office of the director to gain a personal advantage; 
- using the office of the director to knowingly cause harm to the company; 
- not acting in good faith or for a proper purpose; and 
- not acting in the best interests of the company.  
 
C77 (2) (b) states that a director may be held liable as per the common law regarding 
delict for any loss, damages or costs incurred by the company consequent to a breach 
by the director of the following duties: 
 
- carrying out the functions of a director with the required degree of care, skill 
and diligence that may be reasonably be expected of a person in the same 
position as the director, as well as the degree of care, skill and diligence 
expected of a person with the same knowledge, skill and experience as that 
director;  
- any provision of the Companies Bill which is not mentioned under this 
section; and 
- any provision of the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation.  
 
C77 (2) maintains the current common law position in South Africa; a breach of 
fiduciary duty is actionable sui generis, whilst a breach of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence is actionable in delict. One must take note that the phrase “in accordance 
with the principles of the common law” means that the legislative aspects of directors‟ 
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common law duties are in addition to, not replacing, the existing common law rules. It 
is difficult therefore to say that the Companies Bill is codifying directors‟ common 
law duties, due to the fact that the common law has not been replaced. It may perhaps 
be more accurate to say that this is a „partial codification‟. This is contrary to the case 
of the UK; the UK Companies Act of 2006 has replaced the common law with a 
legislative codification of directors‟ duties.  
 
C77 (3) lists the circumstances under which a director is liable for losses, damages or 
costs incurred by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director 
doing the following:  
 
- If the director acts on behalf of the company event though the director has 
knowledge of the fact that he does not have the authority to do so. This 
includes acting in the name of the company, signing on behalf of the company, 
binding the company, authorising an action on behalf of the company. Here 
the definition of „knowledge‟ might open up director liability. If the director is 
negligent in not knowing that the required authority was not granted, the 
director will be deemed to have had knowledge of the fact that no authority to 
act existed. Some of the contractual rules regarding directors have been 
legislated: breach of warranty of authority in conclusion of contract, 
fraudulent misrepresentation of belief relating to a company‟s ability to pay, 
and procuring a company‟s breach of contract or prevention of performance 
by the company of its obligations. One may refer to the section on contract in 
order to get a better understanding of these director breeches.  
- The director will be held liable for any losses to the company if that director 
assents to the carrying on of the company‟s business event though the director 
knows that it is being carried on in a manner prohibited by c22 (1).
128
 The 
definition of knowledge must be taken into account again. This subsection 
implies that a director may not hide behind the fact that he did not participate 
in the reckless trading of the company. Simply knowing of or the fact that a 
director was negligent in not knowing that the company was performing in the 
illegal manner, is enough to hold a director liable for any consequent losses.  
                                                 
128
 A company is prohibited from carrying on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with the 
intent to defraud a person, for any other fraudulent purpose, or trade under insolvent circumstances.  
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- If the director was involved in an act or omission by the company which was 
performed with the intent to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the 
company. This also applies to any other fraudulent purpose. If the director 
knew of this and participated regardless, that director will be held liable for 
any resultant loss to the company. The definition of knowledge will hold the 
director accountable if that director ought to have known of the forbidden act 
or omission.  
- The director signed, consented to, or authorised the publication of: false or 
misleading financial statements, a prospectus or written statement relating to a 
secondary offer to the public (as in c101) which contained an untrue 
statement,
129
 or a false statement in which a person consents to being a 
director. The director‟s liability relating to untrue statements in a prospectus is 
limited by c104 (3). This section may be used as a defence by a director when 
accused of making or supporting an untrue statement. C104 (3) will be 
deliberated under „Liability for untrue statements in prospectus‟.  
 
According to c77 (3) (e) the director of a company will also be liable for any loss 
damages or costs incurred by the company as a direct or indirect result of the director 
attending a meeting or making a decision other than at a meeting (in accordance with 
c74) and neglected to vote against the following:  
 
- the issuing of unauthorised shares; that is notwithstanding that the director 
knew that the shares had not been authorised with respect to c36;
130
  
- the issuing of authorised securities, even though the director knew that the 
authorisation was incompatible with c41;
131
 
                                                 
129
 According to c95 an „untrue statement‟ is a statement which is misleading in the form and context in 
which it is presented. This untrue statement may appear on the face of the prospectus, it may be 
incorporated by reference, or it may accompany the prospectus. For the purposes of the Bill, an untrue 
statement also includes an omission from a prospectus which is intended to misinform.  
130
 C36 deals with the authorisation of shares. The Memorandum of Incorporation of a company sets 
out the number and class of shares which the company is permitted to issue. Unless the Memorandum 
of Incorporation states otherwise, the board of director may rectify the amount of shares which can be 
issued. If the board wishes to act in contrary to the Memorandum of Incorporation, regarding this 
section, the board must first file a Notice of Amendment.  
131
 C41 sets out the rules for shareholders approval for issuing shares in certain cases.  
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- the consent to present options to a person considered in c42 (4)132 even though 
the director knew that the shares for which the options could be exercised or 
securities changed, are not authorised regarding c36;  
- the granting of financial assistance to a person regarding c44133 in order to 
acquire securities of the company. In order for liability to attach, the director 
must have known that the grant was contradictory to c44 or the Memorandum 
of Incorporation. However the resolution or agreement must have been 
confirmed as void by c44 (5),
134
 as considered with c218 (1),
135
  
- the provision of financial assistance to a director in terms of c45 (Loans or 
other financial assistance to directors) even though this provision was contrary 
to the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation or c45. The director who 
fails to vote against a provision of financial assistance to a director will also 
incur liability if the resolution has been deemed void in terms of c45 (6)
136
 
read with c218 (1);  
                                                 
132
 C42 considers the options for subscription of securities.  
133
 C44 deals with the financial assistance for subscription of securities.  
134
 In terms of c44 (5) directors may be held liable if the board‟s decision to provide financial 
assistance is void as a result of an inconsistency with cl44, or the company‟s Memorandum of 
Incorporation. The board must ensure that the necessary conditions for provision of financial assistance 
have been satisfied. In terms of these requirements the board may not authorise financial assistance for 
subscription of securities unless (c44 (3)):  
- the financial assistance relates to an employee share scheme which fulfils the requirements in 
terms of c97; and 
- the financial assistance is resultant from a special resolution of the shareholders, which was 
passed within the previous two years.  
 
The board of directors must also be convinced that the company will pass the solvency and liquidity 
test after the financial assistance has been granted, and that the conditions under which the financial 
assistance has been approved are reasonable to the company.  
135
 C218 deals with civil actions.  
136
 C45 (6) states that a resolution or agreement by the board to provide financial assistance to a 
director is void if it is incompatible with cl45 or any condition in c45 (4). That means the any condition 
in the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation must be taken into consideration. This is in addition 
to the conditions set out in c45 (3):   
- the financial assistance relates to an employee share scheme which fulfils the requirements in 
terms of c97; and 
- the financial assistance is resultant from a special resolution of the shareholders, which was 
passed within the previous two years.  
 
The board of directors must also be convinced that the company will pass the solvency and liquidity 
test after the financial assistance has been granted, and that the conditions under which the financial 
assistance has been approved are reasonable to the company.  
 
According to c45 (5) in the event that the board passes a resolution for financial assistance or a loan to 
directors, the company is required to furnish the shareholders (unless all the shareholders are directors 
of the company) and the trade unions which represent the employees, with a notice of the resolution. 
This must be done within ten business days after the adoption of the resolution if the total value of the 
loans, debts, obligations, or assistance in that resolution, together with other resolutions adopted in that 
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- a resolution which endorses a distribution, even though the director knows that 
the distribution is contrary to c46 (distributions must be authorised by the 
board); 
- the acquisition by the company of its shares, or the shares of a subsidiary 
company, despite the director knowing that the acquisition is not in line with 
c46 or c48;
137
 or 
- an allotment by the company even though the director is aware that the 
allotment is contrary to any condition of Chapter 4 (Public offerings of 
company securities). This is if the allotment is deemed void regarding c109 
(1)
138
 read with c218 (1).  
 
According to c77 (4) a director will only be liable for failing to vote against a 
distribution contrary to c46 if consequent to the said distribution, the company does 
not pass the solvency and liquidity test. It is also necessary for it to have been 
unreasonable, before the vote on the distribution was held, to believe that the 
company could pass the solvency and liquidity test. C77 (4) (b) states that the liability 
of a director in terms of this section will not surpass, on aggregate, the difference 
between the total amount by which the worth of the distribution surpassed the amount 
that would have been distributed without leading to a failure of the company to satisfy 
the solvency and liquidity test, and any amount which the company recuperated from 
the persons to whom the distribution was made.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
financial year, is greater than one-tenth of 1% of the company‟s net worth, at the time when the 
resolution was passed. Otherwise the notice must be given within thirty business days after the end of 
the financial year.   
137
 C48 deals with instances where the company or subsidiary acquires company shares.  
138
 C109 looks at voidable allotments. According to c109 (1) if an allotment offered by a company or 
the acceptance of such by the applicant is inconsistent with c108 (2), the allotment is voidable and the 
directors who were aware of this are to be held liable. C108 looks at restrictions on an allotment. C108 
(2) explains that when a company offers securities to the public, the securities must not be allotted 
unless the minimum amount, which in the opinion of the directors is intended to be raised to provide 
for matters prescribed to be covered by minimum subscription. This amount must also have been 
received by the company. It is up to the directors to decide what is the minimum amount required. 
According to c108 (6) if the conditions stated in subsection (2) have not been accomplished within 
forty business days consequent to the issue of the prospectus, the totals which have been received from 
the applicants must be restored swiftly without interest. C108 (7) states that if the money which was 
due to be returned to applicants in terms of c108 (6) has not been returned within fifty-five days of the 
issue of the prospectus, as a result of director misconduct or negligence, the directors will be liable. 
The extent of this liability is such that every director or prescribed officer of the company will be held 
jointly and severally liable to reimburse the outstanding money with an interest of 6% per annum. This 
is a requirement after the 55
th
 business day consequent to the issue of the prospectus.   
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C77 (5) states that if the board of directors has acted against subsection (3) (e) (in 
terms of a decision which is in breach of the Bill), either the company or a director 
who may be held liable for the consequences, may apply to the court to set the board‟s 
decision aside. The court may completely set the decision aside, set aside certain 
aspects of the decision, or set the decision aside specific to certain conditions. The 
court may also make a decision which is just and equitable in the circumstances of 
each case. This can include a rectification, reversal, or restoration of any amount 
received by a person as a result of the board‟s decision. The court may also order the 
company to indemnify a director who may be held liable in terms of this section.  
 
Any liability incurred in terms of c77 is joint and several with any other person who 
may also be held liable under this section.
139
 A person may not endeavour to initiate 
proceedings to recover a loss, damages or costs in terms of c77 more than three years 
after the act or omission which resulted in the liability.
140
 Any persons who are liable 
under the Companies Bill will also be liable to pay the costs of all parties for court 
proceedings unless they are discarded. Those persons are also liable to repay the 
company for any loss which is not recoverable under the Bill.
141
  
 
C77 (9) relates to s248 of the Companies Act which allows the court to provide relief 
for directors in certain circumstances. C77 (9) states that during actions against 
directors, a court may relieve the director, either completely or partly from liability 
arising out of c77. This is only an option if the court believes that the director is liable 
(or might be) but nevertheless acted reasonably and honestly. The court may also take 
such action if the circumstances of the case, including those associated to the 
appointment of the director, it would be just to absolve the director. The court 
however will not be able to apply this section to actions relating to wilful misconduct 
or wilful breach of trust against directors. This is a departure from s248 of the 
Companies Act which allowed the court to excuse a director in matters regarding 
negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust. The difference comes in the 
fact that the court may no longer excuse a director for a breach of trust; unless it 
occurred as a result of negligence on part of the director. Whilst this does not actually 
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 C77 (7) 
141
 C77 (8) 
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widen the liability of directors, it certainly goes a long way to make it more difficult 
for directors to be exempt from liability when the circumstances of the case make it 
fair to do so.  
 
C77 (10) states that a director who believes that there will be a claim made against 
him may apply to the court for relief, and the court may provide relief in the same 
circumstances as in c77 (9). This also excludes instances where the director is accused 
of wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust.  
 
C77 has set out instances of director liability. The liability in this section, in some 
cases, must be applied in conjunction with the common law. In some areas directors‟ 
liability has increased, whilst in others the common law has been legislated. A new 
defence has been added to South African law; that of the business judgement rule. 
Whether this foreign rule is superfluous, will assist directors, or simply confuse the 
courts still remains to be seen. What must be taken into account is that the definition 
of „knowledge‟ in the Bill goes a long way to increase directors‟ liability due to the 
fact that honest but negligent directors will be deemed to have actual knowledge. This 
will inflict liability in cases where it would not have attached before.  
 
4.10 C78 – Indemnification and directors and officers’ insurance 
 
For the purposes of this section the term „director‟ includes an alternate director, 
prescribed officer, a board committee member, or an audit committee member. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the person is a part of the company‟s board of directors. 
 
C78 (2) states that any stipulation of an agreement, the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, or any resolution taken up by a company is void if it directly or 
indirectly attempts to negate a director‟s duty in terms of cl75 or c76 and liability 
considered in c77. Therefore absolutely nothing may alleviate the director‟s common 
law or statutory duties or liabilities. The same applies for any attempt to restrict any 
legal outcomes as a result of an act or omission which represents wilful misconduct or 
wilful breach of trust by the director.   
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A company may not directly or indirectly pay for a fine which has been assigned to a 
director as a result of a contravention of any national legislation.
142
 
 
According to c78 (4) a company may pay for the litigation defence of a director due to 
any matters that occur as a result of the director‟s office in that company. The 
company may further indemnify the director for the expenses of the defence, even 
though the company has paid for those expenses, if the proceedings against the 
director have been discarded or if the director has been exonerated. The company may 
also indemnify the director for the expenses of litigation if the matter is relating to any 
form of liability, for which the company may indemnify the director. The 
Memorandum of Incorporation may however forbid the company from paying for the 
litigation expenses or indemnifying the director regarding those expenses.  
 
A company is allowed to indemnify a director (unless the Memorandum of 
Incorporation states otherwise) with regards to any form of liability
143
 other than 
liability arising in terms of c77 (3) (a), (b) or (c).
144
 That is, a director may not be 
indemnified if he acts in the name of the company, binds the company, signs on 
behalf of a company, or take action on behalf of the company even though the director 
knows he lacks the authority to do so.
145
 The director may not be indemnified if he 
agreed to the carrying on of the company‟s business in a reckless manner, a negligent 
manner, or with the intent to defraud any person. This also applies to the insolvent 
trading of the company. This will only apply if the director knew that the company 
was being run in such a manner.
146
 Lastly, the director may not be indemnified if he 
contributes to an act or omission by the company which is intended to defraud a 
shareholder, creditor, or employee, despite knowing that this is the case.
147
 The 
company is further not allowed to indemnify a director for any wilful misconduct or 
wilful breach of trust
148
 or for a fine contemplated in c78 (3).
149
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At this point it is necessary to look at the definition of „knowledge‟ as presented in c1 
of the Companies Bill. The words „knowing‟, „knowingly‟ or „knows‟ is defined by as 
the person in question: 
 
- actually had knowledge of the matter; 
- was in a position in which the person ought reasonably to have –  
 had actual knowledge; 
 investigated the matter to an extent that could have provided the person 
with actual knowledge; or 
 taken other measures which, if taken, could reasonably be expected to 
have provided the person with actual knowledge of the matter.  
 
The problem is that the second component of the definition allows for negligence. If 
an honest director did not actually have knowledge of a matter, but ought to have had, 
that director is considered to have possessed the knowledge. This will inevitably leave 
directors with a gap in cover. The company will not be able to indemnify directors in 
these circumstances. At the heart of liability insurance lays the notion that one may 
indemnify persons who are negligent. One must remember that the word „knowledge‟ 
and its derivatives appear many times in the Companies Bill; therefore directors will 
have to be very careful when they ought to be aware of matters regarding the 
company, as no cover will be provided.  
 
It is important to look at the definition of „knowingly‟ with regards to the common 
law. After all, one of the main objectives of the Companies Bill is to codify the 
common law duties of company directors. The Companies Act (1973) did not contain 
a definition of „knowledge‟ so the courts had to use common sense in order to 
produce a meaning. Three main cases may be used to derive a good understanding of 
the word „knowingly‟ or „knowledge‟. These cases deal with s424 of the Companies 
Act or the liability of directors and others for the fraudulent conduct of business. The 
relevant part of the section reads as follows: 
 
“… any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the 
manner aforesaid…”  
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Howard v Herrigel and another NNO [1991] 2 All SA 113 (A) Schreiner JA at 612 H: 
 
“… the person sought to be held liable had knowledge of the facts from which the 
conclusion is properly to be drawn that the business of the company was or is being 
carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud…”  
 
Philotex (Pty) Ltd and others and Braitex and others v Snyman and others [1998] JOL 
1881 (A) at 6: 
 
“"Knowingly" means having knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion is 
properly to be drawn that the business of the company was or is being carried on 
recklessly…” 
 
Terblanche and others v Damji and another [2003] JOL 11359 (C) at 41 (concurring 
with Howard v Herrigel and another NNO): 
 
"Knowingly" has been held to mean, in this context that: 
". . . the person sought to be held liable had knowledge of the facts from which the 
conclusion is properly to be drawn that the business of the company was being carried 
on  recklessly or with intent to defraud…" 
 
From the case law above it is clearly visible that „knowledge‟ is supposed to mean, 
actual knowledge. In the event that a person ought to have knowledge, but does not, it 
may not be said that the person had knowledge, merely a lack thereof.  
 
The indemnification by a company of its directors has always been a controversial 
issue in South Africa, which is probably as a result of poor wording and interpretation 
of legislation. S247 of the South African Companies Act (1973) deals with the 
indemnification of directors by a company. It used to read as follows:  
 
“… Any provision, whether contained in the articles of company or in any contract 
with a company… which purports to exempt any director or officer… from any 
liability which by law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any liability which 
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by law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any act of negligence, default, 
breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company 
or to indemnify him against any such liability shall be void”  
 
A similar section also existed in the UK Companies Act (1985). Many writers in the 
UK and South Africa interpreted these sections to mean that a company may not take 
out D&O cover on behalf of its directors, or that a company may not pay premiums 
on behalf of its directors. This was as a result of the notion that the company would 
then be exempting directors from liability, which is obviously not allowed. 
 
Some are of the view that s247 did not forbid companies to take out D&O cover for 
its directors or pay the premiums on their behalf. This is due to the fact that the 
purchase of D&O as well as the payment of premiums does not equate to an 
exemption from liability. The opposite is actually true: if the director was exempted 
from liability, the D&O policy would have nothing to respond to (as it is actually an 
indemnification policy). As consequent to the fact that the director is liable, the policy 
can essentially respond.  
 
The South African Act, as well as that of the UK was then amended in 1998 (for the 
sake of clarity) and s247 of the South African Act now looks like this:  
 
“Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any provision, whether contained in the 
articles of a company or in any contract with a company, and whether expressed or 
implied, which purports to exempt any director or officer or the auditor of the 
company from any liability which by law would otherwise attach to him in respect of 
any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be guilty in 
relation to the company or to indemnify him against any such liability, shall be void: 
Provided that this subsection shall not be applicable to insurance taken out and kept 
by the company as indemnification against any liability of any director or officer 
towards the company in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach 
of trust.” 
 
This has served to clarify that a company may purchase insurance for its directors, 
however many are still concerned that it mentions nothing about the company‟s 
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ability to pay for premiums on behalf of its directors. Regardless, companies continue 
to purchase D&O and pay the premiums in any case.   
 
An interesting argument has actually developed from this; some are of the opinion 
that the legislation should state that a company may purchase insurance on behalf of 
its directors against liability from third parties. This is a typical depiction of the fact 
that in the public‟s eyes, directors are now accountable to all. Originally directors 
were only liable to the company and it is for that reason that derivative suits were 
created in order to sue directors. One would think that due to the fact that a director 
does not owe a fiduciary duty, or a duty of care to any third party, that the director in 
his capacity as such may not be liable to anyone else. However some distinguish 
between owing a duty and being liable. It is important to very cautious with this type 
of thinking, in that if a director is liable to all, he is in actual fact liable to none.  
 
The Companies Bill has however gone some way in clarifying the matter. C78 (7) 
states that a company may purchase insurance to protect a director from liability or 
expenses for which a company is allowed to indemnify a director (therefore no 
insurance may be provided in the negligence matters discussed above). This insurance 
may also protect the company from expenses which the company may advance in 
terms of c78 (4) (a) or for which the company may indemnify a director regarding c78 
(3) (4). The company will also be protected by this insurance from any liability 
incurred due to the indemnification of directors in accordance with c78 (5). If a 
company pays money on behalf of, or to a director contrary to c78, that company may 
claim restitution from that director.
150
  
 
However the definition of „knowledge‟ will probably cause much confusion when 
applied in the courts. This could have been avoided perhaps by inserting a simple 
clause such as the following: 
 
“Nothing in this Act can be construed as prohibiting the company from purchasing 
directors and officers liability insurance against legal liability claims arising” 
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The Bill should not attempt to define the circumstances in which this cover will 
operate, that can be left to the policy wording.  Insurers who will pay for the claims 
have an interest to limit their own liability to reasonable ground.   Policy wording and 
legislation should not be confused. 
 
4.11 C104 – Liability for untrue statements in prospectus 
 
In the event that securities are offered to the public for subscription or sale, by means 
of an issued prospectus, which contains an untrue statement, and as a result of the 
untrue statement someone incurs a loss or damage by purchasing securities in good 
faith; the following persons are personally liable:
151
 
 
- a person who becomes a director between the first issuing of a prospectus and 
the first general shareholder meeting at which directors are appointed or 
elected; 
- a person who has given permission to be named as a director in the prospectus, 
or consented to being a director close to the time; 
- a promoter of the company; or 
- a person who authorised the issue of the prospectus or made the offer to the 
public. 
 
The above still holds true even if the untrue statement was placed in a report of 
memorandum related to the prospectus.  
 
According to c104 (2), the liability which may be incurred in terms of this section is 
in addition to that under c77 (3) (d) (ii).
152
 
 
According to c104 (3) a person will not be liable for an untrue statement if: 
 
- The person reasonably believed that the statement was true up to the time of 
the allotment of securities or acceptance of the offer. This has to be related to 
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 C104 (1) 
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 This section looks at directors‟ liability as a result of an untrue statement contained in a prospectus.  
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an untrue statement which is not claimed to be made with the authority of an 
expert or a public official document.  
- Regarding an untrue statement asserting to be made by an expert, the person 
will not be liable if the untrue statement signified the statement, or if the 
person reasonably believed up to the time of the issue of the prospectus that 
the expert was competent.  
- The untrue statement claiming to be made by an official was a fair 
representation of the document.  
- The person had consented to being a director of the company, but retracted the 
consent and the prospectus was issued without that person‟s permission.  
- The prospectus was issued without the permission of awareness of the person. 
The person must then give reasonable public notice of the prospectus was 
issued without the required permission or awareness.  
- The person withdrew consent consequent to becoming aware of an untrue 
statement once the prospectus has been issued. The withdrawal of consent and 
reasoning thereof must be made public.  
 
If a person‟s name is incorrectly (either because the person did not consent to being a 
director, withdrew consent to being a director or did not consent to the issue of the 
prospectus), placed in a prospectus as a director of the company, and that person 
suffers any loss, damage or expense as a consequence of the incorrect naming, the 
directors of the company are liable with any other person who issued the prospectus. 
This is with the exception of any directors who had no knowledge of, or did not 
consent to, the issue of the prospectus. The liable directors will also be held 
responsible for any costs of defending a legal action as a result of a person being 
incorrectly named in the prospectus which contained an untrue statement.
153
 This 
applies to any requisite consent by any person with respect to any material aspect that 
is a requirement in a prospectus,
154
 if that consent was either not given or withdrawn 
prior to the issue of the prospectus.   
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A person may incur liability in terms of this section by: 
 
- being a director; 
- agreeing to become a director; 
- authorising the issue of a prospectus; 
- becoming a director between the issue of a prospectus and the holding of the 
first general shareholders meeting at which directors a re appointed or elected. 
 
If a person mentioned above has satisfied liability under this section by means of a 
payment to another person, that liable person may recover a contribution from any 
other person who would be liable to make the same payment (if sued separately). This 
is unless the person who has incurred such liability is guilty of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and the person who will pay back the contribution is not.
155
   
 
4.12 Chapter 6 – Business rescue and compromise with directors  
 
It is necessary to pay some attention to the business rescue proceedings, which will be 
introduced for the first time into South African company law as a result of the new 
Companies Act. Although some of the directors‟ liabilities are done away with whilst 
a company is under business rescue, directors will nevertheless incur new 
responsibilities. It is also important to mention that the practitioner, who is in charge 
of the company during business rescue, will possess a set of duties and liabilities 
which should be covered under D&O liability insurance.  
 
4.12.1 C128 – Application and definitions applicable to this chapter 
 
The concept of „business rescue‟ entails that certain measures are taken to rehabilitate 
a company which is in a financial crisis. This entails:
156
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- temporary supervision, management of the assets, and the affairs of the 
company; 
- a temporary suspension of claiming rights against the company; 
- the development and implementation of a plan ,which must get approved, that 
will rescue the company. This may be performed by reorganising the 
company‟s business, affairs, property, equity and liabilities in a manner which 
will result in either the continued existence of the company as a profitable 
business, or to ensure that creditors and shareholders receive a maximum 
return from the company upon liquidation.   
 
 
4.12.2 C129 – Company resolution to begin business rescue proceedings 
 
The board of a company may decide that the company should commence voluntary 
business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision if there are 
reasonable grounds to deem that the company is financially distraught and that there 
are reasonable possibilities that the company can be saved.
157
 However one may not 
commence business rescue proceedings if the company has already been placed in 
liquidation and the proceedings will have no effect unless it is filed.
158
 
 
The company is then required to inform all affected persons by notice, of the business 
rescue proceedings as well as the grounds for under which the board decided to take 
this action. The company must also assign a business rescue practitioner who must 
consent to this appointment in writing.
159
 The company is further expected to file a 
notice of the appointment of the practitioner within two business days after appointing 
the person, and publish the notice within five business days after that.
160
 In the event 
that a company fails to appoint a practitioner or to publish the notice of appointment, 
the business rescue proceedings will be void. Should this be the case, the company 
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may only apply for business rescue proceedings three months after the void resolution 
was assumed.
161
 
 
A company that has commenced business rescue proceedings may not apply for 
liquidation unless the application for the proceedings has lapsed, or the actual 
business rescue has ended.
162
 If the board of directors has reasonable grounds to 
ascertain that the company is in a financial crisis, but does not attempt to initiate 
business rescue proceedings, the board must inform all the parties concerned of the 
reasons thereof.
163
 This may serve as an avenue for shareholders or creditors to sue 
company directors. If the board fails to institute business rescue proceedings and the 
company goes into liquidation, some might feel that the company should have been 
saved, or that the liquidation could have produced more returns. It will be interesting 
to see how the court determines the criteria of whether or not the board of directors 
should initiate business rescue proceedings.  
 
4.12.3 Cl131 – Court order to begin business rescue proceedings  
 
If a company has not commenced business rescue proceedings, any affected person 
may apply to a court in order to place the company under supervision and commence 
such proceedings.
164
 The court may place the company under supervision and make 
an order to commence business rescue proceedings if:
165
 
 
- the company is financially distressed; 
- the company has not paid a required amount of money relating to 
employment-related matters; or 
- it is just and equitable to do so when taking the company‟s financial situation 
into account and it is reasonably possible that the company can be saved.  
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The court may also decide to dismiss the application and place the company under 
liquidation.  
 
4.12.4 C132 – Duration of business rescue proceedings 
 
The business rescue proceedings of a company will end in a number of instances:
166
 
 
- if the court sets aside the resolution or the order to begin the proceedings; 
- if the court has placed the company under liquidation; 
- if the practitioner has filed a notice of termination of the business rescue 
proceedings with the Commission;  
- if the business rescue plan has been rejected and no affected person has 
attempted to extend the proceedings; or 
- if the business rescue plan has been accepted and the practitioner has filed a 
notice of substantial implementation of the plan.  
 
If the business rescue proceedings of a company last longer than three months (or 
longer if the court deems it necessary on application of the practitioner), the 
practitioner must prepare a report on the progress of the proceedings and update that 
report every month. The practitioner must also deliver this report to the court or to the 
Commission, if the proceedings were not instigated by a court.
167
  
 
4.12.5 C133 – General moratorium on legal proceedings against company 
 
If a company has been placed under business rescue proceedings, no legal action may 
be taken against that company or against any property either owned or possessed by 
the company. However certain exceptions do exist:
168
  
 
- if there is written consent from the practitioner;  
- with the permission of the court;  
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- against a claim made by the company itself;  
- any criminal proceedings against the company or the directors and officers; or 
- regarding any property or right which the company holds as a trustee.  
 
If there is a surety by the company for a person, this surety may not be enforced 
against the company during business rescue proceedings. That is unless the court 
considers it to be otherwise just.
169
 In the event that a right exists to claim against a 
company subject to a time limit, that time period must be placed on hold whilst the 
company is in business rescue proceedings.
170
 
 
This section will prove to be extremely useful due to the fact that a company under 
business rescue proceedings requires all the assistance it can get. If the company has 
to receive legal claims against it during these times it will be impossible to attempt to 
save the organisation from financial distress. However it still remains to be seen if 
persons will be able to claim against the company or its directors and officers, for 
conduct or omissions, which occur during the business rescue proceedings, after these 
proceedings have been terminated. During difficult times such as financial distress, it 
will always prove extremely challenging to satisfy everyone‟s needs. 
 
4.12.6 C137 – Effect on shareholders and directors 
 
Any change in the classification or status of issued securities, except the transfer of 
securities in the ordinary course of business, is not allowed during business rescue 
proceedings. This is unless a court allows otherwise or the business recue plan itself 
states that changes or alterations are permitted.
171
 
 
The following effects will take place on directors during a company‟s business rescue 
proceedings:
172
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- the director must maintain the functions as such but subject to the authority of 
the practitioner;  
- the director must carry out management functions towards the company  
under the instructions and direction of the practitioner. This must be done if it 
is reasonable to do so;  
- the director must still adhere to the rules relating to personal financial 
interests to himself or a related person, in respect of the company, as in c75; 
and 
- otherwise the director is relieved of all other duties and liabilities towards the 
company as set out in c76 and c77 respectively, with the exception of c77 (3) 
(a), (b) and (c). In other words the director may not act in the name of the 
company when not authorised to do so, the director may not allow the 
business of the company to be conducted in a reckless, grossly negligent, 
fraudulent, or insolvent manner, and the director may not be a part of an act or 
omission by the company which is intended to defraud a creditor, employee 
or shareholder.  
 
The directors of a company will be required to carry out any requests of the 
practitioner, and supply the practitioner with any information reasonably required 
regarding the company‟s business.173 Any action by the board of directors which 
required the endorsement of the practitioner will be void unless the necessary consent 
to act is obtained.
174
 
 
The practitioner may apply to a court in order to remove a director from office. The 
court may only approve this request if it can be shown that:
175
 
 
- the director did not conform to the requirements set out in Chapter 6 (Business 
rescue and compromise with creditors); or 
- the director either by an act or an omission is obstructing the performance of 
the practitioner regarding his powers and functions, the management of the 
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company by the practitioner, or the progress and functioning of the business 
rescue plan.  
 
The ability of the practitioner to apply to the court in order to remove a director is in 
addition to the ability of a person to apply to have a director declared delinquent or 
under probation.
176
 
 
During business rescue proceedings the directors of a company will be in a strange 
position; on the one hand some of the duties are nullified, whilst on the other, the 
director is expected to perform in accordance with the practitioner. The director is 
excused of all other duties which would include the fiduciary duty and that of care. 
However one is still expected to exercise the functions of a director subject to the 
authority of the practitioner. It is hard to believe that the fiduciary duty and that of 
care will actually be excused. This section also adds more grounds under which a 
director may be removed from office. If one is removed from office in accordance 
with this section, it will be interesting to see if that will make it easier to bring an 
action against the director once the business rescue proceedings have ended. For 
example, the company ends up in liquidation due to the fact that a director negligently 
obstructed the practitioner from performing his duties during business rescue 
proceedings. The Mean was 2.87, which was an increase from 2.7 during the first 
round of the study.  
 
4.12.7 C138 – Qualifications of practitioners  
 
A person may be a practitioner of a company during business rescue proceedings only 
if the following criteria are met:
177
 
 
- the person must be a member (in good standing) of a profession which is 
under some regulatory authority; 
- the person is not under probation as a result of a court order as in c162 (7); 
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- the person would not be disqualified from acting as a director of a company as 
in c69 (8); 
- the person does not have a relationship with the company which could 
compromise the person‟s objectivity, impartiality or integrity; and  
- the person is not related to anyone who is in a relationship with the company 
which could compromise the person‟s objectivity, impartiality or integrity. 
 
The Minister may assign a person or organisation to regulate the system of 
practitioners. The person or organisation would have to be within the Republic South 
Africa and dedicated to realising the purposes of this Chapter. This person would also 
have to encourage sound principles of good practice regarding business rescue. This 
would require human, financial and operational resources in order to carry out the 
functions of this Chapter.
178
 
 
The Minister may enforce certain reasonable conditions upon the person or 
organisation which will regulate the system of practitioners, as well as procedures to 
be followed. Certain minimum qualifications may be set by the Minister regarding 
who may be appointed into the practice of business practitioners.
179
 
 
If there are certain levels of expertise required of practitioners, one would think that 
they would be judged accordingly when deciding whether the person has carried out 
his duty or care, skill and diligence towards the company. This is the case with 
company directors and practitioners are most likely going to be treated in the same 
manner by the courts. Therefore the higher the degree of skill and knowledge that a 
practitioner possesses, the higher will be the standard of expectation imposed.  
 
4.12.8 C139 – Removal and replacement of practitioner 
 
A practitioner may be removed from office by a court in accordance with c130 
(Objections to company resolution) or as per this section.
180
 The court may remove a 
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practitioner from office either on its own accord or on request of an affected person. 
In order to remove or replace a practitioner from any of the following justifications 
must be proven:
181
 
 
- the practitioner is incompetent or has failed to perform certain duties; 
- the necessary degree of care was not carried out with respect to the 
practitioner‟s duties; 
- the practitioner was involved in illegal conduct; 
- the practitioner no longer fulfils the requirements in c138 (1); 
- the practitioner had a conflict of interest with the company or is no longer 
independent; or 
- the practitioner has become incapacitated and can not function for a 
reasonably foreseeable amount of time.    
 
It is the responsibility of the company, or the creditor who appointed the practitioner, 
to appoint a new person in the event that the practitioner dies, resigns, or is removed 
from office.
182
 
 
4.12.9 C140 – General powers and duties of practitioners 
 
The following are the practitioner‟s powers and duties during a company‟s business 
rescue proceedings; these are in addition to the rest which are set out in this 
Chapter:
183
 
 
- the practitioner possesses complete management control over the company, 
which replaces the board of directors and management;  
- the practitioner may delegate any power and function to a board member or a 
previous member of management;  
- the practitioner may remove any person from management and appoint any 
other in place; and 
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- the practitioner must create and apply the business rescue plan of the 
company.  
 
Unless the practitioner has permission from a court, the practitioner may not appoint a 
person as part of the management of the company if that person has, or knows anyone 
who has, a relationship with the company which would impair the integrity, 
impartiality, or objectivity of that person.
184
 
 
The following applies to the office of a practitioner during company business rescue 
proceedings:
185
 
 
- the practitioner is an officer of the court and must report back to the court on 
the status of the business rescue proceedings as required;  
- the practitioner possesses the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of a 
director in accordance with c75 to c77; 
- the practitioner will not be held liable for conduct which is performed in good 
faith; and  
- the practitioner may be held liable for conduct which amounts to gross 
negligence.  
 
In the event that the company is place under liquidation consequent to business rescue 
proceedings, the practitioner may not be appointed as a liquidator of the company.
186
 
 
It seems that the practitioner will have the same duties and liabilities as company 
directors do. Even more so in that all the responsibilities of the board and 
management will be under the control of the practitioner. This places an enormous 
amount of responsibility on one person alone. One can imagine a multi-national 
company which requires many directors, both executive and non-executive, whom 
often are out of touch with all aspects of the business. In this case, one person will 
bear full responsibility. This may be an exaggeration, as the practitioner may delegate 
any of the duties, however he may be held liable if the delegation results in a loss.  
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Even though the practitioner has the same responsibilities and duties as company 
directors, the practitioner will not be held liable for conduct which is carried out in 
good faith. This is with the exception of gross negligence. It is hard to believe that if 
the practitioner causes a loss or damage as a result of negligence, but in good faith, 
that a claim will not arise. This section is also silent on whether or not the company 
may purchase insurance or indemnify the practitioner. Perhaps D&O liability 
insurance should automatically cover a practitioner in the event that the company is 
placed under business rescue proceedings.  
 
4.12.10 C142 – Directors of company to co-operate with and assist practitioner 
 
The directors of a company, which has been placed under business rescue, must 
furnish the practitioner with all the books and documents regarding the business of the 
company, which is in their possession.
187
 Any director who is aware of the 
whereabouts of any other books or records must inform the practitioner.
188
 
 
The directors of the company will be required to furnish the practitioner, within five 
business days (or longer if the practitioner allows), with statements relating to the 
following:
189
 
 
- material transactions of the company which occurred twelve months prior to 
the inception of the business rescue proceedings;  
- court, arbitration, or administrative proceedings relating to the company; 
- the company‟s assets, liabilities, income and disbursements from the 
previous twelve months; 
- the number of employees that the company has, as well as any agreements 
regarding employee rights of the company; 
- the debtors, as well as the debtors‟ obligations to the company; and 
- the creditors, as well as any rights or claims against the company. 
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No person may withhold any books or records of the company from the practitioner 
during business rescue proceedings.
190
 The directors of a company, which is under 
business rescue proceedings, owe a number of duties towards the company and 
towards the practitioner. This may result in an increase in the instances of legal claims 
against directors. It may be advisable that D&O insurers prepare for the cover of 
companies which are under business rescue proceedings; from the following 
perspectives: 
 
- a company under business rescue proceedings is more likely to incur legal 
claims as a result of financial distress; 
- the directors of a company under business rescue proceedings may be under a 
greater threat of legal claims than otherwise, due to new responsibilities and a 
willingness of shareholders and creditors to reclaim certain funds; and 
- the practitioner may be open to legal claims as a result of a high number of 
responsibilities, duties and liabilities.  
 
4.13 C157 – Extended standing to apply for remedies  
 
This section of the Companies Bill introduces the concept of a class action into South 
African law. Although the concept of a class action did already exist in terms of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 under s38, the Bill 
will introduce it as a very possible reality in the business world.  
 
In terms of c157 an application may be made, or a matter brought to a court, the 
Companies‟ Ombud, the Take-over Panel or the Commission. This right may be 
carried out by the following persons:
191
 
 
- any person directly considered in terms of the Companies Bill; 
- any person who is acting in the name of a person considered above if that 
person can not act on his own behalf;  
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- a person who is acting as a member, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons, as well as an association acting in the interests of its 
members; and  
- any person acting in the interest of the public, with leave of the court.  
 
 The Commission or the Panel may initiate proceedings in a court in the name of a 
person who had made a written request to the Panel or Commission to do so. The 
Commission or Panel may also apply to the court in order to intercede in court 
proceedings if it is felt that certain necessary interests are not being considered.
192
 
According to c157 (3) this section does not construct grounds for any person to bring 
a derivative action in terms of c165.  
 
It will be interesting to see what the results of the introduction of class actions will do 
for directors. Certainly there is a possibility that more legal claims will result, 
however the D&O policy wordings of South Africa have always covered this 
eventuality.  
 
The norm thus far has been that in the event of a company which is being wound up, 
the liquidators will seek compensation for the creditors and shareholders of that 
company. This is a difficult task due to the fact that the creditors of large companies 
generally have competing interests. However the class action will allow shareholders 
and creditors to sue directors autonomously, therefore without the requirement of a 
liquidator.  
 
4.14 C162 – Application to declare director delinquent or under probation 
 
For the purposes of this section „legislation‟ represents national and provincial 
legislation. The legislation here is related to different aspects of a juristic person. This 
includes promotion, formation, management, obligations, prohibitions as well as 
regulations for an industry.
193
  
 
                                                 
192
 C157 (2) 
193
 C162 (1) 
 187 
Three different categories of persons may apply to a court for an order to declare a 
director delinquent or under probation:  
 
- A company, shareholder, director, company secretary, prescribed officer, 
registered trade union representing the employees, or another representative of 
the employees of the company. For the purposes of this section these persons 
will be referred to as „commercial applicants‟.  
- The Commission or the Panel. For the purposes of this section these persons 
will be referred to as „regulatory applicants‟.  
- A state organ, which is responsible for the administration of any legislation. 
For the purposes of this section these persons will be referred to as „state 
applicants‟. A state applicant may only seek to declare a director delinquent 
not under probation.   
 
An application to a court to declare a director delinquent or under probation may only 
be attempted if the person in question either is currently a director of the company, or 
was a director of the company twenty-four months prior to the application.  
 
The court must make an order which will deem a person as a delinquent director, if 
the person:
194
 
 
a) consented to being or acted in the capacity of a director or prescribed officer, 
even though the person was disqualified or ineligible as in c69. This is unless 
the person was under a court order as in c69 (11), or was a director considered 
in c69 (12) – regarding a private company; 
b) acted as a director even though the person was under probation in terms of 
this section or s47 of the Close Corporations Act No. 69 of 1984;  
c) whilst acting as the director of the company:  
i. grossly abused the office of a director; 
ii. utilised information acquired through the office of a director in 
order to gain a personal advantage in contravention of c76 (2) (a); 
iii. acted in a manner: 
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- which is considered as gross negligence, wilful misconduct or 
breach of trust regarding the director‟s functions and duties 
towards the company; or 
- discussed in c77 (3) (a), (b) or (c); 
d) has been repeatedly given a compliance notice for similar conduct relating to 
any legislation;  
e) has been personally convicted of an offence, fined or been subject to a 
penalty, at least two times, regarding any legislation; 
f) within a period of five years was a director of a company, managing member 
of a close corporation or controlled a juristic person, that was convicted of an 
offence, or subject to an administrative fine or penalty, regarding any 
legislation. The person must have been in control, as explained above, of the 
entity when the contravention resulted in the said punishment. The court must 
also believe that the order of delinquency is warranted in light of the nature of 
the contraventions.  
 
The following explains which of the circumstances above are necessary depending on 
which applicant is seeking a court order to declare a person as a delinquent director: 
 
- commercial applicants will require any from (a) to (c) above; 
- regulatory applicants will require any from (a) to (f) above; and 
- state applicants will require any from (d) to (f) above. State applicants will be 
required to serve the Commission with a copy of the application.
195
 
 
A declaration of delinquency from (a) or (b) above will exist for an entire lifetime. A 
declaration of delinquency from (c) to (f) above may be subject to any conditions 
which the court deems necessary, and will last for seven years from the order of 
delinquency, unless the court thinks it necessary to be longer.
196
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A court may make an order which will place a person under probation if:
197
 
 
a) whilst in the office of a director the person: 
i. participated in a meeting in which he failed to vote against a 
resolution regardless of the fact that the company would not satisfy 
the solvency and liquidity test; 
ii. acted contradictory to the duties of a director; or 
iii. sustained or made a decision which led the company to act in a 
manner discussed in c163 (1);
198
 or  
b) within a period of ten years after the effective date: 
i. the person has been a director of more than one company, or a 
managing member of more than one close corporation; and  
ii. during that time two or more of those companies or close 
corporations neglected to pay its creditors or satisfy its obligations. 
This is with the exception of a business rescue plan consequent to a 
board resolution regarding c129
199
 and a compromise with 
creditors regarding c155.
200
 
 
According to c162 (8) a court may place a person under probation with respect to (a) 
(iii) above if the court believes that the declaration is justified in light of the 
circumstances of the company (or corporation), as well as the person‟s conduct 
regarding the management of the company (or corporation) at the time. The court may 
also only place a person under probation with respect to (b) above if the court believes 
that the method by which the company or close corporation was managed was, at 
least, moderately blameworthy for the failure to meet its obligations. The order of 
probation in terms of (b) above must also be justified in light of the circumstances of 
the company (or corporation), as well as the person‟s conduct regarding the 
management of the company (or corporation) at the time.  
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 This is company resolution to commence business rescue proceedings.   
200
 This is regarding a compromise between the company and its creditors.  
 190 
The following explains which of the circumstances above are necessary depending on 
which applicant is seeking a court order to declare a person under probation: 
 
- commercial applicants will require any from (a) and c162 (8) above; and 
- regulatory applicants will require any from (a), (b) and c162 (8) above. 
 
A declaration which places a person under probation may be subject to court 
conditions and does not exceed a period longer than five years as established by the 
court.
201
 
 
The court may order, either as part of the declaration or in addition to it, that the 
person:
202
 
 
- embark on a corrective education programme regarding the person‟s conduct 
as a director; 
- undertake certain community service; 
- pay compensation to a person who suffered a loss as a result of the director‟s 
conduct. This is in the event that the person adversely affected does not any 
other legal base for compensation. This will be a concern for directors due to 
the fact that it means that a director will be liable for compensation even when 
no legal basis for such damages exists. The D&O policies will have to either 
exclude or include such claims against directors; or 
- regarding an order of probation: 
o the person should be supervised by a mentor whilst still participating 
as a director, while the order stands; or 
o the person is limited to being a director of a private company, or a 
company of which the person is the only shareholder.  
 
A person who has been declared a delinquent director or is on probation may apply to 
a court to suspend the order of delinquency and substitute it for probation. This may 
only be attempted three years after the order of delinquency was made. The person 
may also apply to a court to set aside an order of delinquency two years after it was 
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suspended and substituted for probation. The person affected may also apply to a 
court in order to set aside an order of probation two years after the probation was 
ordered.
203
 
 
When the court deliberates whether or not to substitute or set aside an order, the court 
will not grant the new order if any of the conditions attached to the original order have 
not been complied with. The court may however grant the new order if it is convinced 
that the applicant has made adequate progress towards rehabilitation, and if it seems 
possible that the applicant will be able to serve as a director of a company in the 
future.
204
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4.15 C165 – Derivative actions  
 
This section replaces any common law right of a person (not a company) to bring 
legal action to court on behalf of a company.
205
 The following persons may require 
that the company instigates legal action, continues legal action, or takes related legal 
steps in order to guard the interests of that company:
206
 
 
- a shareholder of the company; 
- a director or prescribed officer of the company;  
- a registered trade union or other representation which looks after the 
company‟s employees; or 
- a person who has been granted leave by the court to bring the action.  
 
The company that has been required to take legal action in terms of the above may 
apply, within fifteen days, to a court in order to set the request aside. This may only 
be done on the basis that the demand is frivolous, vexatious or lacking merit.
207
 In the 
event that the company does not apply to a court in order to set the request aside, or 
that the court turns down the company‟s application; the company is required to 
assign an independent and impartial person in order to examine the demand which 
was served. This person must then report to the board on matters which resulted in the 
action, the costs which the company may incur if the action is carried out, as well as 
whether or not it is in the best interests of the company to pursue the action. The 
company is further required to respond within sixty days of the request by either 
taking the necessary legal action to protect the company, or to let the person who 
served the demand know, by means of a notice, that the company will not comply 
with the request.
208
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A person who has made a demand that a company take legal action to defend its own 
interests may apply to a court to commence or continue proceedings on behalf of the 
company. The court may allow this if:
209
 
 
- the company failed to carry out the necessary requirements once served with 
the demand; 
- the company did not appoint an impartial and independent person or 
committee to investigate the matter; 
- the company accepted a report on the matter which was inadequate, irrational 
or unreasonable; 
- the company performed contrary to the recommendations of a reasonable 
report on the matter; or 
- the company served a report of refusal to comply with the request of a person 
contemplated in c165 (2).  
 
The court may only allow a person to defend the company in its own name if the 
person is acting in good faith, the allegations are relevant and serious, and if it is in 
the best interests of the company to do so.
210
 
 
It is possible that a person may apply to a court to defend a company on its own 
behalf without making a demand on the company as stated above, or without allowing 
the company time to respond to the demand. This will only be allowed in very rare 
circumstances. The court may allow for this type of urgency if the time delay which 
will result from subsections (3) to (5) will lead to irreparable damage to the company 
or prejudice to the applicant or another person.
211
 The court may also allow this order 
if the company will not prevent the harm or prejudice which the applicant wants to 
guard, and if the requirements of subsection (5) (b) are fulfilled.  
 
It will be assumed that the granting of leave is not in the best interests of the 
company. However this assumption will be refutable. In order for this assumption to 
appear it will have to be determined that the proceedings are by the company against a 
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third party,
212
 by a third party against the company, or that the company elected to 
either not commence, not defend or discontinue the proceedings. The presumption 
that leave is not in the best interests of the company will also exist if the directors of 
the company:
213
 
 
- acted in good faith; 
- did not possess a personal financial interest in the matter and were not related 
to any person who did; 
- properly informed themselves about the matter; and 
- reasonably believed that the decision in question was in the best interests of 
the company. 
 
If a person has been appointed for action under this section by the court, the court is 
required to decide who will remunerate that person. The order as decided by the court 
may vary and if more persons are to be liable for carrying out the functions of the 
order, the court must state the extent of each person‟s liability. These persons are 
either the parties to the proceedings or the company itself. The person who is granted 
leave by the court in order to carry out proceedings in terms of this section may 
require an inspection of the company‟s financial books at any time. This is provided 
that the person gives reasonable notice to the company in advance.
214
 
 
The court may at any point make decisions regarding the costs of the company, the 
person who was granted leave or another party to the proceedings in respect of leave 
granted for proceedings under this section.
215
 The Bill states that an order made under 
this section may require security for costs.
216
 It is not mentioned whether the court 
must make an order in respect of this matter and under what circumstances the 
security will be necessary.  
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Once the court has granted leave in terms of this section, another person who may 
bring a derivative action (as mentioned above) may apply to the court in order to be 
substituted for the person to whom, leave to carry out proceedings, was originally 
given. The court may allow this substitution if the applicant is acting in good faith and 
if it is fair to do so in the circumstance of the case.
217
 The substitution will have the 
effect that the new person will be regarded as been granted leave in the first place.
218
  
 
Any ratification or approval of conduct by the shareholders of any company conduct 
does not mean that a person may not apply to the court for leave in order to bring a 
derivative action. This will also not prejudice the result of the application for leave or 
the derivative action itself. However the court is allowed to take into consideration 
any ratification or approval, by shareholders of company conduct, when making any 
judgment.
219
 Any derivative action may not be stopped, compromised or settled 
without the approval of the court.
220
 The right to apply for leave or bring an action as 
contemplated in this section may be carried out in accordance with c157.
221
 
 
4.16 C218 – Civil actions  
 
No agreement, resolution, provision or resolution of an agreement, Memorandum of 
Incorporation, or rules of a company that is prohibited, void, voidable, or may be 
declared unlawful in terms of the Companies Bill is actually void, unless the court 
declares it as such.
222
  
 
According to c218 (2) if a person contravenes the new Act and, as a result another 
person suffers loss or damage, the person who committed the contravention is liable 
to the other person for the amount of loss or damage incurred. This section opens up 
directors‟ liability to third parties. In the event that a director contravenes any section 
of the new Act, be it fraudulently or negligently, and a third party suffers a loss (such 
as an employee) the director will be personally liable for that loss. A contravention 
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due to negligence will now be all the more possible as a result of the definition of 
„knowledge‟ provided by the Bill. Therefore directors will be able to be held liable for 
matters which previously would have been excused. This is a concern due to the fact 
that directors were originally only meant to be liable for losses to the company. In this 
way, a director can perform his duties and carry out his responsibilities without the 
constant threat of possible litigation, which could inhibit necessary risk-taking.  
 
The section on civil actions does not alter any other remedy that a person may have by 
law or other regulations.
223
 
 
4.17 Conclusion 
 
The second mitigating step of legislation and more relevantly for this dissertation, the 
new Companies Act, is also not likely to contain claims against directors. Perhaps like 
the codes of corporate governance legislation acts like a double-edged sword. Whilst 
attempting to clarify directors‟ duties through a codification, this may also serve to 
inform potential claimants.  
 
The introduction of the business judgment rule may be seen as a mitigating factor in 
that directors may use it as a defence. However as was stated in this chapter the 
business judgment may be superfluous under South African law and may lead to 
unintended consequences.  
 
The definition of „knowledge‟ as provided in the new Act may also increase director 
liability due to the fact that it may lead to a gap in cover for directors with regards to 
negligence. Further, the introduction of class actions into South African law will 
surely lead to an increased number of claims. This will be amplified by the fact that 
c218 (2) allows for civil remedies; any person who contravenes the Bill will be liable 
to any person who suffers a loss as a consequence of that contravention.  
 
As previously stated, company failures are usually ascribed to breaches of corporate 
governance or company law. Therefore new corporate governance codes are added 
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and old ones are updated. Further, corporate governance notions are being placed 
legislation, as has been seen in the Companies Bill. This is in the hope of preventing 
future corporate losses.  
 
Once again one may be missing the point; putting a law or regulation in place does 
not necessarily prevent persons from breaking the rules. One assumes that creating a 
law against murder would certainly not reduce its occurrence at all. Persons that are 
willing to commit fraud will go through with it no matter what corporate governance 
or legislation permits. This holds even truer for negligence; putting a law in place 
against negligence will certainly not prevent persons from behaving that way, as it is 
something which is not even done with intent.  
 
An economic crisis has occurred, consequent to which many frauds have been 
discovered. The reaction normally is to put laws and regulations in place in order to 
prevent that from happening again in the future. The doctrinal issues and the 
complexity of the modern economic world have led to an in increase directors 
exposure to liability. This in turn leads to increased claims against company directors. 
 
Legislation (the new Companies Act) will be put in place in order to contain the 
increase in director liability. Although this mitigating step has the right intentions, the 
doctrinal and complexity issues will outweigh the expected results. Therefore it is 
expected that director liability and therefore claims against directors will continue to 
increase.  
 
The fact that an entire chapter of the new act is focused on corporate governance and 
mainly directors may lead to increased expectations. It will be much easier to hold 
directors liable when their corporate duties are spelled out in legislation. The 
corporate governance expectations of directors will also be increased as they are now 
legislated in the new Companies Act.  
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5 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 
5.1 History 
 
This section will briefly examine the history and development of D&O liability 
insurance in the US, UK and South Africa respectively.   
 
5.1.1 History – United States   
 
D&O insurance was first developed as a reaction to the surge of lawsuits against 
directors and officers in the 1930s, consequent to the 1929 stock market crash in the 
US. The 1929 stock market crash also led to the enactment of federal securities laws, 
which tended to increase the risk of liability of directors and officers, whilst still 
providing some defensive protection. The first policy is believed to have been placed 
by Minet and underwritten by Lloyd‟s for a US corporation known as the Federated 
Department Stores. Due to the fact that this type of cover had never existed and no 
data was available, policy sales were very scarce. The policy was generally costly and 
complicated (Youngman, 1999).  
 
This slowly developing market was stunted further with the advent of World War 2. 
As a result claims against directors were only significant enough for discussion during 
the 1950s (Youngman, 1999). During these years the growth of the US D&O market 
was held back once again by the fact that Lloyd‟s underwriters declined to reinsure 
US companies.
224
 However eventually US insurers ended up writing the market‟s 
accounts.  
 
The 1960s once again produced increased litigation against directors; this led to new 
players entering the market. From 1964 onwards insurers such as St Paul, American 
Home Assurance, Liberty Mutual and the Kemper Group entered the market. Most of 
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the policy wordings followed that of Lloyd‟s, at which by this stage, was doing most 
of the reinsurance (Lockwood, 2003).  
 
The 1970s became more difficult for D&O insurers; this was as a result of 
competitive pressures and numerous legislative measures (federal and state) being 
passed, which affected company directors. As a result of the success of early D&O 
insurers, many new entrants became active in the market. Competitive pressures led to 
policy alterations such as lowered premiums and increased limits. Consequent to new 
legislation the claims against directors and officers increased and D&O insurers began 
to experience losses (Lockwood, 2003). However the soft market continued until the 
mid-1980s when the D&O market began to suddenly harden. This will be discussed 
later on.  
 
5.1.2 History – United Kingdom 
 
The UK market was, and continues to be, dissimilar from that of the US. It was 
extremely rare to find a company purchasing D&O in the UK until the 1980s unless 
that company had US exposure (Youngman, 1999). S310 of the UK Companies Act 
(1985) stated that the company may not indemnify a director in terms of negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust. This section was similar to s247 of the 
South African Companies Act (1973), which is discussed under the indemnification 
section (c78) of the South African Companies Bill in this dissertation. Although 
arguments were made that this section prohibited companies from purchasing D&O 
insurance on behalf of directors, companies continued to do it anyway, as was the 
case in South Africa. However the UK company legislation was eventually amended 
in order to clarify any confusion; this allowed companies to purchase D&O insurance 
on behalf of their directors.  
 
Although the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s led to companies spending less 
resources on what was considered „non-essential‟ insurance, directors were more 
susceptible to claims and required cover (Youngman, 1999). A combination of new 
legislation and increasing case law against directors slowly led to an increase in the 
demand for D&O insurance. This was then amplified by EU directives which applied 
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to companies in the UK. Eventually it was not only large public companies that 
purchased D&O insurance but also private companies (Youngman, 1999).  
 
5.1.3 History – South Africa  
 
If there is not much to say regarding D&O insurance history in the UK, there is 
certainly even less with respect to South Africa. In South Africa, the D&O insurance 
market only became significant as a result of the South African Companies Act 
(1973). However, as was the case in the UK, and as explained in the indemnification 
section (c78) of the Companies Bill in this dissertation, s274 (1) of the South African 
Companies Act (1973) raised concerns as to whether or not a company would be 
legally allowed to purchase D&O cover for its directors. Nevertheless, companies 
continued to purchase the cover in any case. The South African Insurance Brokers 
Association
225
 made submissions to the Subcommittee on Legal Practices of the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law in order to have the section 
amended. The amendment was made in 1998; however doubt still exists as to whether 
or not companies may purchase D&O insurance for directors in order to protect them 
from third party claims. This has been clarified in the Companies Bill (2008).  
 
The South African courts have never actually had to deal with the legitimacy of a 
D&O policy. Most claims against directors are settled outside the courts between all 
the parties involved. This is however expected to change with the advent of the new 
Companies Act, which will make persons more aware of their rights against directors. 
Another reason for an expected increase in the number of claims against D&O 
policies is the fact that corporate governance codes are also providing an awareness of 
directors‟ duties and liabilities. The third King Report on Corporate Governance is 
expected to encourage the rights of all company stakeholders, which means directors‟ 
duties will increase to other sources. Due to the fact that South Africa is no longer 
being boycotted by overseas investors, as was the case during the early 1990s as a 
result of the apartheid regime, South African companies are now exposed to outside 
                                                 
225
 The organisation is now known as the South African Financial Services Intermediaries Association 
(SAFSIA), which recently merged to become the FIA.  
 201 
investment, as well as laws and regulations. However this results in increased risk and 
therefore opens up directors to more potential claims.   
 
South African D&O policies are shaped in accordance with overseas policies; mainly 
that of the US and the UK. Therefore one may say that South African policies are a 
hybrid of the overseas counterparts.  
 
5.2 D&O insurance cycles 
 
The insurance market, like most others,
226
 is subject to cyclical patterns; the D&O 
market is no exception. The reason for labelling these occurrences as „cycles‟ is as a 
result of repetitive trends, which will occur regarding certain factors of the market. 
Examples of some of the factors regarding the insurance industry are the price, 
availability, quality (of cover) as well as the capacity of insurance companies. The 
cyclical changes denote periods of time when the market may be either „hard‟ or 
„soft‟.  
 
The underwriting cycle is a sequence of premium stages which are typified by 
episodic soft and hard markets (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003: 151). Soft markets are 
exemplified by reduced coverage prices, whilst hard markets are distinguished by 
supply declines and price amplification. The hard market may be recognised by a 
diminution in cover and increasing premiums. Consequently, the increased premiums 
and additional borrowings will replenish capital and supply will increase whilst price 
will decrease (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003). This will then lead to a soft market and 
hence the cycles continue. 
 
Insurance underwriting cycles may exist as a consequence of forces inside or outside 
the insurance industry. An example of a force within the industry is that of 
competition and new entrants in the market. This will normally occur when the 
market is at the end of a hard stage. New entrants will be attracted by the increase in 
premiums and therefore profitability of the industry at the latter stage of a hard 
market. The increase in competition will bring the price of premiums down, which 
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may eventually lead to a softer unprofitable market; paving the way for the return of a 
hard market. An example of an outside force may be that of new legislation. 
Legislation may for example impose higher standards on the insured, which is the 
case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and arguably the South African Companies Bill. This 
could lead to a drastic increase in claims against the insurers and a hardening of the 
market. However some of the factors could swing the market in either direction 
(stringent legislation may lead to directors taking more care and therefore less claims 
will arise) therefore underwriting cycles are unpredictable to an extent. It is not the 
objective of this dissertation to provide an in-depth description of insurance cycles or 
the economic reason thereof. The aim here is to briefly describe what cycles the D&O 
insurance market has been through.  
 
In the US the D&O insurance market was soft until the mid-1980s. The soft market 
may have been consequent to the fact that many new entrants meant decreased 
premiums and modest deductibles (Lockwood, 2003). However by 1985 the market 
began to harden which meant that premiums started to rise, the limits of indemnity 
were decreased, and it became increasingly difficult for D&O insurance companies to 
find reinsurance for this type of cover. This „crisis‟ may have occurred as a result of 
multiple causes; D&O insurance companies were faced with new types of exposure, 
the number of bankruptcies increased, acquisitions and public offerings were on the 
rise, and judicial decisions started to effect the exposure to D&O risk (Romano, 
1988). As a result, loss prediction became progressively more complex in this still 
relatively new line of insurance; therefore profitability in this sector of the insurance 
industry began to decrease. In 1985 around 75% of the D&O reinsurers had retreated 
and the total capacity of the market decreased significantly (Lockwood, 2003).  
 
The D&O insurers that did remain in the market commenced the imposition of certain 
exclusions in policies such as insured versus insured, and claims arising out of 
mergers and acquisitions (Lockwood, 2003). Further explanations of the hardened 
market are the fact that interest rates were increasing in the US at the time, and that 
the reinsurance market was reducing worldwide (Romano, 1988).  
 
The 1985 crisis also affected the Canadian D&O insurance market. According to 
Daniels and Hutton (1992) the 1985 crisis was brought on by a number of legal and 
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industry factors. However the cyclical trends of D&O insurance have the ability to 
weaken directors‟ capability of guarding against legal actions. Some of the 
consequences of this hard market were that some persons refused to take up positions 
as directors, many captive insurance companies were created, and many new players 
entered the market, which led to increased capacity (Lockwood, 2003).  
 
By 1989 the D&O insurance market began to turn soft; this was as a result of the new 
entrants into the market, as well as legislation which were passed by a number of 
states, aimed at limiting directors‟ liability (Lockwood, 2003). The softening of the 
market was despite the fact that severity of claims continued to increase. This soft 
market would begin to come to a close in 1999.  
 
The new hard market was consequent to a number of factors (Lockwood, 2003):  
 
- The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks led to high claims against insurers. 
This also turned reinsurers to less risky lines of cover.  
- A higher than usual amount of bankruptcies occurred among public traded 
companies in the US. 
- A continued increase in the cost of claims due to class action suites.  
- The well-publicised incidents of corporate failures in the US, such as Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco.  
 
From the beginning of 2000, the severity of D&O losses began to increase 
dramatically. This may have been as a result of the fact that investor losses were 
higher than ever before, the prospective of losses to investors increased due to market 
capitalisations, institutional investors were increasingly taking action against directors 
and officers in order to promote „good‟ corporate governance, and many claims were 
related to accounting malpractice (Redington, 2005). In order to illustrate the increase 
in claims settlements, the following list is provided as from 2000:  
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Figure 1: Claims settlements 
 
Company  Settlement 
Enron $7.2 Billion  
WorldCom $6.1 Billion  
Cedant $3.5 Billion 
Tyco $3.2 Billion 
Citi Bank $2.7 Billion 
Lucent $517 Million 
Bank of America $490 Million 
Waste Management $457 Million 
Daimler/Chrysler  $300 Million 
Oxford Heath  $300 Million 
Source: Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
 
The first shareholder class action claim settlement over $100 million occurred in 
1999; as a result of this most D&O insurers increased premiums during 2000. 
According to the Tillinghast 2000 D&O Liability Survey, premiums increased by 
11% on average in that year. This trend continued throughout 2001 and 2002 as the 
cost and number of D&O claims continued to increase. According to the Tillinghast 
2001 D&O Liability Survey, premiums increased by 29% on average that year; this 
was followed by another 29% increase in average premiums in 2002 (Tillinghast 2001 
D&O Liability Survey).  
 
The hardening of the D&O insurance market did also present itself in other means. 
Many insurers left the market, whilst others decreased the amount of cover which 
would be offered (Sirovatka, 2004). This meant that the D&O insurance market 
capacity declined. This has generally been attributed to the worldwide corporate 
governance changes which were taking place. Due to the numerous corporate scandals 
and failures which occurred, and the extent of coverage which the media presented on 
those cases, the public began to doubt company boards of directors (Sirovatka, 2004). 
As a result (although the Act had been contemplated for a while prior to this) the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the US. However the corporate failures continued 
to occur in spite of the new stringent legislation.  
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Eventually in 2004 D&O premiums began to decrease, which was contrary to what 
most expected in the wake of corporate failures such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. 
In the latter half of 2003 and during 2004, the premium average decreased by 10% 
(Tillinghast 2004 D&O Liability Survey). Certain segments of the business world, 
such as mining and agriculture, and personal and business services experienced the 
greatest declines in premiums. This was probably as a consequence of reductions in 
claim frequency (Sirovatka, 2004). However there were still minor increases in 
average premiums in segments such as banking and health services (Sirovatka, 2004).  
 
At the same time the D&O insurance market was softening in other respects; such as 
the fact that coverage restrictions were being moderated. Most participants in the 
Tillinghast 2004 D&O Liability Survey reported an increase in average coverage 
limits and only 28% of the participants reported increases in deductibles. This was 
down from 44% in the 2003 survey. Another relevant pattern was that most 
participants in the Tillinghast 2004 D&O Liability Survey reported an increase in 
policy enhancements (Sirovatka, 2004).  
 
It was not all good news however, as claim frequency and susceptibility continued to 
increase. The Tillinghast 2004 D&O Liability Survey showed that claims frequency 
increased by 11% since 2003. The highest increases in claims frequency were 
reported by the banking, biotechnology and pharmaceutical, and technology sectors. 
The susceptibility of claims increased from 18% to 19% from 2003 to 2004. 
Susceptibility is measured as: the number of participants with a claim/the total 
number of participants in the group (Sirovatka, 2004). Once again, the banking sector 
showed the highest increase in susceptibility to D&O claims in 2004.  
 
Moreover, claims and defence costs were still on the rise in 2004, which was keeping 
with the trend which commenced in 1999. The average claim payment to shareholders 
or investors increased by 12% between the years 2003 to 2004.  
 
The contradiction of decreasing premiums, and increasing cost of claims and claims 
frequency was explicated by a changing capacity of the D&O insurance market 
(Sirovatka, 2004). Due to an increase of new entrants in the D&O market, much 
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capital was injected into the industry. The previous years‟ increases in premiums led 
to increased competition in the market, which tends to bring the price down 
eventually. In order to measure the competitiveness of the D&O market, the 
Tillinghast D&O Liability Survey looks at the full limits capacity of insurers. The full 
limits capacity was at $1.6 – billion in 2000 and declined consistently until 2003 to 
$1.35 – billion. However 2004 saw the full limits capacity increase to $1.5 – billion 
(Sirovatka, 2004). The increased premiums of the hard market attracted new players 
who looked to attract clients by charging lower prices. These new entrants had not 
gone through the hard market‟s fall in profits. The increased competition eventually 
led to a general lowering of D&O insurance premiums throughout the markets 
(Sirovatka, 2004). 
 
In this manner the second hard market drew to a close and the second softer market 
slowly began to emerge. In 2005 the D&O insurance industry underwent a second 
consecutive year of premium decreases. To be precise, the Tillinghast 2005 D&O 
Liability Survey, found a 9% decrease in premiums from 2004 (for-profit 
participants). It was only the durable goods, education, health services and non-
banking financial services sectors that reported slight premium increases (Tillinghast 
2005 D&O Liability Survey). Policy limits increased in 2005, with the survey 
indicating that among for-profit companies, the average policy limit was $14.3 
million, as opposed to $13.6 million in 2004. Deductibles were generally unchanged 
from 2004: the 2005 survey showed that 63% of the participants stated that their 
deductibles remained unchanged, whilst the corresponding 2004 figure was 65%.  
 
In 2005 the Tillinghast D&O Liability Survey also found that policy enhancements 
increased, whilst exclusions decreased. This is in accordance with the pattern of the 
2004 survey. Of the participants, 25% indicated an increase in enhancements, which 
is up from 13% in 2004. For a second consecutive year, 10% of the participants 
reported decreases in exclusions.  
 
The 2005 Tillinghast D&O Liability Survey still showed that the frequency and cost 
of claims was still increasing. Claim frequency regarding for-profit companies was 
0.34, as opposed to 0.33 in the 2004 survey. Non-profit participants indicated a claims 
frequency of 1.53, which was in increase from 1.34 in 2004. Regarding claims 
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susceptibility, for-profit companies reported 19% in 2005 and 15% in 2004, whilst 
non-profit companies reported 6% in 2005 and 5% in 2004. Therefore the trends 
which started occurring in mid-2003 continued to persist in 2005 – the soft market 
was in motion.       
 
In 2006 the D&O insurance market continued to soften in many respects. The average 
premium reduction from 2005 to 2006 was 6.5% regarding repeat participants 
(Tillinghast 2006 D&O Liability Survey). Among public companies, those that had 
assets less than $6 million reported a 21% reduction, whilst those that had assets 
greater than $10 – billion reported a 4% reduction in premiums. However private 
organisations actually reported a 5% increase in average premiums. Policy limits 
increased slightly with a 10% increase in average limits for repeat participants.  
 
Coverage enhancements continued to grow with 31% of participants reporting an 
increase on D&O insurance policies. Policy exclusions decreased slightly as 8% of 
participants stated that there were reductions in exclusions. For the first time since the 
commencement of the hard market the claims frequency began to decrease. For-profit 
companies reported a 0.28 claims frequency which was down from 0.34 in 2005. 
Non-profit companies reported a claim frequency of 1.18 in 2006 as opposed to 1.53 
in 2005. The susceptibility to claims was down for both for-profit and non-profit 
companies. This survey also found that continually, larger companies are more 
susceptible to claims. The soft market continued to prevail even amidst concerns that 
the Tyco claim would send the market into turmoil (Lenckus, 2007).  
 
The 2007 Tillinghast D&O Liability Survey continued to show that the D&O 
insurance market was soft. Premiums declined a further 14% in 2007, and companies 
with assets over $10 – billion actually reported a 41% reduction. The banking sector 
however reported a 57% increase in premiums. The survey reported that this may 
have been as a result of the subprime crisis. Repeat participants also experienced a 
14% reduction in retentions when compared to 2006.  
 
Regarding D&O coverage enhancements, 61% of participants reported increases as 
opposed to 31% in 2006. Policy exclusions were also declining with 34% of 
participants reporting a decrease in policy exclusions, which was up from 8% in 2006. 
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Repeat participants reported an average 13% increase in policy limits. However the 
average policy limit purchased was $9.86 million compared to $11.5 million in 2006.  
 
The 2008 Tillinghast D&O Liability Survey was not yet released when this 
dissertation was produced. However it will be interesting to see if the soft market 
continues to persist for long. The global financial crisis has already led to over one 
hundred legal actions towards the end of 2008 (Towler, 2008). A sudden increase in 
claim frequency and severity could lead to hardening of the D&O market. Thus far 
the D&O insurance market has experienced two hard cycles and two soft cycles. 
Currently the D&O industry is sitting in a soft market and it will be interesting to see 
under what circumstances it may harden. 
 
5.3 The need for D&O insurance  
 
The original aim of D&O insurance after the 1929 financial crisis, and still the 
primary aim of the policy today, is to protect the personal assets of directors from 
liability incurred within the scope of their employment by a company. The D&O 
insurance policy is distinctive due to the fact that it is purchased and owned by the 
company, but it is actually meant to protect the directors (Core, 1997). The company 
is also protected in other ways, most notably; a company will be reimbursed when it 
indemnifies a director. This will be looked at in more detail when the policy itself is 
examined in this dissertation.  
 
The extent of directors‟ personal liability is actually unlimited; therefore even the 
wealth of a director‟s family may be at risk. Directors may sometimes be held liable 
as a result of losses incurred by the company due to actions of their co-directors. 
Ignorance may no longer be used as an excuse for not being aware of loss-causing 
actions. A director will be held liable if he ought reasonably to have known of any 
events which may lead to a loss.  
 
There are certain instances where a company is permitted to indemnify a director 
regarding liability incurred, unless the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation 
states otherwise. This is stipulated in c78 (5) of the Companies Bill; the current 
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Companies Act prohibits indemnification by the company of its directors under s247 
(1). However the relevant section states that this does not apply to the purchasing of 
insurance by the company in order to indemnify a director from losses which arise out 
of services to that company. Whilst this company indemnification does provide some 
protection for directors, it will not be of any assistance in the following 
circumstances: 
 
- if the company becomes insolvent; 
- if the company has inadequate resources;  
- if the company no longer exists; 
- if the company itself is bringing the action; 
- if the company withdraws protection; 
- if the director or officer is no longer employed by the company; and  
- if the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation does not permit 
indemnification.  
 
According to O‟Sullivan (1997) there are five strong arguments in the favour of the 
purchasing of D&O insurance:  
 
- The lack of insurance means that directors may not necessarily be protected 
when taking action on behalf of a company; this may lead to conservative 
management which is unlikely to be profitable for shareholders (Jensen, 
1993).  
- D&O insurance may help recruit more non-executive directors; serving on 
numerous boards may lead to increased risk of liability and protection from 
this liability should appeal to more non-executive directors. Evidence is found 
regarding the ability to appoint non-executive directors in the US in Priest 
(1987), and Daniels and Hutton (1993).  
- D&O insurance may not necessarily have adverse results on market 
mechanisms which motivate managers to perform in the favour of 
shareholders (Oesterle, 1989).  
- Nuisance claims against directors may be extremely costly personally to 
defend, which shows that D&O insurance should be used in order to provide 
some indemnification (Oesterle, 1989).  
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- There were concerns that the fact that the company pays for D&O insurance, 
and in turn, the policy pays any costs or settlements, that directors may not 
have any incentive to avoid losses to the company. However there are still 
reputation costs involved for directors whether they are eventually found liable 
or not. Litigation will still therefore be important in controlling the actions of 
directors (Bhagat et al, 1987).    
   
5.3.1 Where does the risk come from? 
 
The following is a brief, non-exhaustive summary where the risk to directors and 
officers liability, comes from (Youngman, 1999).  
 
- Contract: failure to carry out the terms and conditions of a contract; 
- Corporate manslaughter; very few cases exist worldwide, and even less in 
South Africa. However some insurance companies are starting to consider 
possible cover. In the UK, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act of 2007 has been passed. Directors and companies could soon 
find themselves under increased liability as a result. This should eventually 
make its way to South Africa. Liability could attach as a result of failure, or 
lack thereof, of health and safety regulations within the company, resulting in 
death to a person.  
 
- Director and officer abuse of authority: making a personal profit by company 
means;  
- Employment: discrimination on certain grounds such as gender; 
- Financial irregularities: any insider trading, breach of confidentiality or 
unauthorised buying and selling of shares; 
- Fraud; 
- Government: this may arise out of legislation. For example anti-competitive 
practices; 
- Intellectual property; infringements of patent or copyright laws;  
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- Libel and slander: may occur during times of company turbulence by 
discordant statements. Some policies exclude this cover, however it may be 
added on for an additional premium; 
- Memorandum of Incorporation: the director or officer may perform contrary to 
the company rules and regulations;  
- Mismanagement; may occur if management is not controlled properly by the 
board of directors;  
- Misrepresentation: misleading or false material information which influences a 
person causing a loss; 
- Non-payment: directors and officers may be held liable under employment 
laws if employees do not receive remuneration according to the agreed 
methods; 
- Takeovers or mergers: personal liability will attach if decisions are not in the 
best interests of the company; 
- Unfair practices: the director or officer might not act in a fair and honest 
manner;  
- Wrongful dismissal;  
- Wrongful trading; personal liability will attach if the company‟s business is 
carried out in an unlawful manner;  
 
5.3.2 Potential claimants  
 
The following is a brief, non-exhaustive summary of the possible persons who could 
bring an action against company directors and officers:  
 
- Shareholders and other investors: Shareholders are generally the most 
common source of claims against directors and officers. This is due to the fact 
that directors are looking after their assets. According to the Tillinghast 2008 
D&O Liability Survey, shareholders and other investors made up the highest 
number of claims against directors and officers. The total number of claims 
from this source was 218; this made up 40.4% of total claims against directors 
and officers. The majority of the claims came from inadequate or inaccurate 
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disclosure, including financial reporting (80), followed by stock or other 
public offering (39), and then by breach of fiduciary duty (37).  
- Employees (past, current or prospective) or unions: The Tillinghast 2008 
D&O Liability Survey showed that there were 175 claims from this source; 
32.5% of the total number of claims. Most came from wrongful employee 
dismissal or termination (74), followed by discrimination (46) and salary, 
wage or compensation dispute (12).  
- Other third-party claimants: This category is extremely broad and according to 
the Tillinghast 2008 D&O Liability Survey, it produced 76 claims. That is 
14.2% of total claims against directors and officers. The highest producer of 
claims in this category was „other‟ third-party claimant issues (54) followed 
by general breach of fiduciary duty (10) and finally false advertising and 
deception (5).  
- Competitors, suppliers and other contractors: The Tillinghast 2008 D&O 
Liability Survey showed that this source resulted in 45 claims, which is 8.5% 
of total claims. Most arose from contract disputes (16), followed by business 
interference (13), and lastly copyright and patent infringement (10).  
- Customers, clients and ratepayers: The Tillinghast 2008 D&O Liability Survey 
showed that this category produced 15 claims in total which is 2.9% of total 
claims. The highest incidence in this category was as a result of contract 
dispute (5), then dishonesty and fraud, false advertising/deceptive trade 
practices and „other‟ issues (2 each).  
- Government and regulatory agencies: This category accounted for 9 claims in 
the Tillinghast 2008 D&O Liability Survey, which is 1.7% of total claims. 
Most of the claims came from „other‟ government/regulatory issues (5) 
followed by dishonesty and fraud (2), and antitrust and bankruptcy (1 claim 
each). 
 
5.4 The D&O insurance policy 
 
This dissertation makes use of the Camargue Underwriting Managers‟ D&O liability 
policy. The policy wording may be attained from the website: 
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www.camarguem.co.za. This section is intended to provide a basic understanding of 
D&O policy wording.  
 
5.4.1 Operative clause 
 
The operative clause states:  
 
“Subject to any terms, exceptions and conditions (precedent or otherwise) and in 
consideration of and conditional upon the prior payment of the premium by or on 
behalf of the Insured, the Insurers agree to indemnify the Insured and/or the Insured 
Persons up to the limit of indemnity stated in the schedule in respect of claims first 
made during the period of insurance for wrongful acts occurring on or after the 
retroactive date stated in the schedule.” 
 
The operative clause may also be referred to as the „insuring clause‟ or „insuring 
agreement‟. The operative clause broadly defines the obligations which are incurred 
by the insurer, and the conditions taken up by the insured. It is a summary of the 
agreement between the two parties: insured and insurer. The insurer agrees to 
indemnify the insured subject to the terms, exclusions, limitations, and conditions 
stated in the policy. Whilst this first clause sets the nature of the agreement, it is then 
refined and narrowed down within the policy. 
 
5.4.2 Insuring agreements 
 
Originally D&O policies were written on a „dual‟ or „bi-policy‟ format, therefore two 
policies were actually sold (Lockwood, 2003). The one was a Directors and Officers 
Liability policy and the other was a Reimbursement for Directors and Officers 
Liability Policy (Mattar & Hilson, 1979). This was eventually replaced by a single 
policy which sells both types of cover, known as Side A (Directors and Officers 
Individual Cover) and Side B (Company Reimbursement) cover. Today, although it is 
possible to purchase Side A cover only (Huskins, 2005), D&O policies are sold 
containing both sets of cover.  
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The Side A cover generally reads as follows:  
 
“The Insurers shall pay on behalf of the Insured Persons loss for which they are not 
indemnified by the Insured and which the Insured Persons become legally obligated to 
pay on account of any claim first made against them, individually or otherwise, during 
the period of insurance or, if exercised, during the discovery period, for a wrongful 
act taking place on or after the retroactive date shown in the schedule.”  
 
The individual parts of the statement will be explicated in time; however the 
agreement generally states that the insurer will cover the director or officer for any 
losses incurred in their capacity of director or officer to the company. This part will 
not cover losses which are indemnifiable by the company. The claim must first be 
made against the director or officer during the period of insurance and notified to the 
insurers during that period.  
 
This will cover legal costs which are incurred in the successful defence of allegations 
or suits, as well as any awards granted to the claimants against the director or officer. 
This applies to out of court settlements as well as orders of the court.  
 
Side B cover generally reads as follows:  
 
“The Insurers shall reimburse the Insured for loss arising from company 
indemnification to the Insured Persons, as permitted or required by law, and which the 
Insured Persons have become legally obligated to pay on account of any claim first 
made against them, individually or otherwise, during the period of insurance or, if 
exercised, during the discovery period, for a wrongful act taking place on or after the 
retroactive date shown in the schedule.”  
 
This will only cover a loss which the director or officer is liable for, but for which the 
company is legally (whether it is common law, legislation, or the Memorandum of 
Incorporation) required or permitted to indemnify that director or officer. This is 
where c78 (5) of the Companies Bill and s247 (1) of the Companies Act apply with 
regards to company indemnification of its directors and officers.  
 215 
 
However D&O insurance cover has tended to move away from its original purpose; 
the protection of directors‟ and officers‟ personal assets due to liability incurred as a 
result of errors or omissions perpetrated in the course of their duties towards the 
company which they serve (McCutcheon, 2006). The other purpose was to ensure that 
the company is able to indemnify its directors and officers as a result of legal and 
other indemnification agreements (McCutcheon, 2006). However, in the US, 
companies started to utilise D&O for its own defence and settlement costs, especially 
those arising out of investigations by the SEC. this led to an increasing amount of 
insureds relying on the funds of a single D&O policy. Thus the D&O insurance 
company began to assume responsibility for all defence and settlement costs when 
exposure was resultant from joint liability between the directors and officers, as well 
as the company itself (McCutcheon, 2006).  
 
As a result, Side C or „Entity‟ coverage was created which provides cover directly to 
the company for liabilities, irrespective of whether or not a director or officer is 
named in the claim. This type of cover then started to create other problems; not only 
was cover intended for the director being eroded by claims against the company, in 
the event of a company going bankrupt, creditors used the D&O policy as an asset 
(McCutcheon, 2006). This meant that directors were left with practically no cover 
when it was actually required.   
 
The next response was to produce Side A only cover; this would generally apply once 
the primary D&O cover was exhausted. Once again this created its own problems; this 
is due to the fact that the Side A policy will only be triggered once the insured 
company can no longer indemnify the individual director or officer. This means that 
companies will be spending monetary resources on cover which is only accessed in 
very rare circumstances. Even when the Side A policy is actually used there may be 
further difficulties; many individuals may require cover from that single policy, which 
will result in little actual protection once again for the directors and officers 
(McCutcheon, 2006).  
 
These days Side A only cover may still be purchased, and indeed it actually is. 
However D&O policies are still sold with Side A and Side B cover, and it is 
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recommended that „Entity‟ cover should be purchased separately so that the 
protection offered to directors and officers is not eroded by claims against the 
company.    
 
5.4.3 Notable definitions 
 
Wrongful act: 
 
A wrongful act is generally defined as any actual, alleged or attempted breach of duty, 
breach of trust, error, neglect, misstatement, misleading statement, mistreatment, 
breach of fiduciary obligation, wrongful trading, breach of warranty of authority, by 
an act, omission or negligence. This also includes any matter which is claimed against 
the director or officer solely by reason of serving in such capacity.  
 
A wrongful act will not be covered by the D&O insurance policy if the insured 
committed the said act in his capacity on behalf of another organisation; unless the 
policy explicitly covers this.  
 
Interrelated wrongful acts are those which somehow have a common nexus which is 
reasonable and closely related to the other.  
 
The Insured: 
 
The insured is the company or organisation named in the policy schedule. The parent 
company is that which is named in the policy schedule and may acquire or create 
subsidiaries which then also fall under the same policy. Therefore any director or 
officer of a company in the past,
227
 present or future is included. The insured company 
also includes all its subsidiaries and therefore all the directors and officers of those 
subsidiaries. The subsidiaries include any companies which are acquired or created 
during the policy period.  
 
                                                 
227
 Former directors and officers of companies may still incur liability after they no longer work for the 
insured, for any loss which may have occurred during the period of their employment.  
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Under „director or officer228‟ the policies generally include: 
 
- executive officers: chairperson, CEO, managing director, CFO, in-house 
general counsel;  
- outside director: a position which is held by a director or officer in an outside 
entity
229
 as long as it is at the request of the insured; 
- non-executive directors; 
- de facto and shadow directors; 
- an employee acting in a managerial or supervisory position; 
- an employee that is named as a co-defendant with the insured person; 
- the legal representatives, estate or heirs of the directors and officers: this is in 
the event of insolvency, incapacity or death of the insured person; 
- the spouses of directors and officers.  
 
Defence costs: 
 
This is the portion of the loss which is due to reasonable costs, charges, fees and 
expenses incurred in defending or investigating a claim. This includes premium paid 
for insurance policies in order to institute an appeal.  
 
Policy:  
 
The policy includes the proposal form, the actual policy form, the schedule as well as 
any endorsements.  
 
Subsidiary:  
 
This is an organisation in which the parent company holds a majority of voting rights, 
or has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors, or controls a 
majority of the voting rights as a result of a written agreement with the shareholders.  
 
                                                 
228
 An officer may be defined as any natural person who is employed by the insured in a managerial or 
supervisory position.  
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 This is an entity which is not within the definition of the insured.  
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5.4.4 Exclusions  
 
The exclusions or exceptions of a policy are there to dictate certain occurrences which 
are not covered by the insurance policy. The precise and general exclusions of all 
policies depend on the line of business of the insured, the country/countries in which 
the insured will operate, the market conditions, the reinsurance treaties which apply, 
as well as what the insurance company is willing to cover (Youngman, 1999). 
Depending on the state of the insurance market (whether it is soft or hard) some 
exclusions may be left out, others may be reinstated, whilst others may be deleted for 
an additional premium. Some of the main exclusions will be briefly deliberated. 
 
Breach of copyright or patents: 
 
Breaches of copyrights, patents or trademarks should generally be covered under 
product liability insurance.  
 
Corporate manslaughter: 
 
Corporate manslaughter is becoming more important in the UK with the passing of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007. This area is 
completely untested in the South African insurance industry; however progress will 
probably be made within the next few years.  
 
Damage to property:  
 
It is not the intention of the D&O insurer to cover losses which fall under general 
liability policies. Therefore any loss or damage to material property is excluded for 
the purposes of this type of cover (Youngman, 1999). 
 
Deliberate acts: 
 
These are deliberate breaches of duty or contract by the directors or officers of a 
company (Youngman, 1999). This is sometimes part of the „fraud‟ exclusion.  
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Dishonesty or fraud: 
 
This includes any deliberate fraudulent actor omission or wilful violation.  
 
Employment dispute: 
 
Any claim arising out of an employment related dispute such as wrongful dismissal, 
employment related misrepresentation, discrimination, and harassment, wrongful 
deprivation of a career opportunity or failure to adopt adequate employment policies 
should be covered under employment practices liability (EPL) cover. This type of 
cover may be purchased as an extension to the D&O policy or as a standalone policy.  
 
Illegal personal profits or gains:  
 
Directors are not covered where one has attempted to attain a personal profit to which 
he is not entitled.  
 
Fines:  
 
This relates to fines or penalties which are related to the legal system; this includes 
punitive and exemplary damages. However some insurance policies are stating to 
include cover for certain types of fines as a result of courts overseas being more and 
more willing to implement them.  
 
Inadequate insurance:  
 
This would be as a result of failing to insure company assets correctly. The exclusion 
includes a failure to arrange, maintain or purchase insurance cover. A gap in cover 
may sometimes lead to a claim being brought against the broker who arranged the 
policy as opposed to the director or the underwriters.  
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Insured v insured: 
 
D&O insurance policies exclude claims which are brought by a director against a 
fellow director, or by the company against its directors. This is unless a third party, 
such as a shareholder, brings the action on behalf of the company against the 
directors; this is called a derivative action which is covered by the D&O policy. Class 
actions are also covered by D&O policies; this means that a group of people will 
bring a claim to court collectively. Excluded is also the event in which an outside 
director is sued by an insured person, unless this is referring to a derivative claim.  
 
Known actions: 
 
Insurers do not cover potential claims that are already a certainty. This knowledge 
exclusion applies where there is a pending claim against a policy and a new policy is 
taken out as a renewal or replacement, as well as to knowledge of claims prior to the 
inception of a policy. Often severability is important here as one director may have 
been aware of a loss-causing event whilst the rest of the board may have been 
unaware (Youngman, 1999). 
 
Liability of directors and officers to restore remuneration to which they are not legally 
entitled:  
 
The director or officer has actually not suffered a loss in this case; therefore they are 
required to restore what does not belong to them (Ferreira, 2002).  
 
Libel and slander: 
 
Some policies may automatically include cover for liability incurred as a result of 
libel and slander. If it has been excluded it may be brought back for an additional 
premium.  
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Major shareholder exclusion: 
 
The D&O policy will not respond to claims brought against the insured as a result of a 
wrongful act by a major shareholder. For these purposes a major shareholder is one 
who controls a majority of ordinary shares, or who has the right to appoint or remove 
directors, or who has sole control of the voting rights in the insured company.  
 
Nuclear exclusion: 
 
The D&O insurance policy does not cover any loss which is resultant from nuclear or 
radioactive circumstances.  
 
Pensions:  
 
Any claims resulting from or in any way involving pensions which are established to 
benefit directors, officers or employees are excluded. This may be covered under 
pension trustee policies. Here „pension‟ includes profit sharing, or employee or 
welfare programmes, share options, share incentive schemes and trusts.  
 
Personal guarantees or warrantees: 
 
Cover for personal guarantees and warrantees may be acquired under warranty an 
indemnity policies. However generally cover for warranty of authority is included due 
to the fact that legal obligations involve complex risks (Youngman, 1999). It is 
becoming more common to include cover in general for this exclusion.  
 
Physical or mental injury or damage:  
 
This will include bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, as well as damage to 
property. The policy wording must state that the exclusion applies to claims „for‟ the 
above and not just „arising out of‟ the above. The former includes consequential 
losses and the latter does not.  
 
 
 222 
Pollution, seepage or contamination: 
 
The D&O policy is not intended to cover losses which arise out of, or are attributable 
to, any consequences relating to pollution
230
. However certain policies may allow this 
to a certain extent depending on the directorial responsibilities which are being dealt 
with (Youngman, 1999).  
 
Products liability: 
 
This should be covered by product liability insurance. This may sometimes be left out 
for an additional premium; for example in the event that a product failure causes 
excessive harm to the share price of a company as well as its reputation.  
 
Professional indemnity: 
 
The D&O insurance policy was created in order to protect directors in their capacities 
as such regarding the company; not as professionals. This type of cover may be 
sought under professional liability cover. This exclusion may be deleted for an 
increase in premium.  
 
Questionable payments:  
 
This may be called „commissions and bribes exclusion‟ and includes any payments to 
political parties, the state or consumer groups among others. Unfortunately many of 
these types of payments are actually intended to be brines. This exclusion may 
sometimes be deleted if such is agreed with the insurer.   
 
Retroactive date: 
 
The policy excludes any claims for a wrongful act which occurred prior to the 
retroactive date stated in the schedule. The retroactive date is that from which claims 
                                                 
230
 Pollutants are defined in the Hazardous Substances Act, No 15 of 1973.  
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against the policy will be covered; it does not necessarily have to coincide with the 
date of the policy inception.  
 
War and terrorism exclusion: 
 
The D&O insurance policy does not cover any loss which is resultant from war or 
terrorism. This includes any costs which are incurred in attempting to prevent or 
control any act of war or terrorism. If the insurer alleges that certain costs are not 
covered as a result of this exclusion, the onus lies on the insured to prove that it 
should be covered.  
 
5.4.5 Conditions 
 
Some of the more prominent conditions of the D&O insurance policy will now be 
briefly looked at.  
 
Acquisition of parent company:  
 
This condition applies in the event that the parent (insured0 company either merges 
into or consolidates with another organisation, or another organisation acquires more 
than 50% of the parent company‟s securities representing a right to elect its directors.  
 
The policy will generally continue to cover the insured company but only for 
wrongful acts which occurred prior to the acquisition. All premiums which are still 
due are then considered non-refundable. An extension of cover may be arranged but 
only regarding wrongful acts committed prior to the acquisition and premiums will be 
fully earned by the insurer as soon as such an agreement is made. Obviously any 
additional premiums and conditions must be satisfied by the insured. Any extension 
will be part of the limit of indemnity and not in addition to such.  
 
 
 
 
 224 
Acquisition or creation of another organisation: 
 
In the event that the insured company acquires securities in another company or 
creates another organisation resulting in the new company being a subsidiary, or there 
is a merger or consolidation with another company the policy may respond in 
different ways.  
 
If the acquisition is worth less than 10% of the insured‟s total assets the new company 
is automatically covered under the policy. This is however only applicable to 
wrongful acts committed after the acquisition, unless the insurer and insured can 
agree cover for wrongful acts prior to the acquisition.  
 
In any other case the new acquisition is covered automatically but only for ninety 
days after the acquisition or the remainder of the policy period, whichever is shorter. 
This also only applies to wrongful acts committed after the acquisition. This is called 
automatic cover period. If the insured wants to cover the new acquisition once the 
automatic cover period has ended, an agreement must be reached with the insurance 
company regarding premium or new conditions. Should an agreement not be reached, 
the cover for any new acquisitions will be withdrawn by the insurer.  
 
Action against the insurers: 
 
This condition specifies the circumstances under which legal action may be taken 
against the insurance company. An action may not be brought against the insurers 
unless all the terms of the insurance policy have been complied with. No person has a 
right to join the insurers in an action against the insured and the insurer will not be 
sued in court in response to an earlier pleading by the insured. If the insured becomes 
insolvent or is liquidated, the insurance company is not relieved of its obligations 
towards the insured under the policy.  
 
Advancement of costs:  
 
The insurance company will advance defence costs on behalf of the insured before a  
claim is settled, on condition that if it is later established that those costs were actually 
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not due regarding the insurance policy, that the insured will repay those costs to the 
insurer. The advancement of defence costs also decreases the limit of indemnity.  
 
Allocation:  
 
This condition is necessary in order to decide how much cover will protect the insured 
company and how much cover will protect the directors and officers of the insured 
company. This is important for claim settlements and payments as well as regarding 
defence costs (Youngman, 1999). Allocation problems in D&O generally arise in 
three circumstances (Ferreira, 2002):  
 
- some person are covered, whilst others are not; 
- some claims are covered whilst others are not; and 
- there are issues regarding the insured and uninsured capacity.  
 
Allocation is generally determined in good faith between the insurance company and 
the insured. The allocation issue has been dealt with in several ways (Ferreira, 2002):  
 
- „Best efforts‟ allocation: the insurer and the insured will use their best efforts 
to reach an equitable allocation;  
- Allocation alternative dispute resolution provisions: any disputes regarding 
allocation will be deliberated using alternative dispute resolution; and 
- Predetermined allocation: a predetermined allocation of defence costs and 
predetermined allocation of indemnity losses provision is developed.  
 
Sometimes the insured company will be a defendant in a claim against a director or 
officer. This leads to a problem of what defence costs will go where? This may be 
dealt with by agreeing an extension to the cover which states a predetermined 
allocation. This generally means the 70% of the claim is payable by the insurer and 
30% by the insured company.  
 
Generally in South Africa allocation is either negotiated between the insurer and the 
insured, arbitrated, or judicially determined.  
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Alteration and assignment:  
 
Any alteration to the policy is not effective unless it is made by a written endorsement 
which is signed by an authorised representative of the insurance company.  
 
Annual basis: 
 
Generally D&O insurance policies are annual. It depends on the respective insurance 
company whether or not a new proposal is required prior to each annual renewal. 
Some insurance companies will accept a declaration of information, which states that 
the no new relevant information exists, and if such should come up, the insurers will 
be infirmed.  
 
Authorisation clause:  
 
This condition states that the parent company will act on behalf of the insured persons 
with respect to the maintenance of insurance, such as payment of premiums and that 
the insured persons acknowledge the fact that the parent company will act on their 
behalf.  
 
 
Cessation of subsidiaries: 
 
A company may detach from a subsidiary during the policy period. In that event the 
cover will continue but only for wrongful acts committed prior to the date on which 
the subsidiary ceased to be as such.  
 
Claims made basis:  
 
D&O insurance policies are offered on a „claims made‟ basis. A „claims made‟ policy 
will respond to claims notified to the insurer during the period of the policy. This is 
irrespective of when the wrongful act leading to the loss actually took place. This only 
applies to wrongful acts which took place on or after the retroactive inception date.  
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This cover differs from that of the „losses occurring‟ basis. „Losses occurring‟ implies 
that the insurance policy covers claims which arise out of a wrongful act which 
occurred during the policy period. This is regardless of when the claim is made by the 
insured. All liability policies are either written on a „claims made‟ or „losses 
occurring‟ basis.   
 
Defence and settlement of claims:  
 
This condition relates to the manner in which claims against the insured will be 
defended or settled. Whilst it is the duty of the insured to defend any claims, no 
settlement may be carried out without the consent of the insurance company. The 
insurer also reserves the right to participate in the selection of the defence attorney, 
the creation of a defence strategy, and the settlement negotiations. The insured must 
not prejudice the insurance company in any way regarding the settlement of a claim. 
At any point the insurers may settle a claim for a monetary amount with the consent 
of the insured. The insured may not unreasonably withhold consent in such a case.  
 
Indemnification: 
 
In the event that the insured company will not indemnify an insured for a loss, the 
insurer will advance defence costs or payment for the loss as required by the Side B 
insuring agreement.  
 
Jurisdiction: 
 
This condition states what laws will apply to any disputes and claims which arise in 
connection with the policy. Insurance companies always want the laws of the state in 
which they are present to apply even if the wrongful act occurs overseas where the 
parent company may be undertaking business. This is in order to avoid foreign and 
unknown legislation applying to the insurance policy.  
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Limit of indemnity: 
 
The limit of indemnity is the maximum amount which the insurance company will be 
liable to pay under each policy. This includes all legal and other expenses and costs. 
All claims which arise out of the same wrongful act are deemed to be one claim. The 
limit of indemnity applies after the excess has been paid by the insured. If a claim will 
be covered in part under Side A and in part by Side B, the limit will first apply to Side 
B. The discovery period option (if exercised) does not increase or reinstate the limit of 
indemnity; it becomes a part of that limit.  
 
Notification of claims:  
 
The insured must inform the insurance company as soon as possible (no later than 
thirty days) of a possible claim, or as soon as the insured is aware of any 
circumstances which could potentially lead to a claim. The insured is also required to 
cooperate with, and supply the insurer with all the necessary information regarding a 
claim.  
 
Other insurance:  
 
In the event that the insured company is insured under another policy, the current 
policy will only cover the insured in excess of what the other insurance has covered. 
This is only the case unless the other insurance policy is specifically taken out as an 
excess insurance policy. This can often cause problems as to which insurance policy 
will apply first, however it is customary to ask the insured before the policy is bought 
if any other policy is already in place.  
 
Representations and severability: 
 
This condition refers to representations made by the insured to the insurance company 
in the proposal form. If the representations are not true, cover will not be afforded to 
any person who knew of the actual facts, as well as the company under Side B cover 
for indemnification of any person who knew of the actual facts.  
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Severability of exceptions:  
 
This gives the insurance company the right to assume that the director or officer who 
signs the policy or administers it, is aware of all the possible claims known to the 
other directors and officers covered (Youngman, 1999). It may be unjust in some 
circumstances to withdraw cover from one director if that director was not aware of 
certain facts. For example if another director was intentionally withholding relevant 
information. This condition applies to severability when attempting to apply 
exclusions. No knowledge possessed by one insured is imputed on to another insured 
for the purposes of applying exclusions unless the person who possessed the 
knowledge in an executive officer.  
 
Subrogation:
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This condition requires that the insured shall assist the insurance company in seeing 
out any subrogation rights which may be acquired as a result of indemnification.  
 
Termination of policy: 
 
The D&O insurance policy will terminate at any of the following times:  
 
- at a date specified by the parent company in a prior written notice to the 
insurance company; 
- when the period of insurance stated in the schedule expires; 
- ten days after receipt by the parent company of a written notice of termination 
from the insurer as a result of failure to pay premiums; 
- at any time as agreed by the insurer and the parent company.  
 
Territory:  
 
This condition states that wrongful acts on the part of the insured will only be covered 
in certain locations around the world where the insured has business operations. South 
                                                 
231
 Subrogation refers to the right of one party who has paid for the loss of a second party to be 
compensated from a third party who is responsible for the loss.  
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African policies will exclude the US and Canada as well as any of their territories. 
This is as a result of the high-risk profile of these countries.  
 
5.4.6 Extensions 
 
This section will briefly look some of the more important D&O insurance policy 
extensions.  
 
Company securities:  
 
The insurance company will indemnify the insured for any securities claim which is 
resultant from a wrongful act committed or alleged to have been committed by an 
insured person.  
 
Discovery period:  
 
This extension provides that if the D&O policy is not renewed by either the insured or 
the insurer, or the parent company terminates the policy, an extension period will be 
provided for a certain amount of time; twelve months for example. The cover will 
only apply to wrongful acts committed prior to the commencement of the extension 
but the claim will be deemed to have been made during the policy period. The reason 
for this extension is that claims in D&O can take a long time to surface and cover 
might only be needed a long time after a wrongful act has taken place (Youngman, 
1999). This will be useful in cases involving fraud where one of the insured directors 
had no knowledge of the event and a claim only arises sometime after the expiry of 
the policy.  
 
Estates and legal representatives:  
 
This extension covers claims for wrongful acts against the estates, heirs, legal 
representatives or assigns of the insured in the event that the insured is deceased, 
incompetent, insolvent or liquidated.  
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Outside director liability extension:  
 
This extension to outside directors will apply provided that: 
 
- the cover does not extend to the outside organisation; 
- the cover is in excess of any cover that the outside organisation has for these 
directors;  
- the amount payable under this policy will be reduced by any amount payable 
by other liability policies taken out by the outside organisation;  
- the cover does not apply to claims brought by the directors or officers of the 
outside organisation, unless it is a derivative action, or defence costs regarding 
such a claim; and  
- the cover does not apply to wrongful acts committed after the insured has 
stopped performing as an outside director.  
 
Pollution defence costs: 
 
Defence costs for claims involving pollution are provided, however if the claimant is 
successful, cover will not be provided for the loss incurred.  
 
Public Finance Management Act: 
 
This extension only applies in South Africa and the insured person will then be 
deemed to include the accounting officer and the accounting authority as defined in 
Sections 36 and 49 respectively of the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 
1999.  
 
Reinstatement of limit of indemnity: 
 
The reinstatement of the limit of indemnity will kick in once the current limit has 
been depleted during the policy period. It must be borne in mind that the 
reinstatement will only apply to claims made after the reinstatement. In other words, 
if the current limit is depleted for a certain claim, the insurer will not be liable to 
indemnify the insured for the rest of that claim even if a reinstatement has been 
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included in the policy. The reinstatement will apply to the next claim against the 
insured company or person.  
 
Shareholder derivative actions: 
 
Cover is provided for losses to the insured resulting from shareholder derivative 
actions.  
 
Spousal liability: 
 
This extension will cover the spouse of the insured as a result of the spouse‟s legal 
connection to the insured and the spouse‟s ownership interest in the assets of the 
insured. This does not cover wrongful acts committed by the spouse; it protects the 
assets of the spouse in the event that a claimant will have an interest in the assets of 
the insured.  
 
This is a peculiar extension for the simple reason that a claimant will only need to 
access the insured‟s personal assets in the event that:  
 
- the parent company cannot indemnify the insure; and 
- the D&O policy has either run out or cannot respond.  
 
If the D&O policy does cannot cover the insured it will not be able to cover the 
spouse either.  
 
VAT exclusive: 
 
The limit of indemnity is VAT-exclusive. This extension provides that the insurers 
will indemnify the insured in excess of the limit of indemnity for any VAT 
requirement which may be incurred out of a claims settlement. 
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5.5 D&O literature 
 
This section is divided into two: the first part looks at the impact of D&O insurance 
on corporate governance, whilst the second part looks at the corporate demand for 
D&O insurance. The aim is to briefly cover a large amount of D&O literature in order 
to discover what other uses D&O insurance has for the corporate world.  
 
5.5.1 The influence of D&O insurance on corporate governance  
 
Some literature is available which studies the impact of D&O insurance on corporate 
governance, as well as how to actually utilise D&O insurance in order to increase the 
governance standards of companies. Alles et al (2006) states that D&O insurance 
companies can reduce the governance risk faced by their clients by linking coverage 
to contractual requirements to follow best corporate governance practices.  
 
The insurance industry helped to establish many safety regulations which have now 
become standard practice in society. Some examples are seat belts in cars and smoke 
detectors in buildings (Alles et al, 2006). The most common means of controlling and 
disciplining directors has thus far been regulation and the legal system. This is in line 
with the mitigating steps discussed in this dissertation; corporate governance and 
legislation. These mitigating steps are generally enforced by the courts. It seems that 
investors seek to diversify their portfolios by purchasing small shares in many 
companies. This generally results in little interest in the governance methods of any 
one company; however the losses of a corporate collapse are still costly to society. 
The problem with corporate governance codes is that directors often have no incentive 
to carry out the requirements, as well as the fact that directors may not possess the 
necessary means to carry out the governance requirements of a company.  
 
Litigation may also be used as a method of ensuring that directors carry out their 
functions correctly. However it is often difficult to find a correct balance between 
placing a director‟s personal assets at risk, and providing protection for that director 
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so that a required level of risk is taken in order for a business to be profitable (Alles et 
al, 2006). This leads to tensions between motivating and controlling directors. Alles et 
al (2006) suggests that one may create market-based governance by combining the 
extent of D&O cover with the extent of care carried out by directors into one 
mechanism.  
 
It is possible that being covered by D&O insurance may lead a director to take less 
care; this is the moral hazard problem. However this has been taken care of by the 
insurance industry by making cover and premiums dependent on the insured‟s effort 
to mitigate moral hazard; for example persons that do not smoke will get lower health 
insurance premiums (Alles et al, 2006).  
 
Therefore Alles et al (2006) suggest that governance-linked D&O insurance may 
oblige directors contractually to comply with corporate governance standards in return 
for higher coverage and lower premiums. Directors will be provided with the means 
to apply the best corporate governance techniques, whilst insurers will then be able to 
provide more comprehensive coverage. This will require an ex-post system of control 
by insurance companies where governance standards are used in order to determine 
premiums and cover after the signing of the insurance contract. It is different to the 
ex-ante controls that are used in underwriting which uses past behaviour as a 
determinant of future claims. This may however be extremely risky as was the case of 
Enron: the company seemed to cover all the necessary corporate governance 
requirements even at the time when the losses were discovered. The idea is to provide 
incentives for talented individuals to serve on boards of directors without fear of 
losing personal assets. Increasing litigation may deter non-executive directors from 
serving on certain boards, which may become problematic in South Africa. Basing 
cover and premiums on corporate governance standards may be a good way to 
increase the extent of coverage whilst also decreasing risk (Alles et al, 2006). 
 
A similar, but more specific approach is taken in Huskins (2006). The paper suggests 
that D&O insurers should reward insureds that follow best corporate governance 
practices by offering D&O policies that are non-rescindable. The idea is that this will 
decrease corporate failures and therefore the risk of litigation against directors and 
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officers. As a result of a reduction in claims, the well-governed companies may 
receive lower premiums on their D&O policies.  
 
When a D&O insurer offers a policy to a company, the insurer will require 
information regarding that company‟s risk profile. The single application and policy 
covers multiple individuals; therefore the person who eventually signs the policy, 
does so on behalf of all those insured. Any relevant and material knowledge must be 
presented to the insurance company. If the information provided is incorrect in certain 
manners, the insurer can then rescind, or cancel the cover. This is because the D&O 
insurer may have wanted to charge a different premium with the true facts in hand, or 
may have declined cover completely (Huskins, 2006). 
 
Insurance companies deal with this by declaring that some of the policy is non-
rescindable. This does not always the directors as the non-rescindable part of the 
policy is generally the lower risk portion. Another way in which insurance companies 
deal with the knowledge which is provided during the application for a D&O policy is 
with a severability clause. The persons who had actual knowledge of relevant matters 
on application for the D&O policy and withheld this information are severed out of 
cover. In other words, those persons will not be covered whilst the rest of the innocent 
directors and officers are still covered by the policy (Huskins, 2006).  
 
The fact that severability and rescission are based on the knowledge which is 
possessed by directors and officers may lead to parallel incentives for the directors of 
a company. If less knowledge leads to greater protection, the directors that take part to 
a great extent in a company‟s affairs may get penalised, whilst those that are less 
involved reap the benefits. Another problem for the insured is that policies with less 
rescindability may only be available in times when the insurance market is soft – 
when the market hardens this option may not be available (Huskins, 2006). 
 
Therefore Huskins (2006) suggests that cover should be based on the governance 
standards of individual companies. Processes must be in place for directors to keep a 
check on how management is running the company. The company may be required to 
pass a „governance test‟ which will lead to a scrapping of the insurer‟s right to rescind 
the policy. This type of D&O cover may provide directors with an incentive to utilise 
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good corporate governance techniques, in exchange for non-rescindability, which will 
induce more qualified persons to serve on the board of directors of companies without 
the fear of personal liability (Huskins, 2006).  
 
O‟Sullivan (1997) empirically tests the monitoring hypothesis by exploring the link 
between board composition, managerial ownership, external shareholder control and 
the purchase of D&O insurance. The monitoring hypothesis states that the need for 
D&O insurance will increase as the cost of other methods of motivating managers 
increase. In that manner, as the demand for monitoring increases, the use of D&O 
insurance should also increase (O‟Sullivan, 1997). The study was performed on a 
sample of 366 companies in the UK.  
 
It was found that smaller companies use internal and external ownership to monitor 
managers. However larger companies are more likely to use non-executive directors 
and D&O insurance to monitor managers. This is probably due to the fact that eternal 
monitoring becomes more expensive. The results of the paper support the monitoring 
hypothesis. This confirmed the monitoring hypothesis provided in Holderness (1990) 
which suggests that D&O insurance may itself be used as a means of governing 
companies.  
 
Core (2000) utilises a sample of D&O premiums attained from the proxy statements 
of Canadian companies in order to study D&O premium as a determinate of ex-ante 
litigation risk. The paper discovers a significant connection between D&O premiums 
and the value the companies‟ governance standards. Core (2000) also finds that D&O 
insurers charge higher premiums when companies have governance procedures which 
make shareholders worse off.  
 
From the literature provided one may conclude that:  
 
- D&O insurance may be used to drive good standards of corporate governance; 
- D&O insurance itself may be used as a method of company governance;  
- D&O insurance may use a company‟s standards of corporate governance in 
order to provide better coverage; and  
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- D&O insurance premiums are a good indicator of a company‟s level of 
corporate governance.  
 
5.5.2 The corporate demand for D&O insurance  
 
Mayers and Smith (1982) looked to explain the corporate demand for insurance. It 
was generally thought that the main reason for the purchase of D&O insurance was 
risk aversion; directors are concerned that their personal assets will be taken away in 
order to cover losses to the company or to third parties. However Mayers and Smith 
(1982) attempted to explain the purchase of insurance from a finance point of view. 
The first studies done were merely theoretical and generally concluded that private 
companies are more likely to purchase D&O insurance due to the fact that the 
shareholders of public companies can diversify away from the insurable risks by 
holding shares in other companies. This was the proposition put forward in Smith 
(1986). The owners of private companies will demand the purchase of D&O 
insurance if they are risk averse.  
 
Mayers and Smith (1982) found the following reasons for the corporate purchase of 
insurance: first, insurance contracts spread the risk to persons who are more equipped 
to deal with it, such as the insurance company. Second, the expected transaction costs 
of bankruptcy will be lowered. Third, claims administration will be handled more 
efficiently due to the fact that the insurance company will have much experience in 
this regard. Fourth, the insurance contract may require monitoring of the provisions 
which protect a company from loss. Fifth, purchasing insurance contracts can 
guarantee a company‟s investments. Sixth, the company‟s tax liability may be 
lowered as a result of the purchase of insurance. This is because the payment of 
insurance lowers taxable income. Finally, purchasing insurance may lower the 
regulatory limitations on a company.  
 
Mayers and Smith (1990) empirically tested the corporate demand for insurance. This 
had proved difficult until then as a result of the fact that it was extremely difficult to 
acquire data on the purchase of insurance contracts. Therefore the insurance 
industry‟s purchase of insurance was actually tested because insurance companies 
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were required to report their purchase of reinsurance in their annual statements 
(Mayers and Smith, 1990). The sample was made up of 1276 property/casualty 
insurance companies. It was found that ownership structure, size, line of business, 
geographic concentration, and default risk were significant determinants of the 
companies‟ demand for insurance. The most significant determinant was that of 
ownership structure; the less diversified the owners‟ portfolio, the more reinsurance 
was purchased.    
 
Bhagat et al (1987) looked at the effects of D&O insurance on shareholder wealth. 
The idea was that shareholder-manager conflicts had increased with increasing 
numbers of derivative and class action suites; this led to many debates on what the 
role of D&O insurance actually was. An empirical study was performed in order to 
observe the stock returns regarding management proposals to broaden company 
insurance and indemnification. The results showed that D&O insurance may reconcile 
the interests of directors and shareholders. This was contrary to the arguments at the 
time, which stated that D&O insurance may deter directors from acting in the interests 
of shareholders, as a result of the fact that if a loss occurs, the insurer will be required 
to pay for it and not the guilty director.  
 
The empirical examination performed in Bhagat et al showed that the effect of D&O 
insurance on shareholder wealth is positive, and that there is no negative influence on 
shareholder wealth by increasing director indemnification. Therefore the study 
concluded that there is no reason to introduce legislation which seeks to reduce D&O 
insurance and indemnification. It seems that consistent with other literature, other 
market mechanisms will control director behaviour when one is covered by insurance; 
such as the reputation costs of defending a legal claim.  
 
Han (1996) studies the corporate demand for insurance as well as the impact of 
insurance on the effectiveness of managerial performance in business operations and 
risk management. Different managerial compensation systems are compared. It was 
found that insurance has an important function in creating an efficient managerial 
incentive contract which therefore may determine the value of the company (Han, 
1996). Regarding fixed compensation, insurance cover which ensures solvency is 
most favourable. If compensation is based on the company‟s liquidating value, full 
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cover is most advantageous as it allows for dependence on performance 
compensation. If compensation is based on stock price, partial or no cover at all is 
feasible (Han, 1996).  
 
Core (1997) studies the factors which influence a company‟s demand for D&O 
insurance utilising data from a sample of Canadian companies. The paper 
hypothesizes three bases of demand for D&O insurance: first, demand from a risk-
averse outside director; second, demand from an efficient company insurance 
decision; and third, demand resulting from managerial entrenchment. 
 
The first relates to the fact that D&O insurance will protect the non-executive director 
against litigation. If D&O insurance is not made available the director will have to be 
paid more in order to cover that risk-premium. Risk-averse directors will require more 
insurance in order to take up the position in the company. The second relates to the 
company‟s demand for insurance – reimbursement. Companies with a higher distress 
probability are more likely to purchase insurance; this is due to the fact that insurance 
will lower the expected costs of bankruptcy. As in Mayers and Smith (1982), 
companies with higher inside ownership are more likely to purchase insurance 
because of increased risk aversion. The third relates to the managerial entrenchment 
effect; as voting control increases in favour of insiders (managers in this case), the 
needs of outside shareholders are given less importance. Therefore more insurance is 
purchased which will protect the managers themselves (Core, 1997).  
 
The results showed that companies with greater litigation risk and higher distress 
probabilities are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, as well as to purchase 
higher limits of indemnity. Contrary to Mayers and Smith (1982, 1990) it was found 
that companies with high levels of inside ownership are less likely to purchase 
insurance. However companies with low levels of inside ownership and high levels of 
inside control are more likely to purchase insurance and higher limits of indemnity 
(consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis). One must take into account 
that Core (1997) did contain certain caveats; the sample size was small, and the study 
was only done on a particular type of insurance purchased by Canadian companies.  
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Yamori (1999) empirically examined the demand for insurance of non-financial 
companies utilising data from Japanese companies. The sample consisted of 504 
companies that disclosed their insurance premium during the years 1986 and 1987. 
The paper looks at a number of different factors which could affect a company‟s 
demand for insurance; these will be set out with the results of each from Yamori 
(1999).  
 
The first consideration is that of ownership structure; it is generally said that private 
companies with more owner-managers are more likely to purchase insurance than 
public companies, as the owners of private companies can not diversify away from the 
risk of a loss. There was no evidence found that ownership structure significantly 
reflects the purchase of insurance by companies. However certain caveats did exist in 
this finding, such as that all the companies in the sample were actually listed.  
 
The second consideration is that of tax; the payment of insurance premiums is 
deductible from taxable profits (Yamori, 1999). It was found that tax considerations 
are not an important factor in the purchase of insurance by companies. However non-
profit companies do not pay corporate tax, therefore this factor would be less relevant 
for those companies. The sample tested in this paper consisted of companies which 
recorded profits.  
 
The third consideration is that companies with a higher probability of bankruptcy are 
more likely to purchase insurance in order to reduce the expected costs thereof. 
Yamori (1999) does not find any evidence of this consideration. However the 
companies in the sample which was tested performed exceptionally well, therefore the 
shareholders were probably not that concerned with the purchase of insurance.  
 
The fourth consideration is that of the size of the company. Company size may affect 
the purchase of insurance in two ways. Firstly smaller companies may be more 
affected by the potential for bankruptcy. As stated in Mayers and Smith (1990) 
bankruptcy costs are not proportional to the size of the company, therefore a small 
company may suffer more from bankruptcy and, as a result, necessitate the purchase 
of insurance. However in large companies shareholders find it more difficult to 
monitor the managers due to the size and complexity of the company. These agency 
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costs will then require that shareholders purchase insurance in order to monitor the 
managers and provide for a shield from losses (Yamori, 1999). The paper found 
strong evidence in favour of the size of a company affecting the purchase of 
insurance. It was found that small companies will purchase relatively more insurance 
than large companies.  
 
The last consideration was that of regulated industries. Regulated industries are 
thought to demand more insurance due to the fact that regulators use marked-up 
pricing and that less competitive industries act in expense-preference manners 
(Yamori, 1999). The paper found evidence in favour of the hypothesis that more 
regulated companies will demand more insurance.  
 
O‟Sullivan (2002) looked to explain why large public companies in the UK purchase 
D&O insurance. The idea was to reconcile the findings in the paper with three 
motives from previous literature:  
 
- D&O insurance is purchased as part of the corporate insurance programme; 
- D&O insurance is purchased as a result of demand from directors; and 
- D&O insurance is purchased as part of the corporate governance procedures. 
 
The 1989 UK Companies Act required that companies report the existence of 
company-funded D&O policies. The sample was made up of 386 companies from the 
London International Stock Exchange at the end of 1992. The findings of the 
empirical analysis using a univariate analysis and a logit model show support for each 
of the three above reasons for the purchase of D&O insurance.  
 
The possibility of litigation was a major factor in the purchase of D&O insurance; this 
conclusion was drawn because unpredictable share price performance and the 
carrying out of business in the US was mostly related to insured companies. It was 
also found the insured companies are generally larger; this is consistent with director 
and governance demand for insurance. Shareholders of large companies will find it 
difficult to monitor governance standards due to the size and complexity of the 
company. Therefore D&O insurance is purchased so that the insurer can monitor the 
governance standards of the company and so that protection may exist in the event of 
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a loss. The directors of large companies will be more risk averse due to the fact that 
the shareholders of those companies have more value at risk.  
 
Regarding ownership structure, insured companies have lower levels of managerial 
ownership; this is because owner-managers will have the same monitoring objectives 
as the shareholders, therefore monitoring costs will decrease. It could also go the 
other way in that owner-managers can not diversify their risks and will therefore 
require D&O insurance as a governance mechanism. It was also found that companies 
that had more non-executive directors on the board were more likely to purchase 
insurance. Non-executive directors can use D&O insurance in order to monitor the 
company, as well as to use it for protection in the event of incurring liability. This 
shows that the governance demand for D&O insurance is strong (O‟Sullivan, 2002). 
 
Boyer (2003) empirically tested seven different hypotheses based on data from public 
Canadian companies. The aim was to ascertain the corporate demand for D&O 
insurance. The data was available because the Ontario Securities Commission which 
oversaw the Toronto Stock Exchange made it compulsory for public companies to 
disclose information regarding the purchase of D&O insurance policies. The data was 
based on public companies that filed financial information between 1993 and 1998. 
The following will look at the seven different hypotheses tested as well as the results.  
 
The first was the shareholders‟ protection hypothesis; the evidence was strong in 
favour of supposition. As discussed previously, this hypothesis suggests that D&O 
insurance should appeal to shareholders the most. If the directors of a company cannot 
afford to compensate a claimant in the event of a loss, the D&O policy will supply the 
shareholders with the amount of damages. One would expect a positive relationship 
between the company‟s market value of equity and the amount of D&O insurance 
purchased (Boyer, 2003). This relationship was found in the paper.  
 
The second was that of the compensation package hypothesis; strong evidence was 
also found for this assumption. The idea is that D&O insurance may serve as a 
substitute for directors‟ compensation. Therefore there should be a negative 
relationship between the amount of compensation that a director receives and the 
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amount of D&O insurance purchased. This trend was found in Boyer (2003) and is 
consistent with Core (1997).  
 
The third hypothesis tested was the risk aversion hypothesis; the paper found no 
evidence of this inference in the empirical study. There was no link found between the 
proportion of independent directors serving on the boards of companies and a higher 
amount of D&O insurance. Once again no evidence is found which could lead one to 
believe that the more risk averse a director is, the more D&O insurance is demanded.  
 
The fourth hypothesis is the financial distress hypothesis; the paper found weak 
evidence in favour of this suggestion. A high-risk company, or one that is in financial 
distress, would be expected to purchase more D&O insurance as it would require 
more protection. However Boyer (2003) finds only weak evidence to support this 
concept.  
 
The fifth hypothesis is the monitoring hypothesis; Boyer (2003) finds weak evidence 
to support this suggestion. The insurance company could provide monitoring and 
other services to the insured in order to assist in monitoring the systems of corporate 
governance of the company. One would expect a negative relationship between the 
amount of D&O insurance purchased by a company and other methods of company 
monitoring. Only weak evidence was found of this hypothesis which is supported by 
Holderness (1990), O‟Sullivan (1997) and Core (2000).  
 
The sixth hypothesis is the managerial signalling hypothesis; Boyer (2003) finds 
strong evidence in favour of this concept. The idea is that directors will use the 
amount of insurance purchased to signal their level of skill. Boyer (2003) discusses 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and the concept of adverse selection. If only two types 
of directors exist – good and bad – (relating to the level of skill and therefore risk) the 
good director will require less protection and therefore purchase less insurance. 
Therefore a good director will purchase less insurance in order to show his or her 
higher level of quality
232
. Therefore if managerial signalling is more important at a 
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 Boyer (2003) states that managerial signalling is normally carried out by purchasing higher 
deductibles rather than lesser limits of indemnity.   
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company, less insurance should be purchased; the paper found this relationship to 
exist.  
 
The last hypothesis tested is the entrenchment hypothesis; the evidence in the paper 
was mixed in this regard. Managerial entrenchment has been described as the level of 
influence that managers have on the board of directors (Boyer, 2003). Therefore 
insiders will utilise their control over the board in order to more D&O insurance for 
protection. This is in line with Core (1997) and Chalmers et al (2002). One would 
assume that the more influence managers have over the board of directors, the more 
D&O insurance would be purchased by a company. Boyer (2003) found mixed 
evidence in this regard.  
 
It must be borne in mind that some of the aspects of the corporate demand for 
insurance apply more to the US than South Africa. Take for example the monitoring 
hypothesis – this is deeply connected to the notion that insurance companies may 
assist in improving the corporate governance standards of their insureds. Whilst in the 
US insurance companies do have the tendency to assist their insureds in the running 
of their business and adjust premiums accordingly, this is not necessarily the case in 
the UK; South Africa follows more closely the UK approach. In South Africa the 
D&O insurance company will not dictate to the insured how to run the business 
safely; the insurer will set a premium according to how the company runs its own 
operations. Either that or perhaps deny cover altogether. South African D&O 
insurance companies will therefore examine the risk of a potential applicant, and 
decide whether or not to cover that specific risk and what premium price tag to put on 
it. Local insurance companies will not take on the additional responsibility and cost of 
advising the applicant on how the business should be carried out.  
 
A more negative approach to the need for D&O insurance was taken by Baxter 
(1995); it is claimed that D&O insurance only provides protection in a limited number 
of circumstances and even then, liability could be dealt with by other means. The one 
instance, in which the paper claims that D&O insurance is actually useful, is in the 
event that the company for which the defendant director serves goes insolvent. If a 
third party has a claim against a director and the company which the director serves is 
insolvent, then D&O insurance will be valuable. The paper states that in most other 
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cases, is a third party has a claim against a director, that third party would rather claim 
against the director‟s company as it is more likely to have more funds available. This 
is debatable in this day and age when the according to the Tillinghast 2008 D&O 
Liability Survey, „other‟ third party claims made up 14% of total claims against 
directors; this excludes shareholders, competitors and employees. Baxter (1995) 
offers some other explanations for why D&O insurance actually exists. These will 
now be summarised briefly Baxter (1995):  
 
- US legislation, at the time when D&O insurance originated, made it difficult 
for companies to pay for the indemnification of directors and officers. Laws 
were then introduced to allow for indemnification and companies decided to 
take out more insurance in order to make certain that they could meet those 
indemnities. This was also the case in the UK and South Africa until their 
respective company legislation was altered.  
- Insured persons become attractive defendants; the advertised need for 
insurance makes it harder for people not to be insured. All claimants know that 
if insurance is available, they are likely to be granted more, or more likely to 
be granted, compensation for a loss. In fact that is not actually the case but that 
is the state of mind of most potential claimants.  
- The paper then states that D&O insurance may not necessarily be used as a 
tool for monitoring; at least in the UK. The fact that public companies have to 
state whether they have purchased D&O insurance will not mean that 
shareholders will be able to monitor directors through the insurance company. 
To the contrary, potential claimants will be made aware of the availability of 
insurance and will theoretically be more inclined to sue.  
- D&O insurance has also been regarded as a means to spread a loss; funds may 
thus be available for injured third parties. The paper states that this is however 
only useful when the company for which the director serves has become 
insolvent. Once again, the fact that more funds are available may lead to an 
increased number of claims. It may not be much of a concern that associates 
sue each other if there is an insurance company that will ultimately bear the 
cost.  
- The last motive for the spread of D&O insurance according to the paper is the 
experiences of the US. The hard market of the 1980s led to a situation in 
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which many companies were being denied cover. Society in the US is also 
generally more litigious than in the UK. The lack of cover during the mid-
1980s hard market led to companies either holding money in a trust in order to 
cover directors, or to the use of captive insurance companies. 
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6 INDUSTRY EXPERT ANALYSIS 
 
The final chapter will assess the views of this dissertation against those of industry 
experts. It is not possible to attain data on the effects of corporate governance codes 
and the new Act on D&O liability insurance. This is due to the fact that no actual data 
is available and the new Companies Act has not been passed yet. It is however 
feasible to make certain assumptions and forecasts by utilising previous literature and 
certain reports as this dissertation has done. The next logical step is to assess the 
opinion of this dissertation against those of industry experts. Using the opinions of 
experts is probably the best and only way to create a view of what might occur in the 
future when there is a lack of actual data available. In this manner, the insurance 
industry will also be informed as to what the general consensus is regarding the 
effects of corporate governance codes and the new South African Companies Act 
from within itself.  
 
The industry expert analysis will be performed in two ways: first a Delphi Technique 
study will be performed in order to acquire the views of experts in the field of D&O 
liability insurance, corporate governance, and director liability. The second method 
will be to perform face-to-face and online interviews with the experts in order to make 
the study more robust. This will make the study more robust in two ways: firstly the 
opinions received by the Delphi Technique will be assessed and therefore so will 
those of the dissertation itself. It is true that the more methods that are used to find the 
same answer, the more accurate that answer will be (this is especially important due 
to the fact that no actual data was available for this study). The second reason why the 
interviews will make the study more robust is that the rationale as to why certain 
conclusions were reached by the dissertation and the industry experts will be 
discovered. This is perhaps a shortcoming of multiple choice questions; the reasons 
behind the answers are often hidden.  
 
The total sample size of this study was of thirty industry experts. This may seem like 
a minimum amount; however in South Africa this number actually more than covers 
the entire D&O expert industry. The experts will range: D&O liability insurance 
experts will be made up of underwriters and brokers from various companies, legal 
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experts, and experts in corporate governance. All thirty participants took part in the 
Delphi Technique study, whilst of those twenty took part in the interviews. The lower 
number of participants being interviewed was consequent to the time constraints, 
which are faced by the industry.  
 
This chapter is set out in the following way: the first section sets out the Delphi 
Technique study, the experts‟ answers and the assessment of those answers. The 
second section will look at the interviews, the experts‟ answers as well as an 
assessment of those answers.  
 
6.1 Delphi Technique study 
 
The Delphi Technique study was performed in order to attain actual data from a 
situation in which no figures were actually available. The Delphi Technique is utilised 
in order to forecast certain events for which limited information is available. Thus one 
is required to use intuition as well as the opinions of experts. The procedure of the 
study is structured in order to accumulate and refine knowledge from a group of 
experts. This is done by making use of a series of questionnaires combined with 
controlled opinion feedback.  
 
Methodology: 
 
A sample size of thirty industry experts was selected. The knowledge base of the 
experts ranged between underwriters, brokers, legal experts, and experts in corporate 
governance. A list of the names of the participants in the study may be viewed under 
Appendix 4.  
 
The experts received an explanatory email which contained instructions with regards 
to the study and what was required of them. The email contained a list of twenty-four 
questions which had to be answered by the experts. The questions were actually 
statements which would have to be rated by the experts on a scale:  
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1 = Highly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Highly Disagree              
 
The experts were asked to tick the boxes which reflected their informed opinion and 
once the questionnaire was completed it would be emailed back for assessment. The 
results of the first round of questioning may be viewed under Appendix 3. The results 
of the first round of questions were then sent back to the experts for consideration. 
The participants‟ answers were kept anonymous. Once the results had been taken into 
consideration by the participants, they were then asked to answer the questions again 
and email them back for assessment. The results of the second round of questioning 
may also be viewed under Appendix 3.  
 
It was then determined that a third round of questioning would be redundant. This is 
due to the fact that there was no significant alteration in the experts‟ answers between 
the first and second round of questionnaires.  
 
Utilising the data gathered from the experts by means of the Delphi Technique it was 
then possible to create a forecast and make certain assumptions with respect to the 
effects of corporate governance codes and the new South African Companies Act on 
D&O liability insurance. An assessment of the results will now be undertaken; the 
following section has been divided up into three sub-parts: director liability, effects on 
the insurance industry/policy wording, and effects on directors. These three sub-
sections will now be looked at in turn. Under each sub-section the specific questions 
which are applicable will be analysed with respect to the results obtained in the study.  
 
In order to create a better understanding of the Results Tables the following 
explanation is provided:  
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Descriptions:  
 
- AGREE denotes the summation of „Highly Agree‟ and „Agree‟.  
- DISAGREE denotes the summation of „Highly Disagree‟ and „Disagree‟.   
- Green block represents significance of > 50%.  
- „Mean‟ refers to the average answer selected; a mean of „1.5‟ indicates that the 
average answer lies halfway between „1‟ and „2‟.   
- „Percentages‟ refers to the percent of selected answers under „Agree‟, 
„Neutral‟ and „Disagree‟.  
- „Highest Percentage‟ refers to the answer which was selected mostly per 
question, as well as the percentage of selection of that answer. 
 
6.1.1 Director liability 
 
The scope of this section is as the title suggests; looking at director liability. The first 
two statements of the questionnaire were designed to correlate with Chapters One and 
Two of the dissertation. The aim is to investigate whether or not the expert 
participants believe that director liability has increased due to the doctrinal and 
complexity issues.  
 
The rest of the statements contained in this section of the questionnaire are aimed at 
exploring what the experts believe have been the effects of the various corporate 
governance codes, as well as what the effects will be of the new South African 
Companies Act, on director liability. These statements relate to Chapters Three and 
Four of the dissertation.  
 
1) Director liability has increased as a result of the courts and society being 
more willing to hold directors accountable. 
 
The first Statement received a 100% AGREE result; this was the case with respect to 
the first and second round of questioning. In fact there was no change in answers 
between the first and second round at in the first statement. The results were split ten 
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to twenty between Highly Agree and Agree respectively. The Agree option was 
therefore selected by 66.7% of the participants. The resultant mean was 1.67.  
 
This is a highly significant result with regards to the first inquiry of the dissertation; 
whether doctrinal issues have led to an increase in director liability. In-line with the 
conclusions of the dissertation, the Delphi Technique study found that director 
liability has in fact increased as a result of the courts and society being more willing 
to hold directors accountable for their actions or inactions. It is important to note that 
100% of the legal experts involved in the study opted for the Highly Agree answer. 
This is relevant due to the fact that one would expect the legal experts to have more 
insight into any changes in director liability which may have occurred.  
 
Possible explanations for this polarised result would be as per the dissertation: the 
expansion of the law of delict to include pure economic losses, the role of the media 
in bringing director accountability to the attention of the public, the awareness which 
resulted from the worldwide corporate scandals, and the changing perceptions of the 
roles of directors within a company (in that expectations have increased with 
accountability). It is beyond the scope of this sub-section to delve into explanations 
with respect to the increase in director liability as this has been covered elsewhere. 
However it is important to note that according to the participating experts, director 
liability has increased as a result of the doctrinal issues, which is in concurrence with 
one of the fundamental assertions made by the dissertation.  
 
2) Director liability has increased as a result of the increasing complexity of the 
modern economic world. 
 
The second Statement also received a 100% AGREE result with a mean of 1.67; this 
being a crucial substantiation that the notion which the dissertation is based on 
(increasing director liability) is widely held by industry experts. The result was 
actually identical to the first Statement in that twenty participants selected Agree, 
whilst the remaining ten opted for Highly Agree. The only change that took place 
between the first and second round of answers was that one person switched from 
Neutral to Agree.  
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This result is not surprising in the context of the current state of the world economy. 
The global financial markets are experiencing one of the most severe crises ever 
known, which is leading to significant company losses all over the world. Such is the 
complexity of the modern economic world that almost no country has been left 
unaffected. This together with the doctrinal issues raised earlier has led to a certain 
degree of criticism of company directors. Mervyn King stated, at the first presentation 
of the South African King Report on Corporate Governance of 2010 (King 3), that a 
lack of good corporate governance was a key issue in the causation of the financial 
crisis. This is according to Business Day on the 26/02/2009 – Professor King believes 
that good governance is meant to be about directors controlling companies in the best 
interests of its shareholders; however the subprime crisis is evidence of poor 
implementation and conflicts of interest.  
 
It is thus undeniable that doctrinal and complexity issues are concurrently resulting in 
increasing director liability. 
 
3) The various corporate governance codes around the world have had the effect 
of reducing or containing claims against directors. 
 
The results show that the expert participants do not believe that corporate governance 
codes have reduced claims against directors. The response was 86.67% DISAGREE, 
which was an increase from 76.67 DISAGREE in the first round of questioning. This 
was as a result of three Neutrals shifting to Disagree, whilst one Neutral shifted to 
Agree. It may be worthwhile pointing out that none of the experts opted for the 
Highly Agree option in either round. The mean of the second round was 3.97. The 
most selected answer was Highly Disagree with 21 selections or 70%.  
 
It is generally expected that as the participants of such questionnaires progress 
through consecutive rounds, that Neutral answers tend to migrate towards the 
extremes. It was difficult to extract a pattern with respect to the Neutrals in Statement 
3 due to the fact that they varied between brokers and underwriters. Perhaps this is 
expected as none of the legal or corporate governance experts selected the Neutral 
option. This is probably due to the fact that such experts are more knowledgeable with 
regards to corporate governance codes and are therefore more likely to form a 
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stronger opinion. One must bear in mind that this question required some insight into 
aspects of corporate governance – or perhaps into D&O claims experiences from 
around the world. South Africa, possessing a lack of case law as well as claims 
experience in the field of director liability, was always likely to produce experts that 
may tend to answer this specific Statement as Neutral.   
 
The most important discovery of Statement 3 however is that the experts concurred 
with the conclusion of the dissertation; the various corporate governance codes 
around the world are unlikely to have contained or decreased claims against directors. 
This is perhaps where a double-edged sword effect may come into play; whilst 
corporate governance codes may provide controls they also establish certain duties 
and expectations with respect to company directors. Corporate governance codes also 
lead to public awareness of what is expected of directors and what may be done as a 
consequence of non-compliance. The more spectacular codes (such as the Cadbury 
Code in the UK) were also reactive to corporate failures. The public is then generally 
more inclined to look to claim against directors when a corporate failure occurs. It is 
possible that the potential double-effect of corporate governance codes on director 
liability could be another reason for the amount of Neutral responses received. 
 
More importantly however, another fundamental assumption of the dissertation was 
enforced by the industry experts; the various corporate governance codes have not 
been successful as a mitigating step in reducing corporate failures and claims against 
directors. It is now time to move on to the second mitigating step; that of legislation 
or more specifically, the forthcoming South African Companies Act.   
 
4) The new Act will result in fewer claims against directors. 
 
Statement 4 is essentially the most fundamental one of the Delphi Technique 
questionnaire; this is due to the fact that one may now assess whether, according to 
the industry experts, the second mitigating step of legislation will be successful in 
decreasing claims against directors.  
 
This Statement was a success in accordance with the assumptions made in the 
dissertation; 96.67% of the participants responded according to the DISAGREE 
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options. The corresponding Mean was 4.43 with the highest amount of answers being 
located under the Highly Disagree option of 50% or 15 of the participants. The 
Disagree option was selected by fourteen of the experts. The results were so concrete, 
in fact, that there was no alteration in the response to this Statement between the first 
and second round of answers.  
 
With respect to the Disagree option, fourteen of the respondents selected it as an 
answer, whilst only one opted for Agree. The single participant that selected the 
Agree option was not a legal expert; this is only relevant due to the fact that it would 
be necessary to inquire further into this opinion had it come from one of the major 
legal authorities who took part in this dissertation.  
 
The reasoning behind the manner in which this Statement was responded to is 
assumed to be comparable to that provided in the dissertation. It may be the definition 
of „Knowledge‟ and its derivatives as provided in the Companies Bill; the fact that a 
negligent director will be presumed to have actual knowledge of the situation which 
may lead to a loss.  
 
An increase in potential liability could also be resultant from the future legislation of 
director‟s conduct; in that directors‟ common law duties will now be stated in 
legislature. One could look to the fact that class action suites will now be introduced 
into South African law as a result of the passing of the Companies Bill into law.  
 
Directors‟ personal liability may also potentially increase as a result of stakeholders 
utilising derivative actions as remedies. The dissertation inquired into this source of 
potential claims under Chapter 4; however this may now be reinforced by the results 
on Statement 4 as well as a recently published article in Business Day on 05/03/2009 
entitled “New law will put company directors in firing line”. This article sought the 
opinion of Carl Stein of Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys. In this article Mr. Stein spoke 
the new “enormous” exposure which will be faced by company directors as a result of 
the passing of the new Companies Act.  
 
Mr. Stein is of the opinion that South Africa is following overseas trends (especially 
US and UK) towards increased shareholder activism, which has resulted in the 
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simplification of initiating and successfully completing a derivative action. Derivative 
actions will pose an increased threat to company directors for three key reasons 
according to this article:  
 
- The range of parties who will behave the ability to initiate a derivative action 
will widen. Some examples may be a registered trade union or any person who 
is granted permission by the court to institute the action. It is important to note 
here that the party looking to institute the derivative action would merely have 
to prove is that some merit to the accusation. This coupled with the media 
coverage of the new Act and the resulting awareness of the public could lead 
to a flood of potential claims against directors.  
- The potential reach of derivative actions will also increase as a result of the 
fact that legal action may be taken against anyone who is a part of the 
company; not only the directors and officers.  
- The manner in which courts have interpreted „interests‟ has been considerably 
broad in the past; a derivative action will be valid if it protects the interests of 
the company. This too will likely increase the potential personal liability of 
directors.  
 
The ease with which a derivative action will be commenced is also of concern as one 
would only have to serve a demand on the company. This article is crucial here in 
order to confirm the industry experts‟ opinions with regards to Statement 4 as well as 
the opinions formed by the dissertation itself. The article was also released closer to 
the time of the inception of the new Act.  
 
Statement 4 serves to enforce the opinion of the dissertation in showing that the 
industry experts concur that the second mitigating step of legislation will not decrease 
directors‟ potential liability; in fact the opposite may be true in that claims against 
directors could increase. This is bad news in the current economic climate in which 
company failures are increasing and stakeholders will be looking for someone to take 
the blame. The obvious choice may once again be the directors and officers of the 
company in question.  
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8) The new Act will increase the exposure of directors to D&O claims. 
 
This Statement is linked to Statement 4 in that if the new Act does not serve to 
contain director liability, it may lead to an increase in exposure to D&O claims. 
Should this be the case, this Statement will serve to reinforce the opinion of the 
dissertation as well as that of the industry experts under Statement 4.  
 
This statement was a key success in light of the dissertation; 96.67% of the 
respondents selected one of the AGREE options. This is in fact a mirror image of 
Statement 4 where 96.67% of the participants opted for DISAGREE. It serves to show 
that the same percentage of industry experts that believe that the new Act will not 
contain director liability are of the opinion that the Act may increase claims against 
directors.  
 
The manner in which this result was reached was however different from that of 
Statement 4; the results were extremely focused on Agree with 24 selections or 80%. 
Only five participants opted for Highly Agree and one for Disagree. The resultant 
Mean therefore was 1.9. The only alterations that took place between the two rounds 
of answers were that two Neutrals shifted to the Agree option.  
 
The reasoning behind the high AGREE selection in Statement 8 is most likely similar 
to that on Statement 4. This is due to the fact that the same reasons that will lead one 
to believe that the new Act will not decrease director liability, will most likely lead 
one to believe that directors‟ exposure to claims may increase consequent to the 
legislation. The probable reason why ten less participants opted away from Highly 
Agree (Highly Disagree under Statement 4) is that some may not be as highly 
informed as others with regards to the actual reasoning behind a possible increase in 
claims. For example, perhaps not all the industry experts were aware of the widening 
scope of a derivative action under the new Act, however most of the experts could 
come to a consensus that legislating directors‟ common law duties will not result in a 
reduction in director liability.  
 
What is important to gain from this Statement 8 is that, once again in line with the 
dissertation, the industry experts believe that the new Act will most likely increase the 
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exposure of directors to potential D&O claims. It is just as crucial that the same 
amount also stated that the new Act would be unlikely to contain director liability.  
 
17) The codification of directors‟ duties in the new Act will cause potential 
claimants to be better informed. 
 
This Statement was raised on numerous occasions throughout the dissertation in the 
opinion that the legislating of directors‟ common law duties would lead to better 
informed claimants. In other words, any party that would be in a position to claim 
against a director or officer of a company would obtain more knowledge on how to do 
so as a result of the new Act. Another source of information would be the media; this 
issue was also raised a number of times in the dissertation. The media coverage of the 
codification of directors‟ duties could lead to easy access to information for claimants, 
as well as a sense that a successful suite is more likely due to the fact that common 
law is being legislated.  
 
Statement 17 received a 93.33% AGREE response, which is in accordance with the 
views of the dissertation. The answer with the highest selection was Agree with 80% 
or 24 of the respondents. The Mean therefore was 1.97 as opposed to 2.03 in the first 
round of answers. The Neutral and DISAGREE options each received 3.33% of the 
selections. The only alteration between the first and second round of answers was that 
two Neutrals opted for the Agree option. Highly Agree received four selections in 
both rounds.  
 
This Statement clearly indicates that the industry experts concur with the views of the 
dissertation in that the codification of directors‟ common law duties may lead to more 
knowledgeable potential claimants. This may be as a result of simplification of the 
law, the codification leading to higher chances of prosecution, or the media coverage 
leading to easy access to information.  
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10) The introduction of class actions into South African company law will lead to 
increased claims against directors. 
 
Statement 10 refers to c157 of the South African Companies Bill (Extended standing 
to apply for remedies). This Section, once the Bill is passed into legislation, will 
properly introduce class actions into South African law. The dissertation, in 
accordance with an article by Michael Hart of Deneys Reitz entitled “Companies Bill 
2008 – Here Comes the Class Action!” stated that this new addition to South African 
Companies Law could potentially lead to an increase in claims against directors. This 
is due to the fact that a number of persons will have the ability to apply in order to 
incept a class action before a court, the Companies‟ Ombud, the Take-over Panel of 
the Commission. This new method of instituting a claim against directors may lead to 
an increased number of persons seeking this option, which would once again lead to 
increased director liability.  
 
In accordance with the dissertation 96.67% of the participants selected the AGREE 
options. The Mean was 1.67 with the most chosen answer being Agree (56.67% or 17 
selections). Highly Agree received 12 selections, which indicates the strong opinion 
in favour of the notion that class action suites will increase the likelihood of claims 
being made against directors. Only one participant opted for Disagree which was the 
only exception under Statement 10. It is worth mentioning once again that this 
industry expert was not involved in the legal field, which would be significant with 
regards to this Statement. There was no alteration between the first and second round 
of answers.  
 
21) The definition of „knowledge‟ in the new Act will increase director liability. 
 
This Statement was looked at in the dissertation as well as in an article produced by 
Michael Hart of Deneys Reitz entitled “Companies Bill 2008 – Directors and Officers 
Insurance – Almost Right At Last”. The concern is that the South African Companies 
Bill defines „knowledge‟ as well as its derivatives as actual knowledge or as having 
the ability to have reasonably known, or having the ability to have known if the matter 
had been investigated.  
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This definition (which is unnecessary due to the fact that the Courts have until now 
defined „knowledge‟ according to actual knowledge) may lead to two different 
drawbacks:  
 
- There may be a gap in cover afforded to directors and officers of companies. 
This is due to the fact that c78 (6) (a) (i) states that a company may not 
indemnify a director where that director acted knowingly. C78 (7) (a) states 
that a company may purchase insurance to protect its directors for anything 
which may be indemnified under C78 (5) – this subsection states that a 
company may indemnify its directors with respect to anything allowed by the 
Memorandum of Incorporation except as provided for under c78 (6). 
Therefore directors will be left with less company indemnification as well as a 
gap in D&O insurance cover.  
- The concern with this definition is that it may lead to increased director 
liability. This is consequent to the fact that in every instance where the word 
„knowledge‟ or any of its derivatives are used in the new Act (with regards to 
a director or officer) there will be a higher standard applied. One will no 
longer be looking only at actual knowledge but at the reasonable potential to 
acquire it. This addition of negligence will possibly lead to an increased 
number of instances where interested parties may claim against directors.  
 
The industry experts once again concurred with the opinion of the dissertation. The 
AGREE options received 86.67% of the selections. This was an increase from 83.33% 
in the first round of answers. The difference was that one Neutral opted for Agree 
during the second round of the questionnaire. The answer that received the highest 
number of selections was Agree with 70% or 21 of the participants. The Mean 
therefore was 2.1 as opposed to 2.13 during the first round.  
 
The results of Statement 21 clearly show a strong indication towards the opinion held 
by the dissertation with respect to the definition of „knowledge‟ provided by the South 
African Companies Bill. The Highly Agree option received five selections under this 
Statement, of which three came from either legal experts or experts in corporate 
governance. This is extremely relevant with regards to this legal-orientated section as 
well as due to the fact that the expert Sample Size was 30 (16.67% of the total).  
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This definition will be interesting when looking at it in the context of severability of 
exceptions under the general conditions of a D&O policy. This condition states that 
the knowledge possessed by one insured will mot be imputed on to another insured in 
order to apply exclusions. Perhaps this will ensure that policies will not respond when 
knowledge is imputed on to another director as a result of the new Act. However that 
may leave the director with a gap in cover. Or perhaps D&O policies will be required 
to respond more often due to the fact that legally; there will be more instances where 
knowledge can be imputed on to another director.  
 
It must be pointed out that four participants selected the Disagree option; a possible 
explanation could be that some of the respondents did not look into the finer detail of 
the clauses of the Bill. One must bear in mind that the Disagree total was still less 
than Highly Agree, which is a more elevated extreme.     
 
22) The new Act states that if any person contravenes the Act and another person 
suffers a loss as a result thereof, the person who contravened the Act will be 
liable for that loss. This civil remedy will lead to an increase in director 
liability. 
 
Statement 22 relates to c218 (2) of the South African Companies Bill - if a person 
contravenes the new Act and, as a result another person suffers loss or damage, the 
person who committed the contravention is liable to the other person for the amount 
of loss or damage incurred. It is possible that this Section (be it passed into law) may 
increase director liability by making it feasible that third parties could claim against 
directors. In the instance where a director contravenes a section of the new Act, 
whether it is in a fraudulent or negligent manner, and as a result a third party suffers a 
loss the director will be personally liable for that loss. 
 
Statement 22 received a 90% AGREE response which is in concordance with the 
views of the dissertation. The highest selected answer was Agree with 60% or 18 of 
the participants in the study. The single alteration in this Statement was that one 
Neutral opted for Agree. Two participants selected Disagree, whom once again were 
not legal experts; however nine respondents opted for Highly Agree, four of which 
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could be regarded as experts in the legal system or corporate governance. The Neutral 
selection could once again be explicated by a lack of insight into the Companies Bill.  
 
The Mean in Statement 22 was 1.87 as opposed to 1.9 during the course of the first 
round of answers. This Statement was yet another indication that the experts concur 
with the views of the dissertation – it is unlikely that the new Companies Act will 
contain director liability and therefore claims against directors; in fact it is possible 
that there may be an increase in such.  
 
23) The Business Rescue solution in the new Act will lead to increased director 
liability. 
 
The Business Rescue procedure is set out in Chapter 6 of the South African 
Companies Bill; as was already explicated in the dissertation it is a method which is 
aimed at reviving companies that could potentially fail or are „financially distressed‟. 
A financially distressed company is one which may either not have the ability to pay 
off its debts, or may become insolvent within six months. This notion of Business 
Rescue is in use abroad such as in the US, UK and Australia.  
 
Directors will find themselves in a peculiar position in the event that the company 
commences Business Rescue proceedings. This is due to the fact that under c137 of 
the Companies Bill it is stated that a director will maintain all his functions as such 
under the authority of the Practitioner. The Practitioner is a person who will be 
appointed in order to oversee and control the company during Business Rescue. The 
directors of a company will be relieved of certain duties (including the common law 
fiduciary duty as well as that of care and skill); however they will still be required to 
perform in accordance with the Practitioner. It will also be possible for directors to be 
removed from office under the Business Rescue Chapter – this may occur on 
application of the Practitioner. One must ask how much easier it will be to 
successfully claim against a director once Business Rescue is completed in the event 
that a director is removed from office in accordance with Chapter 6. Directors will 
also take on numerous other duties, as pointed out in the dissertation, in order to 
ensure that the Business Rescue procedure is successful; this all in accordance with 
the instructions of the Practitioner.  
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Statement 23 received the highest number of responses under AGREE – which was 
50%. This was the only Statement that had no significant number of responses under 
any of the options (significance refers to results greater than 50%). Neutral received 
10% and DISAGREE received 40% of the total number of selections. The most 
highly selected answer was Agree with 46.67% of the respondents preferring that 
answer. The Mean was 2.87, which was an increase from 2.7 during the first round of 
the study. 
 
The most significant alteration between the first and second round of answers was that 
six Neutral opted for Disagree, whilst only one moved to Agree. However one must 
keep in mind that Agree nevertheless received the highest number of responses with 
14 whilst Disagree received 12. One person selected Highly Agree, whilst none opted 
for the opposite extreme. However 40% of the respondents did opt for Disagree which 
is a notable amount. There were also some notable legal experts on either of the Agree 
and Disagree options; this makes it extremely difficult to interpret. One may state that 
the disparities may have been so significant due to the fact that many of the 
participants could not familiarise themselves with an entire Chapter of the Companies 
Bill due to time constraints.  
 
It is possible that perhaps some of the industry experts see the fact that directors will 
be relieved of some of their duties as a reason to believe that liability may decrease in 
this regard. This is a very valid statement and it still remain to be seen what the 
director liability outcome will be as a result of the introduction of the Business Rescue 
regime into South African Company law. Nevertheless one must keep in mind that the 
overall result of Statement 23 was in the favour of the opinions provided in the 
dissertation.  
 
24) The business rescue practitioner will require D&O insurance cover. 
 
Statement 24 deals with whether or not the business rescue Practitioner would need 
D&O insurance. The Practitioner is required to take over the running of the company 
once Business Rescue has commenced. This means that the Practitioner acts in place 
of the company‟s board of directors and management. Another requirement is that the 
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company‟s financial situation is assessed and a decision must be made whether or not 
there is a reasonable prospect of Business Rescue success. The Practitioner may select 
or remove any persons from the board and management into and out of any office of 
the company. The development and implementation of the Business Rescue plan is 
also a responsibility which rests with the Practitioner. It is clear therefore that a vast 
amount of responsibility is placed in this position of authority. It has been shown, in 
the case of directors that with responsibility also comes accountability. Statement 24 
looks at whether Practitioners will require D&O insurance in order to protect 
themselves from possible liability incurred in the course of their duties towards the 
company.  
 
This Statement received an 83.33% AGREE response with a Mean of 2.03. This 
consisted of 18 Agree and 7 Highly Agree selections – therefore the results are 
strongly in favour of a positive answer. In fact, 60% of the participants opted for 
Agree, whilst only 10% or three selected Disagree. The results were also made up of 
two Neutrals. There was no alteration with regards to selection of answers between 
the first and second round of the questionnaire.  
 
It is crucial to note that the AGREE selections consisted of extremely noteworthy 
underwriters and brokers whom would be the most significant industry experts under 
this particular statement. However the AGREE answers were also provided by most 
of the legal experts whom would be expected to be well aware of the potential 
liability which could be incurred by the Business Rescue Practitioner. Where the 
responses under this Statement were in the negative, a possible explanation could be 
that those experts believed that the Practitioner would require some other form of 
Professional Indemnity (PI) cover. The industry expert responses under this Statement 
were in accordance with the view of the dissertation that the Business Rescue 
Practitioner will require D&O insurance cover.  
 
6.1.2 Effects on the insurance industry/policy wording 
 
The objective of this section is to inquire into what the possible effects of the South 
African Companies Bill may be on the D&O insurance industry, as well as on the 
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D&O policy itself, provided that it is passed into legislation. The first few Statements 
are aimed at the effects on the D&O policy, whilst the others inquire into the industry 
itself.  
 
20) The most important factor considered in the purchasing of D&O insurance is: 
a. Premium cost 
b. Policy limit 
c. Breadth of cover 
 
Statement 20 is designed to discover what the most important aspect is, which is 
considered by companies when purchasing D&O liability insurance. Here there is 
obviously no correct or preferred answer; it is simply a matter of determining what the 
selected industry experts feel are the key aspects.  
 
It was decided that the question should be answered in three separate parts instead of 
selecting one alternative. This is in order to allow for complete choice of level of 
importance per factor; therefore all three options could have the same significance 
when purchasing D&O insurance.  
 
It was expected that Premium cost would be the factor selected most time and this 
was actually the case. In fact, 100% of the participants opted for AGREE, which 
consisted of 14 Highly Agree and 16 Agree selections. This is consistent with the 
notion that one should purchase as much cover as one can afford. The fact remains 
that „price‟ is one of the most telling factors in economics, therefore there is no reason 
why this should not apply to D&O insurance. The Mean was 1.53 and the most 
selected answer was Agree with 53.33%. This number is low only due to the fact that 
the rest of the experts opted for the even more positive extreme. The only alteration 
between the first and second round of the questionnaire was that 1 Neutral moved to 
Highly Agree.  
 
The second most important fact considered according to the industry experts was the 
Policy limit. This was probably expected due to the fact that it is closely linked to cost 
via demand and supply theory. This option was selected 96.67% as AGREE, which 
was comprised of 3 Highly Agree and 26 Agree options. The DISAGREE options 
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received 3.33% of the votes which was made up of 1 Disagree participant. The Mean 
was 1.97 and the answer with the highest selection was Agree with 86.67%. Therefore 
the number of Highly Agree choices decreased and there was 1 Disagree, which is a 
decrease in the overall positive response from Premium cost. The only movement 
from the first and second round of the questionnaire was that 2 Neutrals opted for 
Agree. 
 
The least important fact, out of the three offered, according to the industry experts 
was Breadth of cover. This factor is also associated to cost, however it may also 
depend on other matters such as the state of the market, and what exclusions or 
extensions the insurer would like to remove or add. The AGREE selections decreased 
to 90%, comprising of 6 Highly Agree and 21 Agree choices. Therefore the most 
opted for answer was Agree with 70%; the resultant Mean was 2. The number of 
DISAGREE selections increased further to 10% consisting entirely of 3 Disagree 
choices. The single alteration between the first and second round of the questionnaire 
was that 1 Neutral opted for Agree.      
 
One can safely assume that the best answer to Statement 20 is „a combination of all‟. 
This is due to the fact that it would be unreasonable and unwise to only consider one 
factor when purchasing D&O insurance. It is generally best to purchase as much as 
one can afford, considering the Limit of Indemnity as well as the breadth of cover 
available at that particular rate. One must also keep in mind that all three factors are 
related; therefore the higher the premium price, the higher the limit of indemnity. 
However the aim of Statement 20 was to see in what manner the industry experts 
would rank the three factors mentioned which are considered when purchasing D&O 
insurance.  
 
6) The new Act will require increasing the limits of indemnity of D&O insurance. 
 
This Statement is designed to find out whether the new Act will result in an increase 
in the limits of indemnity on D&O insurance policies. The answer tended vastly in the 
favour of a positive answer – the AGREE options received 96.67% of the responses. 
This result was made up of 9 Highly Agree and 20 (66.67%) Agree answers. The only 
alterations between the two rounds of questioning were that two Neutrals switched to 
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Agree. The Disagree option only received one (3.33%) selection. The Mean in 
Statement 6 was 1.77.  
 
The logical reasoning behind this belief that the limit of indemnity of D&O insurance 
policies may increase is due to the fact that the experts also believed that the new Act 
may lead to increasing director liability. Increasing liability may lead to an increased 
number of potential claims against directors. An increase in claims would lead to an 
increase in limits of indemnity on the part of D&O insurers. This is in accordance 
with the views of the dissertation with regards to a possibility of increased director 
liability as well as a potential general increase in limits of indemnity. However it is 
generally not thought that the Act on its own will lead to increased limits unless there 
is a major change in the number of lawsuits against directors; this still remains to be 
seen. An increase in the number of lawsuits could also result from the unfavourable 
economic climate which is slowly leading to a hardening of the D&O insurance 
market.  
 
The new Act itself is unlikely to lead to major increases in limits of indemnity of 
D&O insurance policies. This is due to the fact that there are many factors involved 
when selecting the amount of insurance purchased; one would consider the premium 
involved, the economic climate, the market in which the company operates, how 
litigious the country in which the company operates is, as well as the likelihood of 
claims to name but a few. However it is still important to note that the majority of the 
industry experts who participated in the questionnaire believe that some increase in 
D&O insurance premiums will result due to the passing of the new Act.  
 
7) The new Act will have the effect of increasing the premium cost of D&O 
insurance. 
 
Statement 7 looked at a potential increase in the cost of D&O insurance premiums 
consequent to the passing of the new South African Companies Act. One would 
assume that perhaps if director liability increases and therefore the number of claims 
against directors also rise, that premiums covering these eventualities may increase 
too.  
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The response to Statement 7 was in accordance with the above assumption; 83.33% of 
the industry experts opted for AGREE. The most selected answer was Agree with 
73.33% or 22 of the selections. Therefore there was a Mean of 2.23. The negative 
answers all consisted of Disagree with 16.67% or 5 selections.  
 
The negative responses could be as a result of the fact that some industry experts 
believe that the increase in director liability will not be significant enough to result in 
an increase in D&O insurance premiums. It is difficult to say at this time how 
significant the effect of the new Act on will be with regards to claims against 
directors. Therefore one can not conclude that premiums will increase by a sizeable 
amount. It would take a long time for the market to adjust to any effects of the 
Companies Act even if the number of claims against directors increases at a 
reasonable pace. This is probably due to the fact that the D&O insurance market is 
highly competitive. There are a number of South African insurance companies and 
underwriters involved at the moment; once these options are exhausted one can try 
overseas markets.  
 
One may therefore conclude that an increase in director liability with a consequent 
increase in claims against directors may lead to a slight increase in D&O insurance 
premiums eventually. One only has to look at the financial crisis and see that although 
company failures are on the increase, which puts directors at risk, there is yet to be 
any significant increase in D&O insurance premiums.  
 
11) D&O insurers will be required to expand cover as a result of the new Act. 
 
One method of expanding cover could be to remove certain exclusions from a D&O 
policy wording. A particular exclusion is the insured v insured; this is in place in 
order to avoid a situation where one insured sues another and the company then 
claims off the D&O policy. It is also risky to cover an insured v insured situation due 
to the knowledge possessed by either of the parties which may be used against each 
other. This is extremely unlikely to be removed from a D&O insurance policy.  
 
Another example of is the major shareholder exclusion – a „major shareholder‟ is one 
that owns a certain percentage of shares in the company. The amount of shares needed 
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to be owned depends on the insurer; it can range from 15% up. This exclusion exists 
due to the fact that major shareholders can appoint directors and control their actions 
(to a certain extent through voting). A D&O insurer does not want to cover a situation 
where a shareholder has participated in the creation of a strategy of the company and 
consequent to the strategy going wrong, the shareholder attempts to sue the director. 
This exclusion may vary depending on the insurer as well as the situation in the 
market (hard or soft). If there is an increase in major shareholder suites as a result of 
the new Companies Act it is unlikely that D&O underwriters would want to remove 
this exclusion from their policies. This is amplified by the fact that due to the 
economic crisis, the market is beginning to harden.    
 
Statement 11 received a 70% AGREE response from the industry experts. This was 
made up of 19 Agree selections and two Highly Agree selections. This was an 
increase from the first round of the questionnaire under which there were three 
Neutrals – the difference between the first and second round was that two of the 
Neutrals opted for Agree; therefore only one Neutral remained.  
 
There were 26.67% DISAGREE responses which were made up of 7 Disagree and 1 
Highly Disagree response. It was difficult to extract a pattern under this particular 
Statement due to the fact that significant industry experts could be found on either 
side of the poles. There were notable underwriters as well as brokers under AGREE 
and DISAGREE, although clearly the scales tipped towards AGREE. This disparity 
could be as a result of the fact that any increases in director liability are only likely to 
show after a number of years, consequent to the passing of the new Companies Act.  
 
It is also unlikely that any insurance company will be willing to provide wider cover 
in the event that claims against directors actually do increase. There would most likely 
be market pressure to expand cover in order to protect directors from any increased 
liability as a result of the new Act; however whether or not this pressure would lead to 
and actual expansion depends on the supply and demand of D&O insurance at the 
time. It is unlikely to be a demand driven market due to the fact that the current 
economic climate is leading to a hardening of the D&O insurance market. This means 
that insurers will be looking to increase pricing and restrict cover.  
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One notable broker mentioned in a conversation that it is becoming more difficult to 
place cover as well as the fact that it is being restricted. Due to the financial crisis it is 
becoming difficult to find D&O insurance for banks and asset managers. However 
one must keep in mind that this is a result of the economic downturn – this may 
outweigh any pressures on underwriters to widen cover due to the passing of the new 
Companies Act.  
 
It is important to remember that D&O insurance policies cover directors when they 
become legally liable. This means that any new liability that is resultant of the new 
Act will be automatically covered; therefore it will not be necessary to widen policy 
wordings. When asked why so many industry experts stated that cover may require 
widening as a result of the new Act, a notable underwriter stated that it is probably 
due to the fact that if any new exposure is created, one would want to make certain 
that directors are not left with a gap in cover.  
 
12) D&O insurers will be required to broaden policy wordings as a result of the 
new Act. 
 
Statement 12 was a control question in respect of Statement 11; in other words it was 
used to test the reliability of the responses of the previous Statement. Both Statements 
were in fact asking the same thing: will D&O insurers opt to expand cover/broaden 
policy wordings as a result of the new South African Companies Act?  
 
The overall responses were fairly similar although there were some minor differences. 
AGREE received 63.33% of the selections, which was made up of 18 Agree and 1 
Highly Agree result. This was similar to Statement 11 where the results for Agree and 
Highly Agree received 19 and 2 selections respectively. The most selected answer 
therefore was Agree with 60% which was down from 63.33% under Statement 11. 
The Mean was 2.73 as opposed to 2.53 in Statement 11. The DISAGREE options 
received 36.67% of the selections; this was made up of 10 Disagree and 1 Highly 
Disagree answer. Statement 11 received 7 Disagree answers, which was the only 
difference between the two Statements on the negative side. Statement 12 also 
contained one Neutral as opposed to none in its predecessor. The only difference 
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between the first and second round of the questionnaire was the 2 Neutrals switched 
to Agree.  
 
The differences were rather insignificant, however the DISAGREE options were 
selected a fair amount of times. The reasons for the disparities between the two 
statements as well as within the Statements themselves could be twofold: firstly some 
of the respondents perhaps did not completely understand the questions. This could 
explain why there were some differences between the two Statements. Secondly, the 
discussion under Statement 11 still holds true; the industry experts do anticipate 
changes as a result of the new Act, however the changes may not alter the D&O 
policy that significantly. Any changes that may occur could also take a long time to 
eventuate and would probably be resultant from the economic crisis at the same time. 
Nevertheless Statement 12 was a success in that it showed a reasonable similarity in 
the industry experts‟ thinking between the two relevant Statements.  
 
5) The new Act will have the effect of restricting the availability of D&O 
insurance. 
 
Statement 5 is looking at whether or not D&O insurance will be less accessible as a 
result of the new South African Companies Act. This may either be due to the fact 
that insurers will be less willing to supply the cover or because some insurers may 
pull out of the market all together.  
 
It is probably unlikely that D&O insurance will be significantly restricted as a result 
of the new Act, if at all. In the event that director liability increases and claims against 
directors increase too, D&O insurers would probably be more likely to market the 
policy more aggressively. As the need for this type of insurance rises, so too will the 
willingness to sell it. The D&O market is also likely to harder (become a sellers 
market) as a result of the financial crisis. This too should result in an increase in the 
amount of insurance that underwriters are willing to provide, as well as some new 
entrants into the market perhaps.  
 
The industry experts concurred with the views of the dissertation; DISAGREE 
received 93.33% (or 28) of the responses. This was made up of 25 Disagree and 3 
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Highly Disagree results. This is a very significant result in favour of the views of the 
dissertation. There was 1 Neutral answer as well as 1 Highly Agree; the Highly Agree 
selection was not resultant from an expert underwriter or broker, which would be 
significant with respect to the Statement.  
 
The only logical explanation for this positive choice would be that the perception of 
the risk attached to D&O insurance would increase as a result of a possible increase in 
liability and therefore claims. In that manner one may assume that the D&O industry 
would be less willing to provide a type of insurance which is more risky. It is however 
unlikely that D&O insurance will become high-risk enough for no one to be willing to 
provide it. This would be the case even in light of a combination of the new Act as 
well as the financial crisis. There would always be players willing to provide 
insurance at a higher cost – if it would ever actually get to that point. The only 
difference in responses between the first and second round of the questionnaire was 
that 5 Neutrals opted for Disagree. This is an indication that the Delphi Technique 
was effective, as the experts were influenced by the opinions of others away from 
impartiality towards a formulated opinion.  
 
9) The new Act will lead to increased competition in the D&O insurance market. 
 
Statement 9 was aimed at finding out whether the new South African Companies Act 
would result in increased competition in the D&O insurance market. The new Act 
could lead to two possible outcomes in this regard; the first is that claims against 
directors are contained which would decrease the demand for this particular type of 
insurance. This buyers market would lead to players being willing to supply D&O 
insurance. The second possible outcome is that director liability may increase which 
would result in an increase in claims. This would increase demand for D&O insurance 
which would lead to a sellers market. In this case there would be an increase in the 
number of suppliers of D&O insurance.  
 
Statement 9 obtained most of its selections under the DISAGREE with 56.67% - this 
was entirely constituted of 17 Disagree (also the most selected option) answers. The 
resultant Mean therefore was 3.17. There was 1 Neutral result as well as 12 Disagree 
selections, which made up the entire AGREE outcome. The difference between the 
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first and second round of the questionnaire was that 2 and 3 Neutrals moved to Agree 
and Disagree respectively.  
 
The disparities of 12 and 17 Agree and Disagree respectively could be resultant from 
the two possible outcomes which were pointed out with regards to the new Act. 
However one must remember that most of the industry experts concur that the new 
Act is unlikely to contain director liability. Another possible explanation for the 
disparity could be that some of the experts had the financial crisis in mind; this too 
may have a significant effect on the D&O market competition. If the D&O market 
hardens, as is expected due to the economic crisis, premium rates would increase. 
This would result in more capital being available in the D&O market and therefore 
more players would be tempted to join. The outcome would be an increase in 
competition. However the financial crisis could have a second impact; the lack of 
monetary funding as a result of the market crunch could mean that money will be 
required elsewhere – therefore perhaps it would be difficult to invest in D&O 
insurance companies.  
 
With regards to Statement 9 and the new Act; as has been previously explicated, it is 
unlikely that the legislation will lead to a great increase in premium rates in a short 
amount of time. Therefore it may be unlikely, as the industry experts agree, that there 
will be a sudden increase in competition in the D&O insurance market as a result of 
the new Act.    
 
6.1.3 Effects on directors 
 
This subsection is intended to inquire into the effects of the new South African 
Companies Act on directors. One is not necessarily looking at liability but actual the 
possible outcomes on directors themselves. This is being done in order to envisage 
whether the new legislation will alter the way in which directors‟ duties and roles will 
be carried out, as well as how they will be required to operate.  
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16) The codification of directors‟ duties in the new Act will be beneficial to 
directors. 
 
Having seen that the majority of the experts believe that the new Act will not contain 
claims against directors and may in fact lead to increased liability, one would think 
that the codification of directors‟ duties would not be seen as beneficial. However the 
industry experts tended to disagree; 83.33% opted for the AGREE options. This was 
made up of 24 Agree and 1 Highly Agree selection; the Mean therefore was 2.3. The 
highest percentage of answer selected was Agree with 80%. DISAGREE received 
13.33% of the selections, which was made up of 3 Disagree and 1 Highly Disagree 
answers. One must make not of the fact that there were some notable legal experts 
that opted for DISAGREE, however they were in the minority overall. There was also 
one Neutral answer. The alteration between the first and second round of the 
questionnaire was that 4 Neutral moved to Agree.  
 
There are a number of possible motivations why the codification of directors‟ 
common law duties could be beneficial to directors. The fact is that there would be a 
general better understanding of what exactly is required of directors once it is stated in 
legislation. In that manner, directors may be better equipped to deal with potential and 
existing claims. One would also get the sense that if the entire board of directors is 
forced to abide by legislation, the individual directors would feel safer knowing that 
the chances of a lawsuit are less likely. However this may be moot due to the fact that 
common law does not hold directors liable where they did not have a reasonable 
chance of knowing of a fraud or such. The D&O policy also covers directors that had 
no knowledge of such action – although this may change as a result of the new 
definition of „knowledge‟ in the new Act.  
 
One must also remember that there are reasons to believe that the codification will be 
detrimental to directors. Potential claimants will also be better informed with regards 
to directors‟ duties, which may lead them to attempt to claim more often. This would 
be accentuated by the fact that the media has highlighted the possibility of claiming 
against directors when companies suffer a loss. Directors are also already likely to 
know what their duties are; therefore the information factor may be irrelevant in their 
case. It may also be easier to hold directors accountable once their duties are placed in 
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legislation as opposed to common law. One may think that a written statement on 
directors‟ duties would have sufficed.  
 
It is important to remember, however that this Statement was inquiring with regards to 
the codification of directors‟ common law duties; this is but one of the changes which 
the new Act will produce. Perhaps a clarification was required and most of the 
industry experts concur with this fact. This is in spite of whether or not the 
participants may believe that a statement of duties would have been good enough. 
 
15) It will be more difficult to recruit directors (especially non-executive) as a 
result of the passing of the new Act. 
 
Statement 15 looks at whether or not it may be more difficult to attract directors into 
such roles in companies as a result of the new South African Companies Act. The 
thinking behind this question is that if director liability increases as a result of the new 
Act, and consequently, claims frequency and severity rises, directors will no longer 
find it worthwhile to take up these previously glamorous positions.  
 
The „non-executive‟ director may be more difficult to recruit due to the fact that there 
is less involvement in the day-to-day operation of the company; thus it is more 
difficult to realise that a situation has arisen which may lead to a claim. This may also 
be problematic due to the fact that according to the King Codes of Corporate 
Governance, a board system should contain a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors. In fact, it is preferred that there is a higher amount of non-executive 
directors serving on a board of a company. This is already difficult to accomplish in 
South Africa due to a lack of necessary skills. Some non-executive directors actually 
serve on more than twenty different boards at one time.  
 
Statement 15 received a 90% AGREE response, which was made up of 20 Agree and 
7 Highly Agree selections. Therefore Agree was the highest selected response with 
66.67%, whilst the negative answers were completely made up of 3 Disagree 
selections. The resultant Mean was 1.97, which demonstrates the high tendency 
towards the positive options. The only alteration between the first and second round 
of the questionnaire was that 1 Neutral moved to Agree.  
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The results show that the industry experts predominantly believe that the new Act will 
lead to a situation in which it will be more difficult to recruit director on to company 
boards. This is probably as a result of the belief that the new legislation will not 
contain claims against directors and may on the other hand possibly lead to increased 
liability. Having said that and assessed the respondents‟ opinions, one must remember 
that if a big enough carrot is waved in one‟s face, it is bound to be snatched at some 
eventually. Should the risk attached to board membership increase, so too will the 
rewards. It is difficult to imagine that a significant number of directors will no longer 
be willing to serve; however this may end up being a noticeable trend. Directors will 
still have the protection of D&O liability insurance, which will increase in 
significance. An article in Business Day (11/08/2009) interviewed a number of 
notable attorneys who stated that the new legislation may lead to individuals thinking 
twice before joining company boards. 
 
18) There will be a significant difference in the manner in which directors carry 
out their duties as a result of the new Act. 
 
Statement 18 is inquiring into whether or not the industry experts believe that 
directors will alter the way in which they carry out their duties as a consequent to the 
passing of the new South African Companies Act. The reasoning would be that the 
new Act may either contain or perhaps increase claims against directors; this would 
be the result of decreased or increased liability respectively. Therefore would there be 
any modification in the way in which directors do their jobs in respect of the 
companies on which boards they serve?  
 
The respondents generally believed that directors will change the way in which they 
carry out their duties towards the company as a result of the new Act; this is evident 
from the 66.67% AGREE result. The positive result was made up of 19 Agree and 1 
Highly Agree response, leaving a Mean of 2.63. The answer with the highest amount 
of selections was Agree with 63.33%. There were however a significant number of 
respondents that opted for DISAGREE; 10 altogether which were completely made 
up of Disagree selections. The alteration between the first and second round of the 
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questionnaire was that 4 Neutrals moved in the following manner: 3 to Agree and 1 to 
Disagree.  
 
It is difficult to work out why a disparity existed in the results with regards to 
Statement 18. This is due to the fact that the majority of experts believed that the new 
Act would result in increased director liability. It was also found that the new Act 
would be unlikely to contain claims against directors. One would thus think that 
directors may as a result alter the manner in which they perform their duties in some 
way or another. However one must bear in mind that the Bill does not actually add 
any new duties; it merely legislates the old common law existing ones. Even if 
director liability is actually increased this would not add new requirements which 
director would have to follow.  It is true that the requirements are stricter and there are 
additional ways in which a director may be held accountable for his actions. However 
this would alter how careful, cautious and thorough directors will act consequent to 
the passing of the new legislation. That is perhaps the reason why there were 
disparities in the answering of Statement 18 – whilst there are no added duties, 
directors will be required to be a lot more vigilant in the manner in which their 
functions are carried out.  
 
19) The new Act will increase the standards of corporate governance of 
companies. 
 
This Statement is designed to find out whether the industry experts believe that the 
new South African Companies Act will result in companies implementing higher 
standards of corporate governance. Perhaps companies may not even be required to 
implement higher standards but merely abide by existing ones – in the event that the 
organisation does not do so already. As has been noted throughout the dissertation, it 
is the directors of the company that are primarily charged with the implementation 
and carrying-out of corporate governance within companies. This question may 
therefore look at two different aspects:  
 
- Will the new Act itself increase the standard of corporate governance in 
companies – after all Chapter 2 Part F of the Bill is entitled „Governance of 
companies‟? 
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- Will directors enforce corporate governance standards to a higher extent as a 
result of the possibility that they may be accountable otherwise? This would 
be due to a possible increase in director liability consequent to the passing of 
the Act.  
 
Statement 19 received an 88.33% AGREE response which was composed of 23 Agree 
and 2 Highly Agree selections. This is significantly in favour of the positive 
responses, which means that the respondents clearly believe that the new Act will 
result in higher standards of corporate governance; for either actual reason. The 
highest selected answer was Agree with 76.67% with the resultant Mean being 2.23. 
Only 13.33% of the respondents opted for DISAGREE, which was entirely made up 
of Disagree selections. Therefore none of the experts strongly believe that the new 
Act will not result in higher standards of corporate governance in companies. There 
was also one Neutral response. The alteration between the first and second round of 
the questionnaire was that 2 Neutrals opted for Agree, whilst another 2 Neutrals 
selected Disagree.  
 
The vast majority of industry experts are of the opinion that the new Act will result in 
higher standards of corporate governance. This is a reasonable assumption due to the 
fact that the Bill contains so many provisions which relate to some form of company 
governance. It must also be noted that in the event that the new Act leads to increased 
director liability and accountability, it is extremely likely that boards will implement 
higher standards of corporate governance in order to avoid the possibility of claims.   
 
13) Directors should be required to go on training courses in preparation for the 
passing of the new Act. 
 
Statement 13 is attempting to find out whether the industry experts believe that it will 
be necessitated that directors go on training courses in order to familiarise themselves 
with the new South African Companies Act. It would seem logical that everyone on 
the board of directors of a company should be educated with regards to Company 
Law. This is especially crucial when there are changes being made which affect all 
companies. These changes will also seemingly affect directors themselves; one should 
 278 
be educated with regards to the possible effects of the new Act on your office. Here 
are some of the potential questions which should be asked: 
 
- Will liability increase or decrease? 
- What new expectations are there of directors? 
- What effects will the codification of directors‟ common law duties 
have? 
- What will be the role of directors in the new Business Rescue process? 
- What effect will the new Act‟s definition of „knowledge‟ have on 
directors?  
- What rules and procedures should the board have in place in order to 
ensure company compliance with the new Act as well as codes of 
corporate governance?  
- How can directors ensure that these rules and procedures will be 
implemented correctly or at all?  
 
This statement was extremely successful in terms of positive answers. The AGREE 
options received 100% of the respondents‟ selections. The answers were comprised of 
17 Highly Agree and 13 Agree choices. Therefore the extreme positive option 
obtained the majority of the selections, indicating a high tendency towards the 
positive answers. The option which was selected most times by the respondents was 1 
with 56.67%; therefore the Mean was 1.43. The only alteration between the first and 
second round of the questionnaire was that 2 Neutrals opted for Agree.  
 
This is good news for directors as well as the D&O insurance industry. Even in the 
event that director liability does increase, education with regards to the new Act may 
be used as a method of risk management in order to minimise potential claims. The 
training courses would probably have to come from law firms which will contain the 
necessary expertise to educate others. Another method of education is through the 
Institute on Directors (IOD) of South Africa. The IOD is continuously holding 
training courses, not only for directors but all business persons. This would be a very 
effective way to ensure that everyone is kept up to date with the upcoming changes in 
South African Company Law.  
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14) If D&O cover was not available directors would still be prepared to accept 
directorships on company boards. 
 
This Statement is aimed at assessing the importance of D&O liability insurance in 
terms of directors‟ acceptance of positions on company boards. It is evident that the 
majority of companies purchase D&O insurance on behalf of their directors; however 
the directors of small private companies often opt against cover due to the 
unlikelihood of a claim arising. 
 
The industry experts generally concurred with the views of the dissertation that 
persons would be unlikely to take up a position on a company board in the event that 
no D&O insurance cover was available. The majority of the selections fell under 
DISAGREE with 66.67%. This consisted of 17 Disagree and 3 Highly Disagree 
answers indicating a strong tendency towards the need for D&O insurance. The 
prevalent answer was Disagree with 56.67%; the resultant Mean was 3.43. The single 
alteration between the first and second round of the questionnaire was that 1 Neutral 
opted for Disagree. One must also consider that there was an element of disparity in 
this Statement as 33.33% of the respondents opted for AGREE, which was all 
comprised of Agree selections. Therefore there was no extreme belief that directors 
would still take up positions as such in the event that D&O insurance was not 
available. However it may still be necessary to inquire into the motive behind why 10 
participants opted for Agree.  
 
It is likely that those industry experts that opted for Agree may have been referring to 
the many directors of small private companies that are not covered by D&O 
insurance. As it was pointed out earlier, this is resultant from the fact that the 
likelihood of a claim is low. Another reason could be that perhaps if no D&O 
insurance was available there would be other solutions to deal with director liability in 
place. Perhaps director liability would decrease, although the need for D&O insurance 
has been consequent to an increase in such. One would expect that companies would 
make provisions in the event that a claim against a director would arise, or perhaps 
director remuneration would increase in order to offset possible losses resultant from 
claims. It is also worth remembering that D&O insurance only came about after Great 
Depression, prior to which directors did exist without D&O insurance.  
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However as a result of increasing director liability as well as an increase in claims 
against directors, it is reasonable to believe that directors may think twice before 
accepting a position on the board of a company, which does not provide D&O 
liability insurance.  
 
6.2 Interviews 
 
The interviews were done either face-to-face or via email with twenty of the thirty 
total participants that were involved in the study. The responses have been 
summarised and the general views will be expressed. The study may be broken-down 
into three separate sections: director liability, effects on the insurance industry/policy 
wording, and effects on directors. These three separate sub-sections will now be 
looked at in turn.  
 
6.2.1 Director liability 
 
It was a remarkable finding that 100% of the participants of the interviews stated that 
director liability has increased in some way or another. When asked whether the 
increase in director liability was as a result of either doctrinal or complexity issues the 
answer was simply; both. One of the main re-occurring themes was that of the impact 
of the media on director liability. Whilst media will not actually legally increase 
director liability, it certainly plays a part in making potential claimants aware of the 
possibility and magnitude of a claim against a director or officer of a company. The 
spectacular overseas corporate collapses such as Enron and Worldcom, as well as 
those in South Africa such as Leisurenet and Fidentia have certainly made the public 
more aware of corporate crime.  
 
Certainly some of the offenders in such cases deserve some form of liability, however 
the mass publicity has led to a general notion that when a corporate failure (in any 
sense) occurs, someone must be held accountable. The first place where one would 
look to sue is the director or officer of the company in question. It is easy to forget 
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that the complexity of the modern business environment has led to a point in which it 
is difficult for an individual to be in full control of a multi-national corporation. 
Moreover, the subprime crisis of 2008 has already led to numerous law-suites in the 
US and Europe; this shows certain occurrences in other countries may lead to an 
individual being sued who could not have foreseen the danger. These issues are more 
amplified for executive directors than executives due to the fact that courts do 
differentiate between the two. There are still drawbacks however because some non-
executive directors are still held liable in certain instances. It is more difficult for a 
non-executive director, who was hired for a certain type of expertise, to keep in touch 
with all the transactions of a company.  
 
Some of the participants that did not think that director liability has increased to a 
great extent still admitted that in the very least the likelihood of a claim has certainly 
gone up. However the probability of a successful claim in court in South Africa is still 
reasonably low, according to most experts, and the most common reason cited is that 
court cases take extremely long to complete. This in turn means that costs of litigation 
are also particularly excessive.  
 
Perhaps due to the fact that not all insurance industry experts are also legal experts, 
there was less to be said about the courts‟ willingness to hold directors more 
accountable. Nevertheless all experts did agree that doctrinal issues have led to an 
increase in director liability. The most common reason stated is the expansion of the 
law of delict. As was stated in earlier in the dissertation, instances such as the 
recognition of pure economic losses have led to more possible motives for a claim. 
Not only have the motives increased but so has the severity and frequency of claims 
against directors.  
 
A main point to remember is that the perception of directors has changed; as was 
stated earlier in the dissertation directors are not mere figureheads and are expected to 
be aware of all the dealings of the company. The corporate world in general has 
become more accountable for its actions especially when it comes to a loss to any 
company stakeholders. The burden of this accountability is being borne mostly by the 
directors and officers of companies. Now that the general opinion on the increase in 
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director liability has been attained it is necessary to turn one‟s attention to the effects 
of the mitigating steps which have been taken; corporate governance and legislation.  
 
When asked whether or not the various corporate governance codes around the world, 
and especially those in South Africa, have contained director liability 90% of the 
interviewees answered „no‟. Those that did not answer „no‟ however did not claim 
that corporate governance codes have contained director liability, but that it has gone 
some way to provide a system of control. One would assume that everyone could 
agree with this point. The main problem found here was that the experts believed that 
corporate governance acts as a „double-edged sword‟. In other words, whilst it may 
provide for control and transparency which may decrease claims against directors, 
corporate governance also places many onerous duties and responsibilities on 
directors and officers of companies. As a result this may create more opportunities for 
a claim to arise. Corporate governance codes lead to increased controls and to a 
segregation of individual responsibility. Without these controls in place, the risk of a 
loss to the company does increase; for this reason corporate governance is a good 
means to protect investors. However individual responsibility does increase regarding 
directors and officers of corporations.  
 
Another main theme was the fact that corporate governance codes generally increase 
the awareness of the media and the public regarding directors‟ duties and 
responsibilities. This in-turn adds to the increasing director liability which was 
discussed above. Regarding the doctrinal issues, society and courts are generally more 
willing to hold directors accountable for a loss when their duties and responsibilities 
set out in codes of corporate governance. Even in South Africa, when the King Codes 
were published there was much media coverage, which in turn increased public 
awareness of director liability.  
 
On a final note, the experts agreed with the view of the dissertation that the fact that 
corporate failures have continued to occur, and that directors have been held 
accountable for many of these failures, in South Africa and abroad, shows that 
corporate governance codes have not necessarily contained director liability. In fact 
the most spectacular corporate collapses took place at the beginning of the 2000‟s, in 
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South Africa and elsewhere, by which time the majority of countries around the world 
had corporate governance codes in place.  
 
The next point of discussion is that of the second mitigating step; legislation and more 
precisely the new Companies Act. When asked if the new Act would result in 
decreasing claims against directors 100% of the interviewees responded „no‟. Various 
reasons and opinions were provided, however the general feeling was that the new 
Act will hold directors personally responsible for certain losses which accrue to a 
company‟s stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors and employees. The main 
cause of concern for the experts was that the degree of responsibility and participation 
by directors and officers will increase as a result of the new legislation. The new Act 
will reinforce existing law regarding breaches of directors‟ duties in South Africa.  
 
One of the general areas of distress among the interviewees was the fact that 
directors‟ duties towards the company are being codified into legislation. As was 
stated earlier in the dissertation, these duties were normally held in common law and 
have also been developed over hundreds of years as such. It would be practically 
impossible, and unforeseen dilemmas would certainly occur, to encapsulate all the 
common law duties of directors in one piece of legislation. Therefore the new Act 
states that the duties contained in the codification are in addition to, not a replacement 
of, the common law. This in itself may be a point of concern; is the Act itself not 
secure enough to stand on its own? The UK Companies Act has also codified the 
duties of directors; however the legislation has now replaced the common law 
position. Perhaps if the legislation cannot encompass the full extent of the duties owed 
by directors at common law it would be more advisable to make a statement of 
directors‟ duties in the form of corporate governance? If clarification on the issue is 
being sought by the legislators a statement of duties would satisfy this requirement. 
As it stands however, perhaps confusion might arise in the application of concurrent 
legislation and common law with respect to the same aspect. However that is for the 
courts ponder.  
 
In an article in Business Day on 01/09/2008, Michael Katz stated that the concerns 
that directors will be increasingly liable as a result of the codification are unfounded. 
A good point was made that the codified principles will have to be applied in 
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accordance with the established common law principles. It is hard to see how there 
would be any wayward application of deeply entrenched principles. Further, the 
article stated that a new defence is being introduced into South African law; that of 
the business judgment rule. As stated earlier in the dissertation it will be interesting to 
see if this new defence has any value in South African law, given the fact that its 
requirements for application already exist under common law.  
 
The above points are well-taken, however the interviews conducted showed that the 
insurance industry experts are concerned from another perspective. The fact is that 
when a rule is set in legislation it is easier for it to be applied than in common law. It 
is not the application that is a problem but the fact that it will also be easier to hold a 
director liable when duties are spelled out in legislation – even where a person would 
not have been liable for the loss previously. As was the case with the codes of 
corporate governance, this new legislation will also make the public more aware of 
the increased possibilities of holding corporate directors and officers liable for certain 
losses. One only has to think of the media attention that the Companies Bill has 
received thus far; that is yet prior to being passed into legislation.  
 
Just like the codes of practice, legislation may also act like a double-edged sword; 
whilst it provides increased protection for company stakeholders it also increases the 
instances where a director or officer may be held liable for losses. It is therefore 
unlikely that the new Act will actually decrease the number of claims against 
directors. In fact 100% of the interviewees stated that the new legislation will lead to 
increased exposure to claims for corporate directors and officers.  
 
There were also other areas of concern for the industry experts. The introduction of 
class actions into South African law, whilst fair, will no doubt lead to an increased 
number of claims against directors; this is under c157 of the Bill. Further, c218 (2) 
was also often stated as a reason why director liability may increase as a result of the 
new Act. As explicated earlier in the dissertation this is a civil remedy which states 
that if a person contravenes any section of the new act, and any person suffers a loss 
as a result of that contravention, the person who contravenes the Act will be held 
liable for the loss. This could lead to potential liability to an indeterminate plaintiff for 
an indeterminate amount; the experts concurred with this statement.  
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Another concern for the D&O experts was the way in which the new Act will define 
„knowledge‟. It was explained earlier in the dissertation that the Bill defines 
„knowledge‟ and its derivatives as either having actual knowledge or if one ought to 
reasonably have knowledge. The interviewees concurred with the dissertation in 
saying that this may not only leave a gap in insurance cover for directors and officers 
but that it will also lead to increased liability. This is due to the fact that every time a 
director reasonably ought to have had certain knowledge he/she will be deemed to 
actually have it. This means that in certain instances negligent behaviour may be 
considered as purposeful by the courts. In fact every time the word „knowledge‟ 
occurs in the new Act the abovementioned scenario could take place.  
 
A lesser area for concern was that of business rescue proceedings. The lack of interest 
in this area for the interviewees could be due to the fact that some had not yet been 
informed on this topic. However those that were involved in the legislation did 
express some interest. The cause of concern was as per the dissertation; the directors 
of a company under business rescue proceedings relinquish their main common law 
duties (the fiduciary duty and that of care and skill) and still have to carry out others – 
such as to make certain that the business of the company is not carried out in a 
fraudulent manner. This will certainly lead to confusion in court should a claim ever 
arise during this period of time. The business rescue practitioner will also take up the 
duties and responsibilities of the board of directors and the directors themselves will 
be required to carry out their functions in accordance with the requests of the 
practitioner. It will certainly be necessary for the practitioner to have D&O liability 
insurance in order to cover the many possible instances of liability that could arise out 
of such an onerous mandate.  
 
It is necessary to conclude this sub-section with two important points; firstly one must 
look at whether legislation can actually prevent corporate fraud and negligence. 
Secondly one must also consider the macroeconomic factors which will take place 
after the new Act is passed in South Africa. With regards to the first point one must 
keep in mind that errant directors and officers will always exist. This is in the same 
way that criminals have and will always exist regardless of what laws have been 
passed throughout history. It is difficult enough to attempt to control the incidence of 
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purposeful acts such as fraud; it is even harder to attempt to legislate against 
negligence. The truth of the matter is that if a human being is inclined to commit 
fraud this will happen no matter what legislation or code of practice is ever passed. 
Further, there will always be inattentive persons in the world of business therefore it 
will be impossible to legislate negligence away. Therefore it is unlikely that claims 
against directors will be contained by the second mitigating step of legislation.  
 
At the end of 2008 the financial crisis uncovered a massive fraud in the US – that of 
Bernard Madoff. Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ stock market, has been 
charged with securities fraud involving an expected $50 – billion loss to investors. In 
an article in Business Week on 12/12/2008 entitled “Credit crunch unmasks former 
NASDAQ chair” it was mentioned that Madoff‟s hedge fund was actually a Ponzi 
scheme.
233
 The Securities and Exchange Commission rapidly assigned a receiver to 
the fund in order to salvage any remaining assets; however it seemed to be too late. 
This fraud was discovered as a result of the fact that many investors started to 
withdraw their money from the fund in order to hold less risky cash during the time of 
the financial crisis. Eventually there were no more assets to be pulled out. The reason 
this is being mentioned is to illustrate once again that no amount of legislation can 
actually stop fraud and negligence. One must bear in mind that this corporate scandal 
was discovered at the end of 2008 – this is a long time since the passing of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the stricter Securities and Exchange Commission Standards, and 
the numerous corporate governance codes which have been passed since the early 
1990s. One must wonder where all the controls were when this particular fraud started 
to occur. It is thus difficult to expect the new South African Companies Act to bring 
the incidence of claims down. The financial crisis is creating losses in the most 
unexpected places – with a combination of the credit crunch and the new Act coming 
into play in South Africa, it is easy to understand why one may expect a slight 
increase in claims against directors.    
 
With regards to the second point, macroeconomic factors will play a key role in the 
number of claims against directors. The passing and application of the new South 
African Companies Act will coincide with other aspects of the economy which may 
                                                 
233
 A Ponzi scheme operates by utilising new investors‟ funds to pay off old investors.  
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also affect the number of claims against directors. The sub-prime crisis has already 
led to many corporate collapses such as Lehman Brothers. In the US many lawsuits 
have already taken place as a result of the financial crisis. Other aspects of the global 
economy will also play key roles such as increasing fuel and food prices, as well as 
retrenchments resultant from the necessity of cutbacks. There is also an expected 
upcoming hard-market in the D&O insurance sector. These issues are relevant due to 
the fact that it will be difficult after 2010 to tell what impact the new South African 
company legislation had on claims against directors as a result of other 
macroeconomic factors which will have their own impacts.  
 
In an article in Business Day on 23/12/2008 entitled “Executives „need to be alert to 
increased risk‟ in economic crisis” this same point was made. The circumstances in 
which the economic world finds itself as a result of the global financial crisis could 
lead to an increased risk of liability for company directors and officers. The increased 
possibility of company failures could lead to increased temptations to fabricate 
financial results and risk management practices must be put in place in order to ensure 
that all areas are covered. The risk of negligence could also increase as South African 
companies will start implementing new accounting standards named Generally 
Recognised Accounting Practice (GRAP) as from 2010. According to a Business Day 
article on 24/12/2008 the GRAP method will aspire to augment financial reporting, 
accountability and transparency. All these factors will have to be taken into account in 
the next few turbulent global financial years.  
 
It was generally the view of the industry experts that claims against directors will 
continue to increase whether it will be due to the macroeconomic factors or the new 
company legislation. Whether this will actually be the case is hard to predict. Many of 
the interviewees felt that the new act will lead to the proverbial floodgates opening 
and a sudden influx of claims will occur. Others thought that there will be one big 
claim which will be tested in court (with that occasion the right of a company to 
purchase insurance on behalf of its directors will also be confirmed, although the new 
Act has confirmed this) and this will lead to a number of other claims arising. 
Whatever the case will be one thing is for certain; the industry experts believe that the 
new Act will not contain the increasing director liability.  
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6.2.2 Effects on the insurance industry/policy wording 
 
This subsection is aimed at ascertaining what the effects of the new Companies Act 
will be on the D&O insurance industry as well as on D&O policy wordings. As an 
introduction, the first question that was asked was what is the most important factor 
considered when purchasing D&O insurance? The responses were generally classified 
into three separate components: premium cost, policy limits and breadth of cover. 
However the answer seems to lie in a combination of a number of different factors.  
 
It was generally thought that the most important factor considered by a potential 
insured is the price of the premium. After all if a company or individual director is 
unable to afford the premium, then insurance will not be purchased. However one 
must remember that premium cost, policy limits and breadth of cover are actually all 
linked; for an increase in premium one will be afforded increased limits of indemnity 
as well as greater scope of coverage.  
 
The answer further depends on the status of the client; what is the financial position, 
in what line of business is the client involved, what are the chances of litigation? It is 
important to note that one may attain more cover as well as increased scope of cover 
for a comparatively low increase in premium. This may then render the importance of 
premium cost as inconsequential for bigger companies.  
 
The potential insured will have to consider breadth of cover to a high extent 
depending on the line of business in which the client is involved. What exclusions and 
limitations are imposed, what extensions are offered? For the first time in South 
Africa D&O policies do actually differ between insurers; some policies may be much 
broader than others, therefore the breadth of cover becomes increasingly significant. 
A very good point was also made by two excellent brokers; the market may be more 
sensitive the breadth of cover. Increasing premium costs can easily be justified if the 
type of cover offered is significantly more important to the client than that offered by 
any competitors. The client may also be advised as to how much cover is purchased 
by companies which are of similar size in the same type of industry. That is generally 
a good indicator as to how much cover should be taken out.  
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A very notable underwriter summed up this question from a different perspective. 
When asked how much cover should be purchased the best answer should be: how 
much can the client afford? The cost of premium will become very trivial when a 
claim comes through and one has to deal with phenomenal defence costs over an 
extended period of time. The concern is not alleviated at that point as there will still 
be either settlement costs or the actual amount claimed by the aggrieved party. 
Neither of the three factors generally considered when purchasing D&O liability 
cover should be significant enough to actually lead to a scenario where a business in 
uninsured.  
 
When asked about the main reasons as to why D&O liability insurance is purchased 
the experts stated that director protection was most important. The reasons which 
were looked at in Chapter 5, such as to better the corporate governance procedures of 
companies were not as applicable in South Africa as they may be in the US. Up until 
now it is apparent that the most important motive for the purchase of D&O insurance 
was to protect directors when the company which they represent is unable to provide 
indemnification. The new Companies Act does allow for the indemnification of 
directors in certain instances, as well as for the purchase of D&O insurance in general. 
Another very important aspect is that of defence costs; this is especially relevant in 
South Africa due to the nature of the system of the courts. Litigation tends to take 
years to complete and legal fees are extremely high. In the event that a settlement is 
not reached the amount of money spent of defending a claim may be extraordinary. 
Unfortunately in South Africa there is a lack of documented claims examples and 
although claims are starting to arise more and more often, there are still not enough 
that go to court in order to provide examples. This makes it difficult to understand 
fully the most important reasons why D&O liability insurance in purchased in South 
Africa.  
 
With respect to the insurance industry the effects of the new Companies Act are 
interesting. Claims are expected to increase and therefore and therefore there is an 
expected increase in the cost of premiums. However it is not expected that this will 
occur straight after the passing of the new Act. It is rather anticipated that the industry 
will respond once the claims start occurring. Many of the experts stated that there may 
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be one big claim which will go to court and set the trend for the industry. Should this 
big claim ever eventuate the industry will respond accordingly. The question of what 
will happen to the pricing of D&O insurance is difficult as it also depends on capacity 
and competition. However it was generally thought that pricing could go up if claims 
increase, although the increase will not be too significant until the market settles down 
after the inception of the new Act.  
 
It is expected that the limits of indemnity will remain the same for the time being. 
This is at least until the effects of the new Act are actually discovered. However due 
to an expected hardening of the D&O market one may eventually see the limits of 
indemnity on D&O policies decrease. According to some brokers a current trend 
exists where clients are purchasing higher limits of indemnity; however this is 
probably due to the fact that there is a large capacity available and pricing remains 
competitive. Due to the highly publicised nature of the Companies Bill and the 
perception of many that director liability is widening companies may be more tempted 
to purchase higher limits. This may be especially true if directors put pressure on their 
companies to purchase higher limits in order to offer increased protection.  
 
When looking into the availability of D&O it was generally thought that it will not 
decrease as a result of the new Companies Act. Once again it was thought that the 
insurance industry will be reactive; should claims experience deteriorate drastically 
then the availability will reduce.  
 
Another aspect was that of potential changes in the competitive nature of the D&O 
insurance industry. The experts generally agreed that it is unlikely that competition 
will increase. This assumption was made for two reasons; firstly the market is highly 
competitive as it is. There are a number of D&O insurers in South Africa already and 
many of the brokers that were interviewed stated that if one does not find satisfactory 
cover in South Africa (which is unlikely), it is then possible to look abroad and 
purchase D&O insurance elsewhere. The second explanation for the belief that 
competition will not increase is that the D&O insurance market is expected to harden. 
During a hard market the number of new entrants is low to none. However a number 
of underwriters stated that some insurers/reinsurers may be tempted to enter the 
market when the rates do eventually improve.  
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Regarding policy wording, the experts tended to be divided on whether or not it will 
be broadened as a result of the new legislation. Many experts stated that the 
increasing director liability and expected increased in claims should lead to an 
expansion in cover. However others pointed out that South African D&O policies are 
generally a hybrid of those overseas; specifically in the US and the UK. These 
policies are already tailored for high levels of litigation and should be able to 
withstand any impacts of the new Companies Act. Some of the participants stated that 
insurers may try to differentiate their policy wordings. Therefore one may see certain 
new exclusions and extensions, however no examples were provided. It was generally 
agreed by all the experts that there will be no significant changes to policy wordings 
or to the operative clause.  
 
It was mentioned by a notable broker as well as a few underwriters that there will be 
an expected change to Side B of the D&O policy. This change will be with regards to 
the zero deductible which is currently in place on all D&O policies issued in South 
Africa. The zero deductible has been in place due to the fact that s247 of the South 
African Companies Act does not allow for the indemnification of directors by a 
company. Therefore with very little anticipated claims against Side B the deductible 
was set at zero. There were some that were of the belief that the deductible should 
have been kept in place in the event that the company legislation ever changes. This is 
now the case, as the Companies Bill allows for the indemnification of directors by a 
company. Insurers will now as a result have to explain to clients why a new 
deductible must be put in place. This should be noted by all D&O underwriters who 
will have to make this change to their policies.   
 
When asked about the capacity to underwrite D&O insurance it was agreed that there 
should be no significant changes. Even if claims increase to an unexpected extent as a 
result of the new Companies Act most of the South African policies are reinsured 
internationally. Unless capacity decreases globally due to macroeconomic factors, 
there should be no significant changes in underwriting capacity as a result of the new 
Act.  
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Once again it is important to draw a parallel between the effects of the new company 
legislation and that of macroeconomic factors. The experts were very adamant to 
point out, and rightly so, that much of the effects on the D&O insurance industry will 
occur due to outside variables. As mentioned above, if the international underwriting 
capacity decreases, it will impact the South African market. The credit crunch will 
have many unforeseen consequences which have been felt from the late half of 2008. 
The recessionary conditions will lead to increased areas and severity of risk for 
directors and officers worldwide.  
 
One broker that was interviewed mentioned the events of 2008 which occurred at 
AIG. It was stated that two possible outcomes may result; firstly AIG may reduce 
renewal premiums in order to retain business, this would lead to a reduction of 
premiums in the market as other insurance underwriters attempt to remain 
competitive. The second scenario is that premiums could increase in order to render 
reserves capable to deal with the unavoidable increase in claims, which will result due 
to the global financial crisis. In the same manner the global financial crisis could 
influence the D&O market in a number of ways which are all unpredictable.  
 
In an article in Business Day on 06/09/2009 a legal expert from Werksmans Attorneys 
stated that the tough economic times would lead to a great increase in corporate fraud. 
It was stated that company and close corporation liquidations rose by 17.6% in July 
2008. The expert was confident that the new South African Companies Act would go 
a long way to improve this situation by means of the business rescue option; this still 
remains to be seen. One may be certain that the macroeconomic factors will play an 
important role in the number of claims against corporate directors and officer, which 
may in-turn have consequences on the D&O insurance industry as well as the policy 
itself. Whilst and explanation of the effects of the recession on the D&O insurance 
market is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is still extremely important that it is 
mentioned. This is due to the fact that these effects will coincide with those of the 
new Companies Act. In fact all the interviewees at some stage or another tended to 
veer away from the topic of the Companies Bill and mention the possible effects of 
the global liquidity and credit crisis on the D&O insurance market.  
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6.2.3 Effects on directors 
 
This subsection is aimed at discussing some of the possible effects of the new 
Companies Act on directors themselves. It seemed appropriate to commence by 
asking whether or not directors would still be prepared to take up office as such in the 
event that D&O cover was not available. Of the interviewees a reasonably high 
number, in fact nearly 65%, stated that directors would not be prepared to take up 
office if no protection was available. However the question seemed to be phrased in 
an unfavourable manner; the experts rather preferred to talk about whether a person is 
more likely to decline a position as such. When the question is phrased in that fashion 
100% of the interviewees said that a person is more likely to decline a position on the 
board of directors of a company if no D&O cover is available. The basic premise here 
is that the higher the amount of remuneration offered the higher are the chances that a 
person will eventually take up office. In other words if one waves a carrot around for 
long enough, someone is bound to eventually accept it. This question should be noted 
as it shows the level of importance that this line of insurance has accumulated. This 
goes hand-in-hand with the fact that the exposure level of directors to claims has 
increased. As it was stated earlier by an expert, directors may be very scared to take 
up positions on boards of companies once the new Act has been passed. If no D&O 
cover was available, the likelihood of acquiring very experienced directors to serve on 
company boards would become minimal.  
 
The question was raised as to whether the codification of directors‟ duties in the new 
Companies Act would be beneficial to directors. The interview responses were 
extremely varied; whilst most of the experts said that the codification would be 
beneficial in some way or another many still remained sceptical. These were some of 
the more prevalent reasons that the interviewees proposed would benefit directors:  
 
- Directors will have a better understanding of what their duties are; 
- New directors will take comfort in the fact that other board members are 
required to abide by certain standards, which will lead to a less likelihood of a 
claim against the board; 
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- Directors will be better equipped to defend themselves against claims as their 
duties will now be codified in legislation 
- A general and more accessible understanding will be created for everyone by 
the codification, which would surely be to the benefit of directors. 
 
Having stated these possible benefits most experts were concerned about the double-
edged sword that has been mentioned prior to this sub-section. The point once again is 
that the codification will also be beneficial to potential claimants. The media attention 
attached to the codification has made many aware of the increasing possibility of 
holding directors liable. A codification often understandably concerns legal experts 
and insurers due to the fact that once certain standards are written down in an Act it is 
much easier to hold one accountable. In any event directors would have had access to 
legal assistance in order to defend a claim; therefore this new codification which will 
keep the director informed may not be so useful after all. The other point made was 
that directors accepting a position on the board of a company will generally be well 
aware of what their duties and legal consequences of not carrying out those duties are. 
The general consensus was that a statement of directors‟ duties would have sufficed in 
order to keep all parties well informed. However the fact that it will be legislated may 
end up being unfavourable to directors and officers of companies.  
 
The experts were then asked whether or not they believe that as a result of the new 
company legislation it will be more difficult to recruit directors (especially non-
executive) to serve on company boards. The general answer was that it would be more 
difficult and as per the acceptance of office question one must note that this does not 
mean that no one will be willing to serve anymore. It will mean that perhaps directors 
will require more D&O cover and more transparency from the rest of the board in 
order to ensure that their personal assets are protected.  
 
A few of the interviewees, especially the brokers and legal experts, stated their 
concerns regarding the reputational costs which are incurred by directors when a 
claim is made against them. This is one aspect which is obviously not covered by the 
D&O liability policy but can however cause an indeterminate loss to any director. 
This is the case even when the director is eventually proven to be innocent. The legal 
system is often very slow and a case could take many years to conclude – whilst the 
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time is passing the director and the respective company will be receiving much media 
attention, which will have a negative impact in the public eye. The increase in 
possible litigation which the new Companies Act will bring will only serve to increase 
these reputation costs which are extremely difficult to mitigate against. An article in 
the Business Day entitled “Bad blogs easily trash corporate reputations” on 
12/01/2009 explained that it is becoming extremely difficult for companies to 
safeguard their corporate reputations. This is due to the fact that persons can easily 
spread dissatisfactions to a large number of people via various websites. Even once 
the problem is taken care of the information will remain on the internet and will be 
accessible by a large amount of people. The article was primarily referring to 
disillusioned consumers however this could easily be applied to company directors 
who have an increased concern of liability.  
 
Finally the experts were asked whether or not they believe it necessary that directors 
should be educated regarding the new Companies Act. There was a 100% „yes‟ 
response to this question which is completely understandable due to the focus which 
the current Bill has on directors. It was generally thought that much of these courses 
should be taken through the South African Institute of Directors (IOD). However it 
will be the responsibility of all companies to ensure that their board members are 
educated regarding the new legislation as part of the company‟s risk management 
programme. The majority of the underwriters that were interviewed noted that it will 
be up to each company to make certain that the new Act is understood and abided by 
all its directors and employees. This will be in order to prevent any surprise claims 
which may arise as a result of the passing of the new legislation. It is advised that 
companies seek legal advice well before the new Act is passed in 2010 in order to 
make the necessary changes and preparations. This is in order to avoid making 
changes with haste once the Act is already in place.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
In order to test and substantiate the conclusions reached by the dissertation two 
separate studies were conducted. One was a Delphi Technique study; here 30 industry 
experts were required to answer 24 questions. The population covers for all practical 
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purposes the entire market – this is due to the fact that virtually all existing experts on 
directors and officers insurance in South Africa were involved. The results were then 
handed back to the participants for review. Once the review process was completed 
the participants answered the questionnaire for a second time. This is done in order to 
align the experts‟ opinions on the matter as closely as possible. It was unnecessary to 
perform the questionnaire for a third time since there were no significant alterations 
between the first and second round.  
 
The second study consisted of separate face-to-face interviews with 20 industry 
experts. The experts were asked questions regarding the subject matter of the 
dissertation and discussions were held. Whilst the second study is less scientific than 
the first, it does help make the conclusions reached more robust. This is due to the fact 
that one may get an insight into the reasoning behind the experts‟ beliefs with regards 
to the subject matter of the dissertation.  
 
The studies were successful in that the same conclusions were reached that were 
provided in the dissertation; director liability has increased as a result of doctrinal and 
complexity issues. The two mitigating steps which have been taken in order to contain 
claims against directors are not expected to succeed in doing so. It is probable that the 
second mitigating step, that of legislation – more specifically the new Companies Act 
– will not decrease director liability and therefore claims against directors. In fact it is 
possible that claims against directors could increase as a result of the passing of the 
South African Companies Bill into law.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
An assessment was done into the anticipated impacts of codes of corporate 
governance and legislation on Directors and Officers liability insurance in South 
Africa. More specifically, the impact of the new South African Companies Act, which 
is due to be passed in 2010 was considered.  
 
The question was whether director liability has been increasing as a result of doctrinal 
(courts and society being more willing to hold directors accountable) and complexity 
(the complex modern economic environment making it easier for directors to be held 
accountable) issues. The increase in liability goes hand-in-hand with an increase in 
claims against directors. Next an assessment was made of two mitigating steps which 
have been utilised in an attempt to contain director liability. The mitigating steps are 
codes of corporate governance and legislation (the new Companies Act).  
 
The conclusions reached by the dissertation were then tested by means of two 
separate studies. One was a Delphi Technique study in which thirty D&O insurance 
industry experts participated. The experts covered the entire professional industry in 
South Africa. The second was a face-to-face interview system in which twenty D&O 
insurance industry experts took part. This is a robust combination due to the fact that 
the first is scientific, whilst the second provides reasoning with regards to the thinking 
process of the experts involved.  
 
It was found that the conclusions reached by the dissertation were supported by the 
two studies. Director liability and claims against directors has been increasing as a 
result of doctrinal and complexity issues. The two mitigating steps of codes of 
corporate governance and legislation are not expected to contain director liability; in 
fact the new Companies Act may actually lead to an increase in claims against 
directors.  
  
 298 
 
Appendices 
Table 1: List of worldwide corporate governance codes 
Appendix 1 – Table 1: List of worldwide corporate governance codes 
 
Country Corporate governance 
code 
Date 
Argentina  Codigo de Mejores 
Practicas de Cobierno de 
las Organizaciones para la 
Republica Argentina 
2004 
Australia Revised corporate 
Governance Principles and 
Recommendations 
2007 
Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice 
Recommendations 
2003 
Corporate governance: A 
Guide for Fund Managers 
and Corporations 
2002 
Horwath 2002 Corporate 
Governance Report 
2002 
Corporate Governance: A 
Guide for Investment 
Managers and 
Corporations 
1999 
Corporate Governance – 
Volume 1: in Principle  
1997 
Corporate Governance – 
Volume 2: in Practice 
1997 
Corporate Governance: A 
Guide for Investment 
Managers & A Statement 
of Recommended 
Corporate Practice  
1995 
Bosch Report 1995 
Austria Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance 
2007 
 Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance 
2006 
 Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance 
2005 
 Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance 
2002 
Bangladesh The Code of Corporate 2004 
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Governance for 
Bangladesh  
Belgium Buysse Code: Corporate 
Governance 
Recommendations for 
Non-Listed Enterprises 
2005 
Lippens Code: The 
Belgian Code on 
Corporate Governance 
2004 
Director‟s Charter 2000 
Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance Reporting 
1999 
Cardon Report – Corporate 
Governance for Belgian 
Listed Companies 
1998 
Corporate Governance 1998 
Brazil Code of best Practice of 
Corporate Governance 
2004 
CVM Recommendations 
on Corporate Governance 
2002 
Panorama De Governanca 
Corporativa No Brasil  
2001 
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Code 
for Corporate Governance 
2007 
Canada TSX Guide to Good 
Disclosure  
2006 
Corporate Governance: A 
Guide to Good Disclosure 
2003 
Beyond Compliance: 
Building a Governance 
Culture  
2001 
Five Years to  the Dey: 
Report on Corporate 
Governance 
1999 
Building on Strength: 
Improving Governance 
and Accountability in 
Canada‟s Voluntary Sector   
1999 
Guidelines for Improved 
Corporate Governance 
1994 
China Provisional Code of 
Corporate Governance for 
Securities Companies  
2004 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed 
Companies in China 
2001 
Cyprus Corporate Governance 
Code 
2006 
Addendum for Corporate 2003 
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Governance Code which 
was introduced in 
September, 2002 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
2002 
Czech Republic Corporate Governance 
Code Based on the OECD 
Principles (2004) 
2004 
Revised Corporate 
Governance Code Based 
on the OECD Principles  
2001 
Denmark Committee on Corporate 
Governance‟s 
Recommendations for 
corporate governance of 
August 15, 
2005, section VI revised 
by February 6, 2008 
2008 
Revised Recommendations 
for Corporate Governance 
in Denmark  
2005 
 
Report on Corporate 
Governance in Denmark 
2003 
Corporate Governance in 
Denmark - 
recommendations for good 
corporate 
governance in Denmark 
Second part in 
The Nørby Committee‟s 
report 
2001 
Guidelines on Good 
Management of a Listed 
Company (Corporate 
Governance)  
2000 
Estonia Corporate Governance 
Recommendations 
2005 
Finland Improving corporate 
Governance of Unlisted 
Companies   
2006 
Corporate Governance 
Recommendations for 
2003 
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Listed Companies  
France Recommandations Sur Le 
Gouvernement 
D‟Entreprise  
2004 
The Corporate Governance 
of Listed Companies  
2003 
Bouton Report: Promoting 
Better Corporate 
Governance in Listed 
Companies  
2002 
Vienot 2 Report 1999 
Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance  
1998 
Vienot 1 Report 1995 
Germany German Corporate 
Governance Code – 
Amended 2007  
2007 
Cromme Code: 
Governance Code – 
Amended 2006 
2006 
Cromme Code: 
Governance Code – 
Amended 2005 
2005 
Corporate Governance 
Code for Asset 
Management Companies 
2005 
Cromme Code: 
Governance Code – 
Amended 2003 
2003 
Cromme Code: German 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
2002 
Baums Commission 
Report 
2001 
German Code of Corporate 
Governance 
2000 
Corporate Governance 
Rules for Quoted German 
Companies  
2000 
DSW Guidelines 1998 
Gesetz zur Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich 
1998 
Greece Principles of Corporate 
Governance 
2002 
Principles on Corporate 
Governance in Greece: 
Recommendations on its 
Competitive 
1999 
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Transformation  
Hong Kong  Code on Corporate 
Governance Practices and 
Corporate Governance 
Report 
2004 
Model Code for Securities 
Transactions by Directors 
of Listed Companies   
2001 
Corporate Governance 
Disclosure in Annual 
Reports 
2001 
Code of Best Practice  1999 
Hungary Corporate Governance 
Recommendations  
2007 
Corporate Governance 
Recommendations  
2002 
Iceland Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance 2
nd
 Edition  
2005 
Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance 
2004 
India Report of the Kumar 
Mangalam Birla 
Committee on Corporate 
Governance  
2002 
Desirable Corporate 
Governance – A Code  
1998 
Indonesia  Indonesia‟s Code of 
Corporate Governance  
2006 
Indonesian code for Good 
Corporate Governance 
2001 
Code for Good Corporate 
Governance  
2000 
Ireland  Corporate Governance, 
Share Option and other 
Incentive Scheme 
Guidelines  
1999 
Italy Supervisory Provisions 
Concerning Banks‟ 
Organisation and 
Corporate Governance  
2008 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
2006 
Handbook on Corporate 
Governance Reports 
2004 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
2002 
Report: Code of Conduct 1999 
Legislative Decree 58 of 
24 February 1998 – 
1998 
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Consolidated law on 
financial intermediation 
pursuant to Articles 8 and 
21 of Law 52 of 6 
February 1996 
Jamaica Code on corporate 
Governance 
2006 
Japan Principles of Corporate 
Governance for Listed 
Companies  
2004 
Revised Corporate 
Governance Principles 
2001 
Report of the Pension 
Fund Corporate 
Governance Research 
Committee: Action 
Guidelines for Exercising 
Votes  
1998 
Corporate Governance 
Principles: a Japanese 
View 
1997 
Urgent Recommendations 
Concerning Corporate 
Governance 
1997 
Kenya Principles of Corporate 
Governance in Kenya and 
a Sample Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
2002 
Sample Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance in Kenya  
2002 
Latvia Corporate Governance 
Principles and 
Recommendations on their 
Implementation 
2005 
Lebanon The Lebanese Code of 
Corporate Governance  
2006 
Lithuania The Corporate Governance 
Code for the Companies 
Listed on the National 
Stock Exchange of 
Lithuania  
2004 
Luxembourg Corporate Governance: 
The Ten Principles of 
Corporate Governance of 
the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange   
2006 
Macedonia Corporate Governance 
Code for Companies 
2006 
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Listed on the Macedonian 
Stock Exchange 
Malaysia  Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance  
2007 
Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 
2000 
Malta Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance: 
Revised Code for Issuers 
of Listed Companies 
2005 
Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance for 
Public Interest Companies  
2005 
The Code of Principles of 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
2001 
Mexico Corporate Governance 
Code for Mexico 
1999 
Morocco  Moroccan Code of Good 
Corporate Governance 
Practices  
2008 
New Zealand Corporate Governance in 
New Zealand, Principles 
and Guidelines: A 
Handbook for Directors, 
Executives, and Advisors  
2004 
Corporate Governance in 
New Zealand, Principles 
and Guidelines 
2004 
Corporate Governance 
Principles  
2003 
Nigeria Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks in 
Nigeria Post Consolidation  
2006 
Norway The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance  
2007 
The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
2006 
The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
2005 
The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
2004 
Pakistan Code of Corporate 
Governance 
2002 
Peru  Principles of Good 2002 
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Governance for Peruvian 
Companies   
Peru: Codigo de Buen 
Gobierno Corporativo Para 
Empresas Emisoras de 
Valores  
2001 
Poland Code of Best Practice for 
WSE Listed Companies 
2007 
Best Practices in Public 
Companies 2005 
2005 
Best Practices in Public 
Companies 2002 
2002 
Gdansk Code: The 
Corporate Governance 
Code for Polish Listed 
Companies  
2002 
Portugal  Corporate Governance 
Code and Legal 
Framework Consolidation 
2007 
White Book on Corporate 
Governance in Portugal 
2006 
Code of Commercial 
Companies 
2005 
Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance   
2003 
CMVM Regulation No. 
11/2003 
2003 
CMVM Regulation No. 
07/2001 
2001 
Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance 
1999 
Romania  Corporate Governance 
Code: Corporate 
Governance Initiative for 
Economic Democracy in 
Romania  
2000 
Russia Russian Code of Corporate 
Conduct 
2002 
Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance 
2005 
Code of Corporate 
Governance  
2001 
Slovakia Corporate Governance 
Code – Based on the 
OECD Principles 
2002 
Slovenia Ljubljana Corporate 
Governance Code  
2007 
Ljubljana Corporate 
Governance Code 
2005 
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Ljubljana Corporate 
Governance Code 
2004 
South Africa  The King Report on 
Corporate Governance 
(King 1) 
1994 
The King Report on 
Corporate Governance 
(King 2) 
2002 
South Korea  Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance 
1999 
Spain Corporate Governance 
Unified Code 
2006 
Code of Ethics for 
Companies 
2006 
IC-A: Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance – 
Code of Good Practice for 
Boards and Directors    
2005 
Decalogo Del Directivo  2004 
Aldama Report: Report by 
the Special Commission to 
Foster Transparency and 
Security in the Markets 
and in Listed Companies   
2003 
Codigo de Buen Gobierno 
– The Governance of 
Listed Companies   
1998 
Una Propuesta de Normas 
Para Un Mejor 
Funcionamiento de Los 
Consejos de 
Administracion  
1996 
Sri Lanka  Dreft Rules on Corporate 
Governance for Listed 
Companies  
2006 
Guidelines Relating  to 
Audit and Audit 
Committees  
2004 
Code of Best Practice on 
Corporate Governance  
2003 
Code of Best Practice on 
Audit Committees  
2002 
Code of Best Practice – 
Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance  
1997  
Sweden Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance  
2005 
Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance – 
2004 
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Report of the Code Group  
Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance – A 
Proposal of the Code 
Group 
2004 
Naringslivets 
Borskommitte 
Recommendations  
2003 
Corporate Governance 
Policy – The Swedish 
Shareholders‟ Association   
2001 
Switzerland  Corporate Governance 
Directive – Information 
Relating to Corporate 
Governance  
2007 
Governance in Family 
Firms  
2006 
Swiss Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance  
2002 
Corporate Governance 
Directive – Information 
Relating to Corporate 
Governance 
2002 
Taiwan  Taiwan Corporate 
Governance Best Practice 
Principles  
2002 
Thailand The Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies   
2006 
Code of Best Practice for 
Directors of Listed 
Companies  
1999 
Best Practice Guidelines 
for Audit Committees  
1999 
A SET Code of Best 
Practice for Directors of 
Listed Companies  
 
The Netherlands  SCGOP: Manual for 
Corporate Governance  
2004 
Tabaksblat Code: 
Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Provisions  
2003 
SCGOP: Corporate 
Governance Handbook  
2001 
Government Governance: 
Corporate Governance in 
the Public Sector, Why 
2000 
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and How?  
Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance in 
the Netherlands: 
Recommendations for 
Sound Management, 
Effective Supervision and 
Accountability  
1997 
The Philippines  ICD Code of Proper 
Practices for Directors  
2000 
Trinidad and Tobago  Corporate Governance 
Guideline 
2006 
Turkey  Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey: Corporate 
Governance Principles  
2003 
Ukraine  Ukrainian Corporate 
Governance Principles  
2003 
United Kingdom Guidelines for Disclosure 
and Transparency in 
Private Equity  
2007 
The Combines Code on 
Corporate Governance 
2006 
Good Practice Suggestions 
from the Higgs Report 
2006 
Internal Control: Revised 
Guidance for Directors on 
the Combined Code 
2005 
Corporate Governance in 
Central Government 
Departments: Code of 
Good Practice  
2005 
Pension Scheme 
Governance – Fit for the 
21
st
 Century (NAPF) 
2005 
Good Governance: A Code 
for the Voluntary and 
Community Sector 
2005 
Corporate Governance: A 
Practical Guide  
2004 
The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance  
2003 
Smith Report: Audit 
Committees – Combined 
Code Guidance  
2003 
Higgs Report: Review of 
the Role and Effectiveness 
of Non-Executive 
Directors  
2003 
The Responsibilities of 2002 
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Institutional Shareholders 
and Agents – Statement of 
Principles   
The Hermes Principles  2003 
 Code of Good Practice: 
Institutional Investors and 
Corporate Governance  
2001 
The Combined Code: 
Principles of Good 
Governance and Code of 
Best Practice  
2000 
Hermes‟ Code of Conduct: 
International Corporate 
Governance Principles  
1999 
The KPMG Review –   
Internal Control: A 
Practical Guide   
1999 
Turnbull Report – Internal 
Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined 
Code  
1999 
Hampel Report  1998 
Greenbury Report – Study 
Group on Director‟s 
Remuneration  
1995 
Cadbury Report – The 
Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance  
1992 
United States  TIAA-CREF: Policy 
Statement on Corporate 
Governance  
2007 
Asset Manager Code of 
Professional Conduct  
2004 
Final NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules  
2003 
Restoring Trust – The 
Breeden Report on 
Corporate Governance  
2003 
The Conference Board 
Commission on Public 
Trust and Private 
Enterprise – Findings and 
Recommendations  
2003 
The Business Roundtable 
– Principles of Corporate 
Governance  
2002 
Council of Institutional 
Investors – Corporate 
Governance Policies  
2002 
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Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations  
2002 
Report of the NACD Blue 
Ribbon Commission on 
Director Professionalism  
2001 
CalPERS – Global 
Corporate Governance 
Principles  
1999 
The Business Roundtable 
– Statement on Corporate 
Governance  
1997 
Source: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php  
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Appendix 2 – Table 2: South African legislation relevant to company directors 
Table 2: South African legislation relevant to company directors 
 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive; this is due to the fact that new legislation is 
enacted frequently and that courts may find that directors possess duties, or may be 
held liable under statutes which are already in operation but do not currently apply to 
directors. Some legislation may apply only explicitly to certain companies, whilst 
others apply to all companies operating in South Africa. It is also important to 
highlight the fact that only South African legislation which affects directors is listed 
here; however South African directors may be affected by legislation from abroad. 
This depends on whether the company in question undertakes business ventures in 
other countries, or in the event that legislation from overseas has a far reaching effect, 
as is the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The list is meant to supplement and update 
other such lists already created such as that in Mammatt et al (2004).  
 
Scope Legislation 
Constitutional Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa No. 108 of 1996 
Commercial Business Names Act No. 27 of 1960  
Close Corporations Act No. 69 of 1984 
(Potentially repelled by the Companies 
Bill if passed into legislation)  
Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 (Repelled 
by the Companies Bill if passed into 
legislation) 
Harmful Business Practices Act No. 71 of 
1988 as amended by Harmful Business 
Practices Amendment Act No. 23 of 1999 
Environmental  Environment Conservation Act No. 73 of 
1989 as amended by Environmental 
Conservation Amendment Act No. 50 of 
2003 
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Hazardous Substances Act No. 15 of 
1973 
Marine Pollution (Control and Civil 
Liability) Act No. 6 of 1981 previously 
named Prevention and Combating of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act No. 67 of 
1971 
National Environmental Management Act 
No. 107 of 1998 
Occupational Health and Safety Act No. 
85 of 1993 
Financial  Banks Act No. 94 0f 1990 as amended by 
Banks Amendment Act No. 36 of 2000  
Bills of Exchange Act No. 34 of 1964 as 
amended by Bills of Exchange 
Amendment Act No. 56 of 2000 
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 as 
amended by Competition Second 
Amendment Act No. 39 of 2000  
Currency and Exchanges Act No. 9 of 
1933 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practice) Act No 71 of 1998 to be 
repelled by Consumer Protection Act 
(due to be passed) 
Customs and Excise Act No. 91 of 1964 
as amended by Customs and Excise 
Amendment Act 19 of 1994  
Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act No. 37 of 2002 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 
of 2001 as amended by Financial 
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act No. 
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11 of 2008 
Immovable Property (Removal or 
Modification of Restrictions) Act No. 94 
of 1965 
Import and Export Control Act No. 30 of 
1994 
Income Tax Act No. 28 of 1997  
Insider Trading Act No. 135 of 1998 
Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936 as 
amended by Insolvency Second 
Amendment Act No. 69 of 2002 
Marketable Securities Tax Act No. 32 of 
1948 
National Credit Act No. 34 of 2005 
National Small Business Act No. 102 of 
1996 as amended by National Small 
Business Amendment Act No. 26 of 2003   
Protection of Businesses Act No. 99 of 
1978 
Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 
1999 
Regional Services Councils Act No. 109 
of 1985  
Skills Development Act No. 97 of 1998 
South African Reserve Bank Act No. 90 
of 1989 
Stamp Duties Act No. 77 of 1968 
 Transfer Duty Act No. 40 of 1949 
Unemployment Insurance Act No. 63 of 
2001 
Usury Act No. 73 of 1968 as amended by 
Usury Amendment Act No. 10 of 2003 
Value-Added Tax Act No. 89 of 1991 
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Intellectual Property Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 as 
amended by Copyright Amendment Act 
No. 9 of 2002  
Designs Act No. 195 of 1993 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment 
Act No. 38 of 1997 
Merchandise Marks Act No. 17 of 1941 
as amended by Merchandise Amendment 
Act No. 61 of 2002 
Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 as amended 
by Patents Amendment Act No. 58 of 
2002 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 
No. 2 of 2000 as amended by Promotion 
of Access to Information Amendment 
Act No. 54 of 2002 
Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 
Labour Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 
3 of 1983 as amended by Basic 
Conditions of Employment Amendment 
Act No. 11 of 2002 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act No. 130 of 1993 as 
amended by Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Amendment Act No. 61 of 1997 
Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998  
Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995  
Skills Development Act No. 97 of 1998  
Pensions General Pensions Act No. 29 of 1979 
Pension Funds Act No. 24 of 1956 as 
amended by Pension Funds Amendment 
Act No. 65 of 2001  
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Appendix 3 – Table 3: Delphi Technique Results 
Table 3: Delphi Technique Results 
 
Labels (Answers): 
1 = Highly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral  
4 = Disagree 
5 = Highly Disagree   
 
Results: 
 
Questionnaire Round 1: 
 
Question 
 
Mean  
  
  
Percentages   
  
Highest 
Percentage 
Agree Neutral Disagree Answer % 
Q1  1.666667  100.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2 66.67% 
Q2  1.7  96.67% 3.33% 0.00%  2 63.33% 
Q3  3.9  3.33% 20.00% 76.67%  4 60.00% 
Q4  4.433333  3.33% 0.00% 96.67%  5 50.00% 
Q5  3.8  3.33% 20.00% 76.67%  4 66.67% 
Q6  1.833333  90.00% 6.67% 3.33%  2 60.00% 
Q7  2.233333  83.33% 0.00% 16.67%  2 73.33% 
Q8  1.966667  90.00% 6.67% 3.33%  2 73.33% 
Q9  3.133333  33.33% 20.00% 46.67%  4 46.67% 
Q10  1.666667  96.67% 0.00% 3.33%  2 56.67% 
Q11  2.6  63.33% 10.00% 26.67%  2 56.67% 
Q12  2.8  56.67% 6.67% 36.67%  2 53.33% 
Q13  1.5  93.33% 6.67% 0.00%  1 56.67% 
Q14  3.4  33.33% 3.33% 63.33%  4 53.33% 
Q15  2  86.67% 3.33% 10.00%  2 63.33% 
Q16  2.433333  70.00% 16.67% 13.33%  2 66.67% 
Q17  2.033333  86.67% 10.00% 3.33%  2 73.33% 
Q18  2.7  56.67% 13.33% 30.00%  2 53.33% 
Q19  2.233333  76.67% 16.67% 6.67%  2 70.00% 
Q20a  1.6  96.67% 3.33% 0.00%  2 53.33% 
Q20b  2.033333  90.00% 6.67% 3.33%  2 80.00% 
Q20c  2.033333  86.67% 3.33% 10.00%  2 66.67% 
Q21  2.133333  83.33% 3.33% 13.33%  2 66.67% 
Q22  1.9  86.67% 6.67% 6.67%  2 56.67% 
Q23  2.7  46.67% 33.33% 20.00%  2 43.33% 
Q24  2.033333  83.33% 6.67% 10.00%  2 60.00% 
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Questionnaire Round 2: 
 
Question 
 
Mean  
  
  
Percentages   
  
Highest 
Percentage 
Agree Neutral Disagree Answer % 
Q1  1.666667  100.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2 66.67% 
Q2  1.666667  100.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2 66.67% 
Q3  3.966667  6.67% 6.67% 86.67%  4 70.00% 
Q4  4.433333  3.33% 0.00% 96.67%  5 50.00% 
Q5  3.966667  3.33% 3.33% 93.33%  4 83.33% 
Q6  1.766667  96.67% 0.00% 3.33%  2 66.67% 
Q7  2.233333  83.33% 0.00% 16.67%  2 73.33% 
Q8  1.9  96.67% 0.00% 3.33%  2 80.00% 
Q9  3.166667  40.00% 3.33% 56.67%  4 56.67% 
Q10  1.666667  96.67% 0.00% 3.33%  2 56.67% 
Q11  2.533333  70.00% 3.33% 26.67%  2 63.33% 
Q12  2.733333  63.33% 0.00% 36.67%  2 60.00% 
Q13  1.433333  100.00% 0.00% 0.00%  1 56.67% 
Q14  3.433333  33.33% 0.00% 66.67%  4 56.67% 
Q15  1.966667  90.00% 0.00% 10.00%  2 66.67% 
Q16  2.3  83.33% 3.33% 13.33%  2 80.00% 
Q17  1.966667  93.33% 3.33% 3.33%  2 80.00% 
Q18  2.633333  66.67% 0.00% 33.33%  2 63.33% 
Q19  2.233333  83.33% 3.33% 13.33%  2 76.67% 
Q20a  1.533333  100.00% 0.00% 0.00%  2 53.33% 
Q20b  1.966667  96.67% 0.00% 3.33%  2 86.67% 
Q20c  2  90.00% 0.00% 10.00%  2 70.00% 
Q21  2.1  86.67% 0.00% 13.33%  2 70.00% 
Q22  1.866667  90.00% 3.33% 6.67%  2 60.00% 
Q23  2.866667  50.00% 10.00% 40.00%  2 46.67% 
Q24  2.033333  83.33% 6.67% 10.00%  2 60.00% 
 
 
 
Descriptions:  
 
- Green block represents significance of > 50%.  
- „Mean‟ refers to the average answer selected; a mean of „1.5‟ indicates that the 
average answer lies halfway between „1‟ and „2‟.   
- „Percentages‟ refers to the percent of selected answers under „Agree‟, 
„Neutral‟ and „Disagree‟.  
- „Highest Percentage‟ refers to the answer which was selected mostly per 
question, as well as the percentage of selection of that answer.    
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Appendix 4 – List of Industry Experts Whom Participated in the Studies 
 
List 1: List of Industry Experts Whom Participated in the Studies 
 
Bhana, Zaid – Swiss Re 
Blain, Michael – Centriq 
Coleman, Simon – Camargue Underwriting Managers  
De Pinchart, Geoffrey – Camargue Underwriting Managers 
De Smidt, Peter – Infinity  
Dixon, Tony – Corporate Governance Accreditation  
Dobson, Bill – Standard Bank Insurance Brokers 
Downham, Peter – Camargue Underwriting Managers  
Duff, Roddy – Lloyd‟s  
Engelbrecht, Lindie – Institute of Directors South Africa  
Goldie, Warwick – Etana Insurance Company Limited  
Hart, Michael – Deneys Reitz  
Jack, Angela – Alexander Forbes 
Jordan, Tamsin – Alexander Forbes  
King, Mervyn – King Committee on Corporate Governance  
Le Roux, Martin - Centriq 
Lewis, Jonathan – Governance Integrity Solutions (UK) 
Marescia, Mitch – Camargue Underwriting Managers  
Matthews, Charles – Eton Group 
Mullins, Ana – Phoenix Underwriting Managers 
Pearson, Rod – Glenrand MIB 
Schutte, Nick – Glenrand MIB 
Seccombe, William – Willis  
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